Access National Security News HERE.
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National Security News Content:
1. China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war
2. China’s propagandists preach defiance in the trade war with America
3. New Pentagon chairman: U.S. lacks ability to deter adversaries
4. Medal of Honor recipient Dakota Meyer rejoins the Marine Corps at 36
5. U.S. intelligence contradicts Trump’s justification for mass deportations
6. I was in the CIA. Here’s how helping Myanmar can pay off for US against China. | Opinion
7. Communists Never Win a Fair Fight
8. U.S. Will Pause Ukraine Peace Efforts if No Progress, Rubio Warns
9. Russian missile attack on Kharkiv on Good Friday kills 1, injures 87
10. Defense One: State of the Services
11. There’s no more DEI at DOD, watchdog finds
12. Shuttering of State office leaves US largely defenseless against foreign influence warfare, officials say
13. The Trump White House and the New Opium Wars
14. Germany’s Great Military Reboot Has Now Arrived
15. Gabbard declassifies Biden-era plan to counter domestic terrorism
16. US may soon force allies to take sides in trade war with China
17. Military families challenge Trump’s stricter federal voting rules
18. Reimagining Combat Power for Tomorrow’s Battlefield: The Enhanced Brigade Combat Team
19. The Department of Defense’s Breakthrough Nuclear Moment Risks Slipping Away
20. What America Gets Wrong About the AI Race
21. How to Survive a Constitutional Crisis
Korean News Content:
1. Fighting in Ukraine Could Make North Korea’s Military Stronger
2. Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?
3. U.S. DOE official highlights S. Korea’s role in Trump administration’s energy strategy
4. Ex-DP leader Lee keeps strong lead in presidential election poll
5. South Korea’s Far Right Has Been Terrifyingly Radicalized
6. Army holds nighttime firing drills in border county of Goseong
7. S. Korea’s steel exports to U.S. shrink 19 pct in March on Trump tariffs
8. 7 military officers placed on compulsory leave over alleged martial law involvement
9. Inside Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary history: Daily NK obtains rare N. Korean propaganda book
10. Acting defense chief unlikely to attend Shangri-La Dialogue next month
11. Canada to deploy patrol aircraft to monitor North Korea sanctions violations
12. North Korea, Russia accelerate Tumen bridge project
13. Tragedy in Hoeryong: Mother left destitute after daughter sent to political prison camp
14. <Inside N. Korea> Counterfeit Money Flooding: NK Won, Chinese Yuan, and ‘Donpyo’ Vouchers Spreading Despite Major Crackdowns
15. South Korean government publishes new unification textbook…reflecting the ‘two-nation theory’ of the South and the North
The post 4/18/25 National Security and Korean News and Commentary appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
The events of September 11, 2001, had a profound impact on what became known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) generation, who found themselves fighting terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, the African Sahel, the Philippines, and places in between. Within four years, I met someone who would influence my outlook on our nation’s GWOT campaigns to this day. That unique individual was Captain Travis Patriquin, whose unique approach to life and our counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq led to the success of the Anbar Awakening in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. Sadly, on December 6, 2006, Travis was killed in Ar Ramadi, and I wrote a tribute to Travis here in Small Wars Journal (SWJ) in 2010. Thankfully, the article helped encourage William Doyle to write A Soldier’s Dream: Captain Travis Patriquin and the Awakening of Iraq. Since his death, I have reflected upon the lessons I gained from my interaction with Travis since meeting him 20 years ago in Germany and the legacy he left behind, and I will share those here.
Travis was not your typical Infantry Officer when he joined the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Friedberg, Germany, in 2005. He had a background serving as an enlisted Intelligence specialist in Special Forces units before transitioning as an Officer. Additionally, Travis was a polyglot capable of speaking Spanish and Arabic and claimed to have learned Pashtu, among others. More importantly, he was an outside-the-box thinker who always strived to understand the core issue. The foundation for his thinking was Occam’s Razor, the principle of understanding a problem down to its simplest components. He used Occam’s Razor to inform his analysis of the conflict he and I faced in Tal’Afar, Iraq, which became the basis for his article published after his death.
Travis expanded upon this philosophy when he and most of my Brigade relocated from Tal’Afar to Ar Ramadi in the Spring of 2006. He quickly understood the dynamics of the conflict occurring between the Sunni Sheikhs and the extremists from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that exploded into open conflict and led to the Anbar Awakening, guided by the charismatic Sheikh Sittar. In October 2006, my battalion rejoined the Brigade in Ramadi. I worked with Travis and Sheikh Sittar as the movement grew to expel AQI from the city. However, one nagging issue I raised a few times during our meetings was the prospect that the Awakening forces would morph into a Sunni army capable of threatening the Iraqi government. This sentiment was shared by others, including Carter Malkasian, who attributed the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 to the Awakening and the broader Sons of Iraq program.
While there have been a multitude of factors to the rise of ISIS, Travis would say that Occam’s Razor implies that the most plausible explanation for the rise of ISIS was that the quarrel between the Sunni tribes and AQI was less about ideology and more about internal power dynamics that saw it change from an externally influenced organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to an internally led organization of Iraqi extremists led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. What I learned from Travis in Iraq would influence my observations in Afghanistan and later in Iraq and Syria.
My conversations with Travis about his deployment supporting Special Operations during Operation Anaconda shaped my impression and understanding of Afghanistan, and it gave me an appreciation of how different it would be from my experience in Iraq. Primarily, Travis pointed out that while Islam was the common framework between Afghanistan and Iraq, the history, geography, and tribal dynamics were very different.
From 2012 to 2013, I served in the Commander’s Action Group (CAG), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. I was privileged to observe the intersection between politics and strategy as General John Allen and General Joseph Dunford navigated the complex environment. The central challenge at the time was the planned transition in 2014 when the Afghan government would assume the lead in the counterinsurgency fight. However, during that time, there was a spike in green-on-blue incidents that saw Afghan soldiers turn their weapons on their fellow Afghan security forces and their Coalition partners. Additionally, the coalition’s inability to isolate the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and their Al Qaeda allies from their sanctuaries in Pakistan meant the fighting could go on indefinitely. I remember attending strategy and campaign planning events where I stated we were not answering the key question. In line with Travis’s approach to Occam’s Razor, the key question I raised was, “How do we get the average Afghan to choose between a 7th Century Medieval-minded Taliban that was known quantity vs. a predatory and corrupt Afghan government many believe were propped up by foreigners?” It was a similar question that the British in the mid-1800s and the Soviets in the 1980s faced during their campaigns in Afghanistan. I also noted it was the same fundamental question we failed to ask and answer in our own experience in Vietnam.
In December 2020, serving in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) CAG, I traveled to Afghanistan with General Frank McKenzie, where I “fist-bumped” President Ghani as he walked in for a meeting. Afterward, I observed General McKenzie, as he extensively detailed in his book The Melting Point, working with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and his subordinate commanders to develop options to achieve the President’s policy of withdrawing all combat forces from Afghanistan. 8 months later, I watched the collapse of Afghanistan during the first month of my war college fellowship in Canada. Applying the lessons from Travis, I believe we overcomplicated the war in Afghanistan by not understanding the nature of the fight. While we called the Taliban insurgents, they viewed themselves as an exiled government fighting to reclaim their right to rule. Sadly, the average Afghan knew that time was on the Taliban’s side as the West looked for the exits and, therefore, never put their complete faith in the Afghan government.
In 2011, I served as one of Army Chief of Staff General Odierno’s speechwriters who helped draft the memorandum he and the Secretary of the Army signed indicating the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND). In 2014, I would find myself dealing with the failed conclusion of the war in Iraq and the consequences of my observations from Ramadi as ISIS swept through Iraq and nearly toppled the Shia-led government.
In December 2014, I arrived at U.S. Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCENT), the command responsible for providing the bulk of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Iraq and Syria to combat ISIS. The SOCCENT Commander was dual-hatted as the Director of the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – Syria (CJIATF-Syria), tasked with developing a Syrian 5,000 Syrian Force to resist ISIS in the middle of a full-fledged Syrian Civil War. Additionally, SOCCENT, with Allied SOF, supported the Iraqi Government’s Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) to combat ISIS. The initial success of ISIS in both Iraq and Syria stemmed from several factors. First, the bulk of the Iraqi Security Forces were trained during OIF/OND for static counterinsurgency operations and were not prepared for the ISIS lightning war of maneuver. Second, the top-heavy U.S. and coalition command relationships led to the phrase, “Never have so few been led by so many.” Third, the CJIATF-Syria mission of attempting to build a standardized infantry-style unit while trying to screen potential candidates proved nearly impossible, especially while encouraging them to focus solely on ISIS and not the Assad regime.
After General (later Secretary of Defense) Austin’s testimony in September 2015, SOCCENT planners were tasked with revising our SOF approach to Iraq and Syria. Several planners had experience with the initial response to 9/11 in Afghanistan, and others cut their teeth during the initial invasion of Iraq and the fight against AQ. The changes included streamlining the command relationship by merging CJIATF-Syria and the Combined Joint Task Force – Iraqi (CJOTF-Iraq) into Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR). Second, the focus in Syria switched from training and equipping 5,000 Syrians to a more specialized form of training that allowed a small group of trained Syrians to train their fellow Syrians. It was the perfect example of applying the SOF “Dark Arts” I wrote for SWJ previously, which saw the development of the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF). Travis would have been happy to see the adjustment and the subsequent success of militarily defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Of course, it is hard to tell if some of the Syrians we trained included elements that led to the overthrow of the Assad regime.
My connection between Travis and Ukraine is born from loss. Travis was one of the first to comfort me when my little brother was killed in Baghdad, Iraq, in August 2005. Additionally, Travis’s death, my brother, and ten other friends whose names I wear on a remembrance bracelet daily remind me of the sacrifice in war. I arrived at U.S. Army Europe-Africa six months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I spent the first couple of months directly supporting efforts to assist the Ukrainians in defending themselves. However, once the support to Ukraine shifted to the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U), my efforts shifted toward the broader planning to support NATO and deter aggression. One element from my experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan shaped by the loss of Travis and others was the large-scale attrition seen in Ukraine that exceeds what I and many of my fellow GWOT veterans faced. Therefore, it helped focus the emphasis I placed on my planners to plan for reconstitution operations in a large-scale combat operational environment. Additionally, the WWII generation informed my thoughts on reconstitution, including my interaction with my childhood barber, a Coast Guard veteran of D-Day.
Since meeting Travis 20 years ago, I have learned a lot. First, relax and do not take life too seriously (Ferris Bueller influenced Travis and me). This sentiment is best reflected in the parody video he played of British Soldiers performing the song Is This the Way to Amarillo. This advice is why I come across as stoic and try not to let little things get to me. Second, Occam’s Razor should be applied to reduce a problem with its essential components and not try to overcomplicate a solution. This factor also means recognizing that some solutions take a long time to have an effect, and other solutions require simply managing the problem at an acceptable tolerance level.
Travis was the right man at the right time in Iraq. His simplistic approach, best captured by his infamous “stick man” presentation on how to win in Iraq, will forever cement his legacy in our nation’s history of counterinsurgency operations.
The post A Retrospective on Captain Travis Patriquin: America’s “Lawrence of Arabia” in Ramadi appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
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National Security News Content:
1. Why Richard Armitage was the essential American
2. Be Not Afraid By Stanley McChrystal
3. Students sue Defense Department over book bans in military schools
4. US-funded media like Voice of America must be saved and strengthened
5. Trump Aides Close State Dept. Office on Foreign Disinformation
6. Five Signs That the US and China Will Go to War By James Stavridis
7. A Comparative Analysis of the Impact and Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by Terrorist Groups
8. H.R. McMaster receives accidental call from President Trump
9. Third top Pentagon aide Collin Carroll on administrative leave over leaks probe
10. In Grueling Ranger Competition, Gender Proves No Obstacle
11. Defense Secretary Hegseth: Chinese hypersonics missiles could destroy U.S. carriers in minutes
12. Former INDOPACOM commander urges clarity of US intent to defend Taiwan
13. The Trump Administration’s Pursuit of a Sino-Russian Schism
14. U.S. Tries to Crush China’s AI Ambitions With Chips Crackdown
15. What Is an AI Supercomputer and Why Is Trump Talking About It?
16. Thinking Through Deception on the Electromagnetic Spectrum17.
17. The Ukraine Dividend: Return on Investment of US Security Assistance
18. The Russia That Putin Made
19. China’s Double Game in Myanmar
20. Trump’s Second Coming: Mongolia Watches the Chaos With Caution
21. US Army Eyes Surge in 3D-Printed Drones That Imitate Enemy Forces
22. End of dollar dominance? Trump tariffs are decreasing trust in US currency.
23. Putin’s play for an Indonesian airbase was always likely to fail – but Russia has wider ambitions
24. U.S. Cutting Forces In Syria By Half, Possible Ripple Effects In Region
25. Unwanted Truth 1: Black Lives Matter Was a Cuban Intelligence Operation
26. Questions Congress should ask about DOD ‘peace through strength’ plan
27. Analysis: How the battles Trump loves to wage explain his presidency
Korean News Content:
The post 4/17/25 National Security and Korean News and Commentary appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
To prevent Iran’s nuclear breakout, Trump must confront a messy reality: diplomacy
March 25, 2025
Below is a short survey of this piece published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
Read the full article linked in the title for a deep dive.
This article by Amy J. Nelson examines the complex diplomatic challenges surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, focusing on the Trump administration’s approach to preventing nuclear proliferation. At its core, the piece critiques the United States’ current negotiation strategy, arguing that absolutist tactics and a desire for immediate “wins” undermine effective long-term diplomatic engagement.
Nelson highlights the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a nuanced diplomatic achievement that temporarily constrained Iran’s nuclear capabilities through strategic compromise. The United States’ 2018 withdrawal from this agreement created significant diplomatic tension, weakening trust and reducing negotiation leverage. The article emphasizes that Iran’s nuclear centrifuges continue operating, bringing the country closer to potential nuclear weapon capacity.
The analysis warns that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign and insistence on comprehensive, immediate concessions are counterproductive. Nelson argues for a more patient, incremental approach to arms control negotiations—one that recognizes diplomatic progress as a gradual process requiring flexibility, compromise, and a sophisticated understanding of international relations beyond simplistic “winner-takes-all” frameworks.
Amy J. Nelson is a senior fellow with the Future Security Program at New America, where she works on generating future-forward policy analysis using tools and techniques of prediction and planning with a particular focus on nuclear and artificial intelligence futures. Previously, Nelson was a David M. Rubenstein fellow in the Foreign Policy program and with the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution and a Robert Bosch fellow in residence at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, Germany.
The post To prevent Iran’s nuclear breakout, Trump must confront a messy reality: diplomacy appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
In the GFM world, priorities are everything. As a former Global Force Management Planner and an incoming Security Cooperation Officer bound for the African continent, I’ve seen firsthand the pressures of allocating limited forces to a world full of demands. It’s a constant negotiation—balancing emerging crises, strategic priorities, and operational realities. Which is why recent proposals to merge United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) into a sub-unified command under U.S. European Command (EUCOM) concern me deeply. Some argue this merger would reduce redundancy and streamline overhead. But in practice, such a consolidation would dilute focus, complicate resourcing, and undermine strategic competition in a region where great powers are playing a long game. From a GFM perspective—where clarity, prioritization, and agility matter—AFRICOM must remain its own Combatant Command.
AFRICOM was established in 2007 as a geographic combatant command with a mandate to partner, enable, and support African nations in addressing transnational threats. Unlike other commands, AFRICOM operates with a “small footprint, light touch” model that emphasizes interagency cooperation, capacity-building, and regional partnership over permanent basing or large-scale operations. Its lean structure belies its vast responsibility: 53 countries, over 1.3 billion people, and every strategic challenge imaginable—from violent extremist organizations and fragile states to climate-induced instability, humanitarian disasters, and an intensifying competition with China and Russia. Merging AFRICOM under EUCOM risks marginalizing Africa at a time when its strategic relevance is growing, not diminishing.
From the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea, from the Horn to Southern Africa, the continent is not a monolith. Each region contains unique political dynamics, cultural landscapes, and threat vectors. Consolidating command under EUCOM—already burdened by NATO, Russia, and Arctic concerns—risks flattening Africa’s complexity into a secondary consideration. As a planner, I’ve seen how resource decisions favor areas with clear COCOM advocacy. If AFRICOM becomes a three-star subcommand, its voice will be diminished in the global sourcing arena. GFM priorities are set by strategic demand signals—if Africa isn’t at the table, it’s on the menu.
Strategic Competition Is Heating Up
The “Efficiencies” Argument Misses the Mark
From Ends-Ways-Means to Strategic Risk
A Planner’s Perspective: The View from the GFM Desk
Recommendations: Strengthen, Don’t Subordinate
Africa Is Strategic—Act Like It
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army Command and Staff General College, Department of the Army, United States Africa Command, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Author Bio
United States Army Major Joel J. Richardson is a Field Artillery officer currently attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. A former Global Force Management Planner at Special Operations Command Central, he brings joint, SOF, and National Guard perspectives to professional military discourse. He writes on operational planning, leader and development.
The post Why AFRICOM Should Stand Alone: Preserving Strategic Agility Through Dedicated Theater Command appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
Terrorist attacks result in the deaths of more than 20,000 people every year. Terrorist groups, which are rarely random or senseless in their actions, tend to use strategic weapons that cause more casualties and increase their notoriety. Although terrorist organizations use various types of weapons, they often prefer improvised explosive devices (IEDs) due to their accessibility and ease of creation. IEDs can be strategically placed or affixed to targeted equipment with minimal effort.
An IED is a homemade explosive device designed to inflict damage, cause disruption, or instill fear. These devices are employed by a variety of actors, including criminals, terrorists, insurgents, vandals, and suicide bombers. The design and potential impact of IEDs can vary significantly, ranging from simple pipe bombs to more sophisticated devices capable of causing extensive damage and loss of life. IEDs can be deployed in several ways, including being carried by an individual, planted in a vehicle, sent via a package, or concealed along roadways. The term “IED,” commonly referred to as roadside bombs, became widely recognized during the Iraq War, which began in 2003.
Some examples of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) include truck bombs, pipe bombs, and devices triggered by cell phone timers. On April 19, 1995, a truck bomb, made from ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitromethane, exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 169 people. In the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, a pipe bomb filled with nails exploded in Centennial Olympic Park, killing two and injuring several others. On March 11, 2004, in Madrid, 10 explosions rocked four commuter trains, killing 191 people and injuring over 1,800. The bombs were made from Goma-2 ECO explosives and metal fragments, initiated by cell phones. On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers carried out attacks on London’s transportation system, killing 52 and injuring hundreds. The explosives were believed to be TATP, based on evidence found in an arrested suspect’s apartment.
The procurement of arms and explosives by terrorist groups for deploying IEDs is influenced by several critical factors. First, state sponsorship of terrorism is a significant factor, as political interests and definitional ambiguities lead to varying approaches to addressing terrorism. Non-state actors perceived as allies often receive support, while those labeled as terrorists are targeted. For instance, Iran-backed militia groups in the Middle East receive logistical assistance from Tehran, including rockets, mortars, missiles, and materials used to construct IEDs. Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) reports the use of IEDs in 134 attacks by such groups between 2018 and 2024. Another critical factor is the occurrence of proxy wars, in which non-state actors are provided with weapons and financial support by various states, despite the violent nature of their actions. In Syria, GTTAC recorded 88 terrorist perpetrators from 2018 to 2024, supported by Russia, the Gulf States, Turkiye, and Iran. Porous borders in regions with active terror groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and ISIS in Syria, facilitate the smuggling and transfer of arms and explosives. Additionally, endemic corruption in countries plagued by terrorism is closely linked to weak governance, with high terrorism levels correlating with poor rankings on the Corruption Perception Index. The convergence of criminal and terrorist organizations further exacerbates this issue, as these groups collaborate to achieve mutual interests and gain access to weaponry and explosives. Lastly, the financial capacity of terrorist groups, often sustained through illicit trafficking and smuggling activities, enables them to procure the necessary resources to manufacture and deploy IEDs.
According to data from the GTTAC, firearms were the most commonly used weapon by terrorist groups, accounting for 25,570 incidents, or 50.2% of all terrorist attacks between 2018 and 2023. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the second most prevalent, with 8,210 incidents (15.93%), followed by explosives in 7,781 attacks (15.1%), incendiary devices in 1,831 attacks (3.55%), and melee weapons in 1,213 attacks (2.29%) during the same period.
The number of terrorist incidents between 2018 and 2024 fluctuated between 8,000 and 10,000, as seen in Figure 1 below. Despite these variations in the overall number of incidents, the frequency of IED-related attacks exhibited a gradual decline over the same period. The proportion of IED-related incidents ranged from 10% to 22%, with the lowest recorded percentage in 2024, at 10.91%. A significant contributing factor to the low proportion in 2024 is the increase in missile attacks by Hezbollah, as documented by GTTAC, which recorded over 1,400 such attacks in Israel in 2024.
Figure 1: Total Incidents and IED-Related Incidents (2018 to 2024)
The GTTAC data from 2018 to 2024, as seen in Figure 2 below, highlights trends in the use of IEDs in terrorist attacks. Total fatalities decreased steadily from 32,864 in 2018 to 18,987 in 2024. However, fatalities caused by IEDs saw notable fluctuations. In 2019, there was a sharp increase in IED-related fatalities, with 5,203 deaths, making up 19.8% of all fatalities. Following this peak, the number of IED-related fatalities gradually decreased over the next several years. By 2024, fatalities due to IEDs dropped to 1,985, or 10.4% of the total. Despite the overall decline in total fatalities, IEDs continued to be a significant tool in terrorist attacks throughout the period. The proportion of IED-related fatalities fluctuated, with a noticeable dip in 2023, when only 1,777 fatalities (8.2%) were attributed to IEDs. This suggests that while the total number of fatalities and IED-related deaths has generally decreased, IEDs remain an important weapon for terrorist groups.
Figure 2: Total Fatalities and Fatalities Due to IEDs (2018–2024)
The GTTAC data on the number of victims targeted and killed in IED attacks, as seen in Figure 3 below, highlights the varying levels of vulnerability among different groups. The general population suffered the highest number of casualties, with 2,324 victims. Military personnel were also significantly targeted, accounting for 1,720 fatalities, which reflects the high targeting of military forces in such attacks. Government personnel faced substantial casualties as well, with 1,321 fatalities, indicating that state institutions are frequently targeted by terrorist groups. Political figures, however, were the least affected, with only 28 fatalities, possibly due to their relatively lower visibility or priority in these attacks. Additionally, groups and professionals each saw a moderate number of fatalities, with 349 and 182 victims, respectively, suggesting that specific sectors or individuals are targeted for their symbolic or strategic value.
Figure 3: Victims Targeted and Killed in IED Attacks (2018–2024)
The GTTAC data on IED attacks by terrorist typologies, as seen in Figure 4, indicates the varying use of IEDs across different ideological groups. Religious (jihadist) groups accounted for the largest share of IED attacks, with 2,703 incidents, followed by separatist groups with 1,973 attacks. Left-wing groups were responsible for 810 IED-related incidents. Interestingly, far-right groups are notably absent from this data, as they have never been reported to use IEDs, reflecting a distinct operational preference for other methods of violence. Anarchist and vigilante groups contributed only a small number of incidents, with 11 and 7 IED attacks, respectively.
Figure 4: Distribution of IED Attacks by Terrorist Typology
The data presented in Figure 5 offers a group-level analysis of IED usage from 2018 to 2024, focusing on several of the top 10 perpetrators responsible for the most attacks in 2024, namely Al-Shabaab, ISIS-Core, JNIM, and Hezbollah. Al-Shabaab maintained a relatively high level of IED activity throughout the period, with 138 attacks in 2018, fluctuating numbers in subsequent years, and a peak of 170 attacks in 2019. However, a steady decline in their use of IEDs was observed in the following years. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated group utilized IEDs in 60 of its 261 attacks in 2024. ISIS-Core exhibited considerable fluctuations in IED use, reaching a peak of 246 attacks in 2019 before gradually decreasing to 55 out of 560 attacks in 2024. This trend may indicate a reduction in ISIS’s territorial control and a strategic shift towards leveraging sleeper cells for low-profile shooting attacks in Iraq and Syria, in response to significant weakening by international counterterrorism operations in recent years.
Figure 5: Group-Level Analysis of IED Usage by Terrorist Organizations (2018–2024)
Jamaat al-Nusra wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated group operating in the Sahel region, exhibited relatively stable IED activity, with a peak of 71 attacks in 2022, followed by moderate levels in subsequent years, including 37 out of its 377 attacks in 2024. JNIM’s sustained reliance on IEDs underscores the continued strategic importance of these devices in its operational activities across the Sahel. Conversely, Hezbollah, which had minimal recorded IED activity in earlier years, experienced a significant increase in 2024, with 97 incidents out of its 1,450 attacks in 2024. This notable escalation is likely attributable to the group’s expanding involvement in the Middle East, particularly in the aftermath of the October 7 terror attacks, which exacerbated regional tensions.
In conclusion, the data provides valuable insights into the changing landscape of IED-related terrorism. The steady decline in the proportion of IED incidents, particularly in 2024, is partly due to intensified military actions targeting terrorist groups in rural areas. This pressure has forced these groups to adapt, shifting towards direct assault methods, such as storming and shooting attacks. Jihadist organizations remain the primary perpetrators of IED-related terrorism. However, despite the overall decline in IED use, groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda continue to rely on these tactics in their areas of operation. The decrease in IED usage may also be linked to a broader shift in terrorist weaponry, with a notable rise in the use of missiles and drones. Various groups, including Iran-backed militias and Al-Qaeda affiliates in regions like Syria, Yemen, and the Sahel, have increasingly turned to drones. This strategy offers lower risk to the attackers while potentially causing greater harm and attracting more attention.
The post A Comparative Analysis of the Impact and Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by Terrorist Groups appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
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Access Korean News HERE.
National Security News Content:
1. A Retrospective on Captain Travis Patriquin: America’s “Lawrence of Arabia” in Ramadi
2. The People Are the Key: Irregular Warfare Success Story in the Philippines
3. The Art of Not Dealing: China’s 3-Ring Strategy for a Prolonged Trade War
4. Tariffs Are Essential to a Free People
5. Army Special Ops Slated to Lose Thousands of Paid Airborne Positions
6. Training officers outperform special forces team during Best Ranger Competition
7. USAJOBS – Senior Advisor to the Department of Defense Department of Homeland Security DHS Headquarters Office of the Secretary
8. The White House pressed for fast negotiations with its shock and awe tariffs. Now it can’t drum up enough interest from a ‘first mover’
9. Chip War and the Battle for Technological Sovereignty: A Hybrid Warfare Perspective (Book Review)
10. It Was Never the End of History, But the Beginning of the Clash of Civilizations
11. The New Adaptation War by Mick Ryan
12. Taiwan’s Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Model and Beijing’s Grey Zone Aggression
13. Indonesia dismisses report of Russian request to base aircraft in Papua New Guinea
14. Cartels, China, and Fentanyl-Related Illicit Finance | JD Supra
15. Taiwan’s Biggest Problem in Steeling Itself for War with China is Cultural
16. Operation Opera Redux? Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Preventive War Paradox
17. Nuclear Deterrence vs Nuclear Warfighting: Is There a Difference and Does it Matter?
18. Pentagon Review of Close Combat Training Standards Is Long Overdue
19. AUKUS Should Build a Center for Experimentation in Western Australia
20. Will DOGE Take a Bite Out of This Spy Firm’s Stock? That’s Classified
21. Viral Videos, Trade Tensions Drive U.S. Shoppers to Chinese App
Korean News Content:
1. Senior Pentagon official calls Trump’s policy ‘not recipe for isolation’ but ‘common sense’ approach
2. North Korea soldiers, weapons helped Russia at critical moment in war on Ukraine
3. Finance Minister Choi to meet Bessent over trade issues next week
4. S. Korea to boost shipbuilding, energy cooperation with U.S. for tariff negotiations: trade minister
5. S. Korea, Vietnam agree on close communication on U.S. tariffs
6. Could Trump’s tariffs cause simmering tensions in South Korea to boil over?
7. How Trump’s push to deregulate crypto could help North Korean hackers
8. South Korea’s Politics After Impeachment
9. Opinion: South Korea’s democracy stands strong after presidential turmoil
10. Police say North Korea impersonated horoscope writers, counterintelligence command in 120,000 phishing emails
11. North Korea has earned estimated $20B from military support for Russia: Report
12. Russia issued nearly 10K visas for North Koreans in 2024, consular data shows
13. “If South Korea Arms Its Nuclear Armament, the Korean Peninsula Will Become an ‘India-Pakistan’ Situation”
14. Acting president says S. Korea, U.S. seeking ‘win-win’ solution for tariffs
15. Shipbuilding cooperation with U.S. chance for S. Korean industry to leap forward: acting president
16. Editorial: Missiles for Pyongyang, silence in Seoul?
17. South Korea’s Hanwha and Poland’s WB Group agree to guided missile joint venture in Poland
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Chris Miller’s Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology provides an in-depth analysis of the semiconductor industry’s pivotal role in global power dynamics. Integrating the insights from the Hybrid Center of Excellence’s Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE) framework, we can assess how recent developments among key industry players align with or diverge from Miller’s predictions, particularly concerning hybrid threats and systemic vulnerabilities.
In the CORE framework, hybrid threats are defined as multi-domain strategies that exploit systemic vulnerabilities to undermine democratic institutions, economic stability, and national security. Miller’s analysis of the global semiconductor supply chain perfectly aligns with this concept. The world’s reliance on a handful of key players—such as Taiwan’s TSMC, the U.S.’s Intel, and the Netherlands’ ASML—exposes critical infrastructure to potential disruption from adversarial state and non-state actors.
One of the book’s key takeaways is that microchip supply chains are not merely an economic concern but a central pillar of national security. The U.S.-China rivalry over semiconductor dominance exemplifies how economic interdependencies can be weaponized. This is a classic case of economic hybrid warfare, where states use trade restrictions, technological embargoes, and cyber espionage to exert pressure on adversaries. The U.S. export bans on advanced chips and fabrication equipment to China, coupled with China’s retaliatory measures, fit within the broader spectrum of hybrid threats outlined in CORE.
Miller highlighted the strategic vulnerabilities stemming from the concentration of semiconductor manufacturing in specific regions, notably East Asia. The CORE framework emphasizes the importance of diversifying critical infrastructure to mitigate hybrid threats. Recent geopolitical tensions have underscored these concerns. For instance, the U.S. has implemented export controls to limit China’s access to advanced chipmaking technologies, aiming to maintain its technological edge. This move aligns with Miller’s prediction of increasing bifurcation between Chinese and non-Chinese spheres in the semiconductor industry.
The Chip War narrative underscores one of the core principles of the resilience ecosystem model: the need to secure critical infrastructure and mitigate cascading failures. The book highlights how the concentration of chip manufacturing in Taiwan represents a massive single point of failure in global supply chains. Taiwan’s geopolitical vulnerability is not just a regional issue but a systemic risk to global economies and security.
From a hybrid warfare perspective, this is an Achilles’ heel that can be exploited through disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, or even military actions. The CORE framework warns of the dangers of over-reliance on foreign technological capabilities, particularly in sectors as critical as semiconductors. China’s push for self-sufficiency through its “Made in China 2025” initiative is a direct response to this vulnerability, illustrating a strategic shift in hybrid resilience.
Miller predicted a bifurcation between the Chinese and non-Chinese spheres in the semiconductor industry. China has been actively pursuing self-sufficiency in chip production, investing heavily in domestic manufacturing capabilities. However, recent reports indicate that China’s purchases of chipmaking equipment are expected to decline in 2025, suggesting challenges in its quest for self-reliance.
Miller also explores how semiconductor technology is integral to cybersecurity and cyber warfare. Advanced AI-driven cyber operations, deepfake disinformation campaigns, and digital espionage all rely on cutting-edge chips. The book details how U.S. and Chinese intelligence agencies compete for semiconductor supremacy, a key enabler of both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.
The CORE framework highlights cyber resilience as a crucial component of national security. The semiconductor industry’s entanglement in cyber warfare underscores the necessity of protecting supply chains from espionage, intellectual property theft, and sabotage. The book warns that semiconductor fabrication facilities are prime targets for cyberattacks, and securing these assets should be a top priority for policymakers.
Miller discussed the relentless pace of innovation in semiconductor technology. Recent data supports this, with global semiconductor sales increasing by 19.1% in 2024 and projections indicating continued double-digit growth in 2025. Companies are making substantial investments to stay at the forefront of technological advancements. For example, NXP Semiconductors has entered into an agreement to acquire Kinara, Inc., aiming to enhance its capabilities in high-performance, energy-efficient, and programmable discrete neural processing units.
Miller’s analysis offers several strategic lessons that align with the CORE model’s resilience-building approach:
Chris Miller’s Chip War is not just a history of the semiconductor industry—it is a warning about the future of global security. Through the lens of the CORE framework, the book serves as a case study in how hybrid threats exploit technological dependencies. Semiconductor dominance is not just about economic growth; it is a key battlefield in irregular warfare, where economic leverage, cyber capabilities, and geopolitical strategy intersect.
As states race to secure their semiconductor industries, the lessons from Chip War are clear: resilience against hybrid threats requires systemic thinking, proactive policymaking, and a recognition that technological power is inseparable from national security. For policymakers and security professionals, Miller’s book is an essential read in understanding how the microchip is now a frontline weapon in global competition.
Through the lens of the CORE framework, it’s evident that the semiconductor industry continues to navigate complex challenges and opportunities. Many of Miller’s predictions have materialized, particularly regarding geopolitical tensions and the push for supply chain diversification. Ongoing investments in technology and workforce development are crucial to building resilience against hybrid threats and ensuring the industry’s sustainable growth.
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are his own and not that of any part of the US Government.
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When Francis Fukuyama proclaimed “the end of history” in 1989, he did so with the conviction that liberal democracy had triumphed as the ultimate form of governance. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the seemingly unstoppable march of globalization painted a picture of a world where ideological struggles were over. However, history did not end—it simply took a different turn. Instead of a universal order dominated by liberal democracy, we have entered an era that Samuel Huntington foresaw in his seminal work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
The current global conflicts, from Ukraine to Gaza, from the South China Sea to tensions in the Mediterranean, are not merely geopolitical disputes. They are manifestations of deeper civilizational fault lines. The West’s long-standing dominance is being challenged, not just by rival states but by alternative worldviews, historical grievances, and divergent cultural identities. The so-called “Second Cold War” framework oversimplifies these tensions as merely a revival of U.S.-Soviet-style rivalry. In reality, what we are witnessing is not Cold War 2.0 but a multipolar clash of civilizations, in which Western Judeo-Christian civilization, Chinese Confucianism, Islamic resurgence, and Russian Eurasianism are competing to shape the future.
To frame the present era as a Second Cold War is to impose a misleading historical analogy on a world that has fundamentally changed. The original Cold War was defined by a clear ideological divide between two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. The current global order is far more fragmented. While the U.S. and its allies remain dominant in many respects, they are not facing a singular ideological rival but rather a constellation of competing powers. Russia is not the Soviet Union, nor is China a communist revolutionary state seeking to spread an alternative economic model globally.
Furthermore, unlike the Cold War, where the U.S. and USSR operated in largely separate economic spheres, today’s great powers are deeply intertwined. China and the United States remain economically interdependent, with vast trade networks binding them together. Russia, while isolated from the West in some respects, continues to find economic and strategic partners in the Global South. The Soviet bloc once operated under strict ideological discipline, with little room for deviation. Today’s alliances are far more fluid, shifting based on national interests rather than ideological commitments. This multipolarity cannot be accurately described using the outdated Cold War paradigm. Actors emerging in this multi-polar world each originated in their own way.
In the post-Cold War world, non-Western civilizations are not only reclaiming their historical identities but also forging strategic alliances against the West. This alignment is not based on shared ideological principles, as was the case during the Cold War, but rather on a pragmatic convergence of interests under the simple logic of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The result is the emergence of what I term the Axis of Totalitarianism, an informal but powerful coalition that seeks to challenge and dismantle the global influence of Western Judeo-Christian civilization.
This model is evident in three key civilizational blocs that form the core of the Axis of Totalitarianism:
This new confrontation is civilizational in nature. It pits the values of individual liberty, democratic governance, and free markets against authoritarianism, collectivism, and state-controlled order. While the principal actors of this axis—China’s Confucian-Communist model, Islamic political resurgence, Russia’s authoritarian Orthodox nationalism, and North Korea’s dynastic totalitarianism—differ in their historical experiences and governing philosophies, they share a common objective: undermining Western dominance and reshaping the global order in their own image.
Within this axis, Russia occupies a unique position. Unlike China or the Islamic world, Russia is not entirely outside the Western civilizational sphere. Its Orthodox Christian heritage and cultural legacy share significant overlaps with Western Judeo-Christian values. This identity creates a paradox: Russia simultaneously clashes with the West geopolitically while maintaining certain civilizational commonalities that leave the door open for reconciliation. The long history of European engagement with Russia since Peter the Great, from periods of integration to fierce rivalry, suggests that while conflict currently prevails, coordination remains a potential outcome. This emerging axis directly challenges the Western model, a framework built on the enduring principles of individualism, liberty, and open inquiry.
Western civilization has developed through a unique synthesis of Judeo-Christian ethics, Greco-Roman political and legal traditions, and the intellectual advancements of the Enlightenment. This fusion has created a civilizational framework rooted in individualism, liberty, and open inquiry, which has driven the most significant advancements in human history. While no civilization is without its flaws, the Western model has historically produced the highest levels of scientific progress, economic prosperity, and political stability.
At its core, Western civilization prioritizes the sovereignty of the individual. Unlike collectivist societies, where the state, the religious order, or the ruling elite dictate the course of human life, the Western tradition elevates personal agency, moral autonomy, and self-determination. This concept is deeply embedded in its Judeo-Christian heritage. The Biblical tradition stresses the moral responsibility of the individual before God—a radical departure from polytheistic and tribal societies, where human beings were often seen as mere instruments of divine or state power. Christianity reinforced this idea by emphasizing personal salvation and free will, further cultivating an ethos in which individuals were responsible for their own ethical and moral decisions rather than being bound to predetermined social roles.
Simultaneously, the Greco-Roman legacy contributed a rational and legalistic approach to governance. The Greek concept of citizenship and the Roman codification of laws introduced the principles of legal rights, civic responsibility, and participatory governance. The polis, or city-state, became the foundation for democratic institutions, where debate, critical thinking, and the search for truth were not only permitted but encouraged. This legacy carried through the centuries and found new expression during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, when developed the modern ideas of constitutional government, checks and balances, and universal human rights.
The Enlightenment, in particular, played a transformative role in shaping the Western model of governance and society. It reinforced the idea that rulers derive their legitimacy not from divine authority or hereditary power but from the consent of the governed. This led to the formation of constitutional democracies, the rule of law, and the separation of church and state, ensuring that no single authority—whether religious or political—could monopolize power. The protection of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience became pillars of Western governance, distinguishing it from civilizations that maintained rigid hierarchies of authority and obedience.
Western civilization’s ability to self-correct is a defining feature: from the Protestant Reformation to the civil rights movements of the 20th century, it has continuously reassessed its values, corrected injustices, and expanded freedoms. This adaptability has been a source of strength, ensuring that the West remains resilient even in the face of internal and external challenges. This strength is evident in the remarkable peace that has emerged among Western nations.
One of the most remarkable achievements of Western civilization has been the elimination of intra-Western warfare, a phenomenon that I describe as Pax Occidentalis. For centuries, Europe was the epicenter of devastating conflicts. The rivalry between kingdoms, empires, and later nation-states resulted in continuous warfare—from the Hundred Years’ War and the Napoleonic Wars to the catastrophic World Wars of the 20th century. The cycle of conflict seemed inescapable.
However, following the Second World War, a radical transformation took place. The Western world, recognizing the destructive potential of modern warfare, constructed a new political, economic, and ideological framework that prioritized cooperation over conflict. This shift was not accidental but the result of several interrelated developments.
First, capitalism replaced military conquest as the primary means of competition. In previous centuries, wealth and power were often obtained through territorial expansion and resource extraction. However, the expansion of free markets, global trade, and industrialization created an alternative pathway to dominance. Instead of engaging in war to secure resources, Western nations competed through economic growth, technological innovation, and financial influence. The post-war economic boom, led by the United States and Western Europe, demonstrated that prosperity could be achieved through commerce rather than conquest.
Second, the institutionalization of political cooperation reduced the likelihood of war. The creation of NATO, the European Union, and various international organizations ensured that disputes between Western nations were resolved through diplomacy rather than armed conflict. For the first time in history, European states and their transatlantic allies committed themselves to a system where political dialogue, economic integration, and security pacts supplanted militaristic rivalries. The European Union, in particular, turned centuries-old adversaries—France and Germany, Britain and Spain—into economic and political partners.
Third, democratic governance fundamentally changed the incentives for war. Unlike authoritarian regimes, which often rely on militarism to maintain internal legitimacy, democratic states are accountable to their citizens, who overwhelmingly prefer peace and stability. Public opinion in democratic societies acts as a check against reckless military adventurism. The democratic peace theory, which argues that established democracies are far less likely to go to war with one another, has largely held true in the post-war era. In contrast to this Western peace, the Islamic world grapples with its own internal conflicts and a turbulent struggle with modernity.
The Islamic world’s engagement with modernity has been marked by a persistent struggle between secular nationalism and political Islam. Unlike the West, which underwent secularization Islamic civilization has largely moved in the opposite direction.
At the heart of this ideological framework is Sharia law, which in many Islamic states supersedes secular legal codes. In countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, governance is explicitly based on Islamic jurisprudence, resulting in rigid theocratic rule where religious authorities hold immense power over law, education, social norms, and personal freedoms.
The concept of the Ummah—the global Muslim community—reinforces this collectivist worldview. It suggests that a Muslim’s primary allegiance is not to a nation-state but to the broader Islamic world. This undermines nationalism, individual sovereignty, and integration into secular societies, making it difficult for Islamic nations to develop independent, modern political structures that separate religion from governance.
A critical and often ignored phenomenon in the modern geopolitical landscape is the mass migration of Muslims to the West, which has introduced a unique ideological contradiction—what I term Civilizational Schizophrenia.
This concept encapsulates the paradox in which Western policymakers and intellectuals believe that large-scale Muslim immigration will naturally result in assimilation into Western values, despite the fact that Islamic civilization inherently conditions its adherents to resist Westernization and, instead, expand Islamic influence wherever possible.
The fundamental flaw in this assumption lies in the failure to recognize that migration is not merely a demographic shift but a civilizational export. Because Western immigration policies are not merit-based and do not prioritize individuals who embrace Western values, they have resulted in the mass importation of Islamic civilizational codes, rather than the integration of Muslims into the liberal-democratic framework.
In Islamic doctrine, the expansion of Islam is not simply a religious or spiritual mission but a political obligation. As a result, the notion that Muslim migrants will abandon their historical and religious ties to embrace Western liberalism is not only naïve but schizophrenic, as it contradicts the very structure of Islamic teachings.
The long-term consequences of Civilizational Schizophrenia are already evident in Western societies. The failure of multiculturalism in France, Germany, and Sweden, the rise of parallel Islamic societies in European cities, and the radicalization of second-generation Muslim youth all demonstrate that the Islamic world is not integrating into the West. Instead, it is reshaping Western societies from within, creating a clash of civilizations inside Western borders. This internal struggle is mirrored by a different, yet equally potent, civilizational challenge from the East: the rise of China’s civilizational hegemony.
China represents a unique challenge to the Western world, not merely as an economic superpower but as a civilization seeking to establish an alternative global order. While Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of “biding time and hiding strength” guided China’s foreign policy for decades, modern China under Xi Jinping has abandoned this approach, openly seeking hegemony not only in Asia but across the developing world.
Unlike the West, China operates on a Confucian-Communist hybrid model that fuses:
China’s ambitions go beyond economic dominance. The country seeks to become a civilizational power, offering a non-Western governance model to nations dissatisfied with democracy. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not just an infrastructure project—it is a civilizational expansion effort, embedding Chinese influence economically, politically, and culturally in Asia, Africa, and even Europe.
China’s return to interventionist foreign policy, particularly in Africa and Central Asia, signals a departure from Deng’s doctrine and a shift toward imperial ambition. However, this imperialist expansion inevitably leads to conflict with Russia, particularly in Central Asia and Siberia, where both powers vie for strategic dominance. There may be a tendency to believe the world is still two poles with each state picking their preferred side. The friction between two imperialist powers—Russia and China—discounts this theory.
China and Russia, while often seen as aligned against the West, are in reality engaged in their own imperialist struggle, particularly in Central Asia and Siberia. This creates an opportunity for the West to exploit their growing tensions and realign Russia as a strategic counterweight against Chinese expansionism.
China’s influence in Russia’s traditional sphere is not limited to economic expansion or demographic shifts; it also extends into political maneuvering. Beijing has steadily undermined Moscow’s grip over the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Historically, Russia dominated the region through Soviet-era institutions, security cooperation, and economic interdependence.
One of China’s primary strategies has been cultivating relationships with Central Asian leaders by presenting itself as a pragmatic and non-interventionist partner. Unlike Russia, which often imposes political demands on its allies, China has positioned itself as a power that offers economic growth without political strings attached. This has made it an attractive alternative for governments that seek to balance Russian influence while securing their own interests. China’s extensive investments in infrastructure, energy, and manufacturing have created a situation where many Central Asian nations are now more economically dependent on China than on Russia. Beijing has financed highways, bridges, and industrial zones that have linked Central Asia’s economies to China’s market, reinforcing a trade dependency that Moscow struggles to counter.
Additionally, China has deliberately worked to shift the political allegiances of Central Asia by establishing alternative security arrangements that reduce reliance on Russia. Traditionally, Moscow dominated regional security through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an alliance designed to maintain Russia’s military presence in the region. However, China has increasingly inserted itself into security matters through organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral framework that brings together China, Russia, and several Central Asian states. While the SCO originally functioned as a diplomatic platform, China has steadily transformed it into a mechanism for increasing its own political leverage. Through joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism initiatives, China has subtly established itself as a key security provider, reducing the need for Russian intervention.
Russia has also struggled to contain China’s growing influence because of its own internal economic weaknesses. With Russia’s economy hampered by Western sanctions, declining foreign investment, and an overreliance on energy exports, it lacks the financial capability to compete with China’s large-scale investments. Central Asian governments recognize this and have begun shifting their long-term strategic alignment toward China rather than Russia. Beijing’s ability to offer no-strings-attached loans, build infrastructure at record speed, and open its vast consumer market to Central Asian exports has left Moscow with little leverage.
China’s political maneuvering is not limited to Central Asia; it extends into Russia’s own territory, particularly in Siberia and the Russian Far East. In these regions, Chinese political influence is growing alongside economic and demographic shifts. Local Russian officials have begun fostering closer ties with Chinese investors, sometimes bypassing Moscow in negotiations. This has led to concerns that China is not just an economic competitor but an active force in reshaping regional governance structures in ways that undermine Russian authority. Some analysts have warned that the gradual economic colonization of Siberia and the Far East could lead to a geopolitical realignment where these territories become more aligned with China’s interests than with those of Moscow.
The growing tension between Russian and Chinese interests highlights the fundamental clash of imperialisms between the two powers. While both nations are authoritarian and anti-Western, their long-term ambitions do not align. Russia sees itself as a great Eurasian power that maintains dominance over its historical sphere of influence, while China views the same region as a natural extension of its economic and strategic reach. This contradiction creates an inherent conflict that Western powers can exploit. If the West adopts a strategic, pragmatic approach, it can use Russia’s concerns about Chinese expansion to drive a wedge between the two. While Russia has been pushed closer to China in recent years due to Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the West could reverse this trend by offering Russia incentives to distance itself from China. If Moscow perceives Beijing as an existential threat to its long-term territorial integrity, it may ultimately seek rapprochement with the West as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence.
The clash of imperialism between China and Russia is not just a theoretical possibility—it is a geopolitical reality that is already unfolding. The demographic shifts in Siberia, the erosion of Russian influence in Central Asia, and the increasing dependency of Russian regional economies on Chinese capital all point toward an inevitable confrontation. The question is whether the West will recognize this fault line and act strategically to exploit it, or whether it will continue to push Russia further into China’s embrace.
With these dynamics, the West must adopt a comprehensive strategy to maintain its dominance in the face of these competing imperialisms and emerging civilizational challenges.
The Western world stands at a crossroads. As the axis of totalitarianism continues to consolidate its power, the West must recognize that it is no longer dealing with a mere economic or military rivalry but a full-scale civilizational conflict. If the West wishes to preserve its global dominance, it must act decisively, intelligently, and strategically. The following framework outlines the essential steps that the West must take to secure its future and counter the threats posed by its adversaries.
To remain dominant, the West must not isolate itself but instead seek allies from non-Western civilizations that have a shared interest in countering the rise of China and the broader authoritarian bloc. Among these, Japan, South Korea, and India are particularly crucial.
Japan and South Korea, despite their deep integration into the global economy, remain vulnerable to Chinese influence due to their geographical proximity and economic ties to Beijing. The West must ensure that these nations do not fall into China’s sphere of influence, as they are naturally inclined to bandwagon with the strongest power if the West appears weak. To prevent this, the West must reinforce military, technological, and economic alliances with these nations, ensuring that they see greater benefits in aligning with the democratic world rather than succumbing to China’s dominance.
India, on the other hand, serves a dual purpose in this grand strategy. Firstly, with its massive population, it presents the only real demographic counterbalance to China. Secondly, India and China are historical rivals, engaged in territorial disputes and economic competition. The West must invest heavily in India’s economic and military rise, leveraging its population and anti-China stance to create a powerful counterweight in Asia. India’s participation in QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) with the U.S., Japan, and Australia should be expanded and deepened, ensuring that it becomes a long-term pillar of Western strategic interests.
Israel is the only beacon of Western values in the Middle East, standing as the frontline defense against radical Islamic terrorist organizations that threaten Western civilization. The rise of political Islam, backed by nations such as Iran and Qatar, has led to the formation of a sophisticated network of terrorist proxies, whose primary objective is to weaken the West by destabilizing its key regional ally—Israel.
If Israel were to fall, it would signal a catastrophic victory for anti-Western forces, emboldening Islamic radicals across the globe. The West must therefore provide Israel with all necessary military, economic, and diplomatic support, ensuring that it remains the dominant military power in the region and successfully defeats Islamist threats. This is not merely about Middle Eastern stability—it is about the survival of Western civilization itself in the face of a hostile and expansionist Islamic ideology.
The only way for Türkiye to remain a part of the Western civilization is through Kemalism, the ideology that once firmly aligned it with secularism, nationalism, and modernity. However, under the rule of Islamist and neo-Ottoman forces, Türkiye has drifted away from these principles, adopting an ambiguous foreign policy that sometimes supports Western interests and sometimes aligns with anti-Western forces.
The West must actively engage with Türkiye’s Kemalist factions, strengthening the country’s secular institutions and ensuring that it does not fall deeper into Islamist or pro-Russian influence. A Kemalist Türkiye is not only an important Western ally but also a strategic counterweight to radical Islamic expansion in the region.
Although Russia has positioned itself as an adversary to the West, its long-term interests do not fully align with China’s imperial ambitions. As previously discussed, China is gradually undermining Russia’s influence in Central Asia and Siberia, leading to a fundamental clash of imperialisms.
The West must recognize this fault line and exploit it to drive Russia away from China. While Moscow may never fully embrace the West, a pragmatic reconciliation could prevent a long-term China-Russia alliance, thereby weakening the axis of totalitarianism. Offering selective incentives—such as economic cooperation, technological partnerships, and strategic dialogue—could gradually shift Russia’s geopolitical orientation, making it more of a neutral power rather than a hostile one.
The myth that America will save Europe must come to an end. The United States, despite its vast military capabilities, cannot bear the entire burden of Western security alone. Europe must heavily invest in its own military and revitalize NATO, ensuring that it becomes a truly formidable force capable of countering Russian aggression, Islamic terrorism, and Chinese expansionism.
This means significant increases in defense spending, the development of next-generation military technologies, and the establishment of stronger joint command structures. NATO is the single most successful security alliance in history, and the West must never allow it to weaken.
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) poses a serious economic challenge to Western dominance, but it is far from a unified alliance. The West must exploit internal divisions within BRICS, particularly the rivalries between India and China, Russia’s concerns over China’s growing influence, and Brazil’s economic dependencies on Western markets.
By driving wedges between these nations, the West can prevent BRICS from emerging as a coherent economic alternative to the Western-led global order. The key is to offer selective economic incentives to certain BRICS members, pulling them closer to the West and weakening the bloc from within.
The West is facing an existential demographic crisis. Population declines, combined with gender ideologies that weaken social cohesion, threatens the long-term survival of Western civilization. If the West does not address low birth rates, the decline of the traditional family structure, and the erosion of core values, it will soon find itself outnumbered and overrun by civilizational competitors that do not share the same internal weaknesses.
The West must reaffirm its civilizational roots, promoting family values, social stability, and national identity, while resisting the moral decay that weakens its societal foundations.
Capitalism is the strongest weapon the West has ever created. It is the engine of economic prosperity, technological advancement, and military superiority. The rise of socialist and anti-market ideologies within the West itself threatens to erode the very foundation of Western dominance.
The West must embrace a renewed commitment to free markets, dismantling overregulation, socialist policies, and anti-innovation mindsets. Economic strength is directly linked to military and geopolitical power—if the West weakens itself economically, it will soon be overtaken strategically.
An Islamic country with nuclear weapons is not just a threat to the West—it is a threat to the entire world. The West must ensure that no radical Islamic regime ever acquires nuclear capability, whether it be Iran, Pakistan’s extremists, or any other potential threat.
This requires preemptive measures, including diplomatic isolation, covert operations, and if necessary, military intervention. A nuclear-armed Islamist power could permanently alter global stability, and the West must prevent it at all costs.
The West must end its naïve approach to immigration. Current policies allow massive, unchecked Muslim migration that imports anti-Western civilizational codes.
Western immigration policy must become strictly meritocratic, admitting only those who embrace Western values and contribute to the prosperity and security of the civilization. Uncontrolled immigration is a Trojan Horse, and the West must close its gates before it is too late.
To preserve Western dominance, the West must economically detach itself from China, reducing Beijing’s leverage over global markets. For years, China has used its role as the world’s factory to exert influence, but its expansionist ambitions and human rights violations necessitate a strategic decoupling. This involves shifting supply chains to countries like India, Japan, and South Korea, and reducing dependency on Chinese production, thereby weakening China’s global economic power.
Decoupling also protects technological and military superiority. By limiting China’s access to advanced Western technologies, the West can prevent China from strengthening its military and technological base. While this process may cause economic disruptions, it is crucial for maintaining the West’s leadership in global affairs and ensuring it is not coerced by China’s growing influence.
The West faces a decisive civilizational struggle. To preserve its dominance, it must forge strong alliances with Japan, Korea, and India, unwaveringly support Israel, reintegrate a Kemalist Türkiye, and drive a wedge between Russia and China. Europe must invest in its own defense, strengthen NATO, and counter hostile blocs like BRICS.
Internally, the West must combat demographic decline, reject moral decay, and end civilizational schizophrenia by enforcing merit-based immigration. Capitalism remains its greatest weapon, while Islamist regimes must never be allowed nuclear capabilities.
The West’s adversaries are divided. Its survival depends on exploiting their weaknesses while restoring its own strength. The choice is clear: fight for dominance or fade into decline.
The post It Was Never the End of History, But the Beginning of the Clash of Civilizations appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.
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