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Towards a Comprehensive, Chronological Bibliography of Gordon Clark 11 Feb 2:42 PM (3 months ago)

The following are notes meant to accompany what is eventually intended to be a comprehensive, chronological bibliography of Gordon Clark recently posted here. The bibliography itself builds on one that Doug Douma created. Differences are as follows:

a) I've chronologized the list as best as I can. 

b) Where possible, I've linked to where one can find a public, searchable version of each work.

c) Much more Clark material has been found since Doug created his bibliography. I've also included known letters by Clark in the bibliography.

I was able to find online archives of The Presbyterian Guardian, The New Scholasticum, Christianity Today, The Southern Presbyterian, The Presbyterian, Blue Banner Faith and Life, and publications by the Evangelical Theological Society. 

Some publications are not accessible online, like those from The Gordon Review, Christian Scholars Review, The Presbyterian, The Calvin Forum, the Reformed Presbyterian Advocate, Bible Presbyterian Reporter, The Witness, and the American Scientific Affiliation. Other publications may be incomplete or have discrepancies, like The Home Evangel or The Evangelical Quarterly. 

Those with access to the publications I mentioned which cannot be found online might be able to find more undiscovered work by Clark. One example: a 1953 article ("On Social Security: A Rejoinder") mentions a February 1952 article on the same topic and by the same publication, The Witness. However, there is no one I know of who has access to the February 1952 issue, so it cannot be made publicly available. Other issues from The Witness might have even more articles, and the same is true for the other publications in the previous paragraph.

So while the bibliography is eventually intended to be as comprehensive as possible, there are more writings by Clark than contained in this bibliography. I have quite a lot of material from the J. Oliver Buswell library at Covenant Seminary in St. Louis that has yet to be included - probably pages worth of bibliographic material. This bibliography should more so be looked at as a first draft that satisfies one function of the bibliography within the scope of the larger project I have in mind: to allow interested parties to read and more easily follow the development of Clark's thought (link). 

Finally, as a work in progress, I would also like to make the entries more uniform in terms of formatting. I also imagine there are mistakes within the bibliography, which is 50+ pdf pages. If anyone finds something in need of correction, they are welcome to let me know.

Gordon Clark: The Next War (The Presbyterian Guardian) 7 Feb 10:47 AM (3 months ago)

1944. The Next War. The Presbyterian Guardian. Mar. 10, Vol. 13, No. 5, 71-72.

When the present armed conflict ceases, another war now half concealed will become more evident. Quite obviously the economy of all nations will be strained or shattered. And in the wake of social dislocations, not to say chaos, nearly anything is likely to happen. 

One contender will be communism. This is certain, not merely because Russia will emerge from battle with glory, prestige, and power, but also because the communistic philosophy for years has been making its way into the thinking of a vocal minority of aggressive leaders. Communism has at least two easily recognized' advantages. First, it erects tangible, economic gains as the end of personal and national activity. Its materialistic view of good is quickly grasped by the least thoughtful of people while the more spiritual values of other philosophies are harder to appreciate. Second, communism can appeal to political leaders because it presents a detailed system of civilization. Not only does it advocate material values but also it implements itself with definite methods of procedure and works out its problems with the careful accuracy of a blueprint. Therefore the promises of comfort that communism makes to a ruined world are likely to be accepted at face value by despondent people. What matters it, they may say, if freedom. of religion and other intangible nonsense are lost? Religion is only an opiate anyhow. 

Strange as it may seem, the religious leaders of America, in spite of their pacifism and what used to pass for liberalism, abet the cause of communism. For years they have been as pink as scarlet fever, and it is improbable that a deeper , shade of red will cause them much anxiety. And in return, communism will not object too strongly to their form of opiate. Their "religion", a socialistic. and communistic philosophy, is entirely man-centered; and their large control of radio is an excellent screen for the silencing of the God-centered thought that seriously denies the supremacy of man. The modernist church will prate piously about the freedom of worship, and yet at the same time it will classify the freedom to practise religion as a form of class hatred. 

To combat this attack on Christianity, the first step is clear. The basic principles of a God-centered philosophy must be. vigorously asserted in opposition to the .man-centered or humanistic type of thought. Against the sovereignty of man the sovereignty of God must be boldly proclaimed. In place of material well-being, the spiritual values of Christianity must be put in first place. 

An assertion of basic principles, however, is far from sufficient to. stem the tide of humanism and communism. It is relatively easy to make belief in God appear plausible. A general theistic world-view and even an authoritarian revelation can be defended against the charge of inconsistency. However, when all this is done, the theistic world-view will not be convincing to the political, intellectual and social leaders of our day. And the reason that it will fail to convince is that basic principles alone cannot compete with basic principles plus an application in detail. If Christianity is to survive in any large way, the human task - always depending on God's grace - is to apply its principles to all phases of life. 

The radicals have their influential spokesmen in Washington with specific proposals to abridge the. freedom of religion and of the press, with specific, proposals to ruin the financial structure of our country, with specific proposals to alter the administration of justice. 

The Calvinistic Christian has the doctrine of total depravity and may even conclude that power in the hands of' one man or of a few is dangerous to public welfare. Fewer Calvinists have definite ideas on the gold standard. And are there any who can propose or criticise, on the basis of Christian principles, the more detailed points of law? Calvin cannot be accused of paying too little attention to theology, and yet he did not neglect the politics of Geneva. His. descendants today do not need less theology but they do need a Calvinistic law school. 

While the law is important, it is but an illustration of a general need. Another illustration, less pressing though more pleasant, is found in art. The Calvinist has the doctrine of common grace to explain the artistic ability of painters, sculptors, writers, and musicians. But where is the Christian theory of aesthetics, or where is Christian art-criticism? Art is a part of Cod's world - it has its place and purpose. But are these studied and understood by the Christian? Communism has made a rather specific use of art. No one can fail to see the communistic view of American' history in the works of Diego Rivera. This may be the use of art rather than aesthetic theory, but can the Calvinist compete on either score? 

The mention of history reminds one that the great Augustine outlined a Christian philosophy of history. Has it been developed and expanded? Evolution is an antichristian theory of biology - and of sociology too. Are there Christian alternatives, not merely in basic principle but in concrete detail? 

The need of a comprehensive Christian philosophy, shown by these illustrative examples, has been recognized at times. In the Stone lectures of 1898-99 Abraham Kuyper not only saw the need but took steps to meet it. The lectures are excellent, but unfortunately their greatest excellence is that they point out how much has been left undone. Kuyper's chapters are no more than a meager beginning. 

How can this beginning be continued? The educated leadership of the country has passed through an education that is basically and in detail opposed to Christianity. Most Christians are unaware of the extent to which they themselves have received pagan ideas. Practically everything that appears in print is in the broad sense humanistic. Such a situation shows clearly what is needed. A center of Christian learning must be established in which investigation in all fields of study will be pursued. A Christian college is not sufficient. Several Christian colleges exist at the present time. Some do respectable work; some are rather incompetent. A list of the faculty's publications is the, criterion. And there is enough room in the country for other Christian colleges, if they are to be competent. But the greater need is the need of a university. This includes a law school, as the preceding remarks have indicated; it must include a graduate school for the granting of the doctorate; and it must be administered by a faculty which through research, mutual criticism, and publication will develop the philosophy to coordinate Christian thought and action. 

Conservative Protestantism has shown all too little zeal in defending, the faith. A defeatist attitude induces surrender before the world's problems. Some supposedly devout fundamentalists openly advocate withdrawing into their little groups and refraining from meeting scholarly opposition The Romanists have adopted a different course. They give evidence of being deeply convinced of the truth of their system, and they are not too lazy to expand it by well-written volumes. They have their centers of learning and they have an organized body of knowledge. Roman zeal puts the fundamentalists to shame, and Roman gains imperil our Christian liberties. 

Since Protestantism is already so far behind in the race, no additional time should be lost. The recently announced temporary committee to form a Christian University Association should proceed as quickly as possible to charter a corporation, to collect subscriptions, equipment, and a library, and to recruit a competent and fully qualified faculty. Then, when the present armed conflict ceases, the Christian university would be ready to open its doors and wage successful war in the battle for God-centered truth.

Energetic Objections 5 Feb 5:42 PM (3 months ago)

I came across the Energetic Processions channel recently and took some time to listen to a few videos lodging objections to Protestantism on justification. It's a three and a half hour video, so I'm going to pick on just a few things the Eastern Orthodox panel mention. This originally was a longer post, but I already cut and published certain material in other posts, not all of which I can remember. For one example, though, see Robinson's comments at 52:20 in the video, which I address here and touch on again here).

One of the participants, Cyril Jenkins, says: 

More Thoughts on Necessitarianism 5 Feb 1:36 PM (3 months ago)

Clark's Critics II 4 Feb 5:11 PM (3 months ago)

This is a post in which I hope to round out some commentary on OPC critics of Gordon Clark. As I said in a recent and similar post (link; here and here are the other posts I've written), I cannot now dedicate time to responding to every such critic. Some men's material is book-length (at minimum). I am satisfied by my present efforts, though, and I look forward either to writing posts on other subjects or, as I really should be doing, returning to my transcription efforts on unpublished works of Clark, which have been slack. Below, I'll be analyzing works by Charles Dennison, Michael Horton, and John Muether.

Charles Dennison

The first critic with whom I'll interact is Charles Dennison, author of History of a Pilgrim People. I'll not repeat Robbins' critiques of this book (link). I recommend link two in paragraph 1 above for more information on the accurate timeline involving the "program of action." 

I'll point out Robbins writes that some things in Dennison's book are "helpful" - as do I - as high praise as I think I've ever heard Robbins say of one who sides with Van Til rather than Clark. Generally, this is a book with quality information. I had to borrow a copy from an OPC friend and take numerous pictures, since no copies were available for below $125. I do hear it is being reprinted, however, which could explain the drop in price of currently available, used copies.

Dennison doesn't downplay the importance of the theological issues and offers some counter-historical claims to Frame's assertion that Van Til and Clark misunderstood each other; later, Muether will as well. He is certainly more measured than the authors mentioned in my last post, although like them (and just as Robbins says), he too nearly always fails to footnote a primary source for his more challenging intimations regarding Clark. 

Thus, there are gaps. For example, Dennison tries to explain how the accusation that Clark was a hyper-Calvinist could have been correct given his OPC cohorts (e.g. Robert Strong, Richard Gray). They apparently "looked past his theological positions" (pg. 134). No evidence or specificity is given for or to any of this.

Most of what Dennison has to say about the 1940s debate is extremely short. Dennison also does not note that Clark not only distinguished God's knowledge and man's knowledge quantitatively but in respect to mode (pg. 133). He mentions Clark's view of the primacy of the intellect as one of the inciting issues and that for Van Til (emphasis mine), "Man's knowledge is like (analogous to) God's knowledge but it is not the same" (pg. 133). I'll discuss these topics later, under a different author, below.

What cannot be missed is that Dennison pictures Clark as a "front man" (his words) for a larger network of OPC churchmen who wished "to bring the church back to an American Presbyterianism of an evangelical stripe" (pgs. 133-134). Now, where the idea of a "front man" comes from, I don't know - it isn't footnoted in any author I've read who has made the claim. I do, however, recommend the following writings by Clark - written around the time of the controversy - so readers can see if they find anything objectionable or anti-Reformed about his position on Christianity and culture: link, link ("The Next War"). 

Dennison's thesis - a negative view of the so-called "evangelical stripe" defended by Clark et al. - depends on his view of Machen (and our relationship to him) being correct: "Because we in the OPC lack a cultural tie, we lack an indigenous American identity and a route to larger appeal. This cross has been difficult first us to bear. So far we have been unwilling to abandon it, possibly because we sensed our relationship to Machen would never be the same if we did" (pg. 7). 

What of North's interpretation of Machen (see my last post)? And are we really going to suggest we should follow Machen in all respects? Dennison doesn't (pg. 13ff.), and North's book shows Machen had his faults. I'm also somewhat skeptical of the idea that OPC churchmen dwell on their "relationship" to Machen concerning this whole question. 

There are a few ways of framing the issue. One is to ask, as Dennison does, are we better off "culturally disenfranchised," without an "establishment identity" (pg. x)? For example, can the church without this identity "better declare God's word? advise foes? manifest a true catholicity? be a servant in the world for the sake of the Savior whose kingdom is not of the world? If it can, we dare not shrink from such a liberation..."? 

Wait - what if it can't? A church can always serve in the ways Dennison describes, but I've noticed a persistent theme in OPC literature on this point: to leave questions about whether cultural engagement is better or not in the hypothetical and to assume the very point at issue. What if our being honest about the horrors of sin that are perpetuated, regulated, or even legislated and enforced in our country enables us to "better declare God's word" et al.? 

If Dennison considers his position a liberation, what would he consider this hypothetical requirement? Or, what is the antonym of liberation? Since I can speak in hypotheticals as easily as Dennison, if the church is, say, supposed to speak (to political representatives, even!) and act on behalf of the oppressed in society, wouldn't it be quite ironic for Dennison to think of the hypothetical requirement I'm presenting as itself oppressive? 

What are the best arguments Dennison has? One is a series of rhetorical questions. From pg. 40: "...in the culture, is [the church] to dominate? Take over? Is she the purveyor of some sort of religious imperialism? Or is she to seek marriage with the culture and become indistinguishable from it?" These hyperboles are quite a far distance, though, from Dennison's original contention that "Simply put, the OPC has no cultural or social agenda" (pg. 7). 

A better argument, I think, would be to bring to the forefront what some OPC theologians have alluded to but not explored deeply when it comes to this topic: eschatology. Dennison notes that it was linked to "the new Westminster apologetic" (pgs. 111ff.) by Buswell, but Dennison too seems to leave the point to others to debate and discover. I'm speaking here of the implicit amillennialism of a number of authors whom I have mentioned have written about or commentated on this topic. I mentioned one framing of the issue earlier, here is another: is this being argued as a part of our denominational identity? 

If so, it needs to be made explicit. Further argumentation would be also needed that amillennialism encourages some kind of ecclesiastic invisibility or silence. Whereas Dennison views his position as liberating, I would think ecclesiastic freedom to speak and act on current, cultural events would be more liberating. The OPC has even seemingly done this prior to the time of Dennison's publication (link).

Muether and Hart do at least make explicit, in Fighting the Good Fight, that "the leaders of the OPC fully embraced the teaching of amillennialism as the view on Christ’s return most consistent with Scripture." Muether and Hart are referring to the Westminster faculty of the time. But I don't find any clear indication that amillennialism was a mark of the OPC's identity. Clark rejected amillennialism as a founding member and leader, although he accepted that "In this world the Christian is a pilgrim and a stranger" (Readings in Ethics, 1931, chapter on Early Christianity). 

It is obviously not in the scope of this post to attempt to answer which eschatological view is more or less true. There is another wrinkle here, however: dispensational premilennarians split from the OPC in 1937. Granted, they left for reasons not exclusive to eschatology, but when they formed the Bible Presbyterian Church, the former OPC members who split off made changes to the Westminster Standards "to reflect the premillennial doctrine held by the founders of the synod" (link).

Clearly, eschatology had some role in the 1937 split. This could be taken to mean the OPC had a distinctive eschatological identity after all, or it could simply mean the OPC by and large rejected the pretribulational premillennarian (and often dispensational) theology of those who left. The latter seems more likely to me, since, as the Bible Presbyterian Church members themselves implicitly acknowledged by attempting to reformulate them, the Westminster Standards as accepted by the OPC don't specify one millennial position as correct.

Either way, Clark's recommendation to become a member in the American Council of Christian Churches, stated at the OPC's twelfth general assembly (link), was a recommendation to regarding a council founded by the leader of those who split off from the OPC in 1937 to help form the Bible Presbyterian Church: Carl McIntire (see Dennison's chapter on Tragedy). 

Clark was, of course, also formerly employed by his friend, J. Oliver Buswell, another OPC member who split with McIntire in 1937 - who is credited with partially convincing Clark of premillennarianism by the time he was hired at Wheaton College (where Buswell was president), in 1937. Although Clark remained in the OPC and maintained a fundamentally different position on premillennialism than the Bible Presbyterian Church members, the two remained in friendly correspondence.

In 1937, we see an indication of how members who were soon to split from the OPC perceived treatment against their views by who Muether and Hart regard as the leaders of the OPC. In a recorded statement from the third general assembly (link), we read: "Mr. Laird resigned from the Board of Westminster Seminary on April 27 because the seminary had in recent months turned from exposure and attack upon modernism to an attack upon premillennialism." 

The open question is whether eschatology was relevant to the 1940s OPC debate. In short, did these same leaders - the Westminster faculty - see it as a success when in Clark, another advocate (and perhaps advocates, depending on what were the eschatological views of others who left the OPC with Clark) for premillennialism left the OPC... or was this largely unrecognized as an after- or non-thought? 

A subject worthy of further research, I can only offer a few comments before I leave most of it for another time or person to pursue. Those interested are encouraged to pay careful attention to Dennison's chapter on Vos and the "otherworldliness" of the Christian religion (pg. 85ff.). Compare Daryl Hart, who uses the same language here and, as I recall, in his book on The Lost Soul of American Protestantism. 

The key question, I think, is what does the "not yet" part of history look like. In his last sentence to his chapter on Clark and others, Dennison says, the OPC "has been stamped with an other-worldliness and waits for further help as to how she, rather than seeking to regain the world she has lost, might be of service to her Lord in the world" (pg. 136). On and for what is the OPC waiting? 

It is true that Adam had a pre-redemptive eschatological goal and that Christ has already granted to His people eschatological blessings (pg. 85). But is the Christian religion "otherworldly" in the sense that we lose all touch with our life as pilgrims as we look to Christ's return? Dennison correctly notes that the "wholly-other" god of neo-orthodoxy "generated their own irrelevance" (pg. 100) - is he in similar danger here with respect to the church? 

Michael Horton

Horton's follow-up - in which he finally brings up Van Til - is baffling. He quotes a passage from Van Til's The Defense of the Faith to the effect that "Our knowledge of God is not and cannot be comprehensive," and then Horton immediately says of this, "In his debate with Gordon Clark, Van Til defended the classical Reformed insistence on this distinction" (pg. 136). 

Clark's Critics 26 Dec 2024 2:57 PM (4 months ago)

At this point, it almost goes without saying that I enjoy interacting with critics of Clark (link, link, link, link, link, and so on). I myself critique Clark here and there, but there are better and (usually) worse attempts. It would be impossible to respond to every critic, and I don't feel any sort of compulsion to interact with everyone - especially not random people on the internet. But in time, I do hope to have a decent collection of responses to critics who were worth engaging.

I've mostly dealt with contemporary authors. It would take much more investment of time than I have at present to comb through all of Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, and others' work who may not be as well known now but were during, say, the 1940s OPC controversy (e.g. Klooster, Kuschke, Stonehouse). It would also be reinventing the wheel to go over ground that has been sufficiently covered by others. 

Unapologetica 19 Dec 2024 7:24 AM (4 months ago)

There is a part of me that has considered this blog as primarily a medium through which I can work out my own thoughts. But I do recognize that other people read it from time to time. I hope what I write strengthens those readers. 

Every so often, I try to remind myself why I gave this blog its title: while I frequently reflect on apologetic matters, 2 Corinthians 12:19 intimates that defenses I offer are not supposed to be of myself per se. So if - as a husband, father, son, brother, friend, or stranger - I've lost sight that my speech ought to be consciously performed in the sight of God as a Christian being conformed to Christ, the sort of apologetic in which I'm engaging is a failure that will build neither myself nor others up. This happens all too frequently. What can help?

Concrete imagery can ground us. We are meant to be the light of the world (Matthew 5:14-16). This is only possible because the Word is the redeeming light in whose image Christians are progressively conformed (Hebrews 1:3, John 1:9ff., 2 Corinthians 4:5-6, Romans 8:29, Ephesians 1:8-9). The word of the Word is a lamp unto our feet and light unto our path (Psalm 119:105). To the extent that we live our lives according to God's word, we ourselves are enlightened (Ephesians 1:17-18, 5:8-17). Thinking of light should almost trigger an automatic response of that on which we are already disposed to meditate. The same can be said of other imagery (link, link, link, link). The following passage is rich in wisdom:

2 Corinthians 2:17-3:5 ...we are not, like so many, peddlers of God's word, but as men of sincerity, as commissioned by God, in the sight of God we speak in Christ. Are we beginning to commend ourselves again? Or do we need, as some do, letters of recommendation to you, or from you? You yourselves are our letter of recommendation, written on our hearts, to be known and read by all. And you show that you are a letter from Christ delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts. Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God. Not that we are sufficient in ourselves to claim anything as coming from us, but our sufficiency is from God.

A Review of "The Bible, Verification, and First Principles of Reason" (Without Excuse) 19 Dec 2024 4:36 AM (4 months ago)

Last year, I posted a few extended comments on a footnote that referenced Gordon Clark in chapter 11 of Without Excuse (link). In this post, I plan to focus attention on chapter one. It's the essay I found to be the most interesting, contains the only other mentions of Clark in the book, and can also be read for free (link).

The author, M. Dan Kemp, proposes the following thesis: “…if the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge, attempts to verify the Christian Scriptures are not epistemically profitable” (pg. 1). When I read this for the first time, it sounded like Mr. Kemp was suggesting that a Christian foundationalist who accepts Scripture as his epistemic foundation cannot know his epistemic foundation by inferential reasoning. Therefore, any further attempts made towards that end - knowing the Christian Scriptures are true - would not be profitable. 

I would have agreed with Mr. Kemp to the extent that the sort of "human knowledge" in question are true beliefs humans have that are epistemically justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense. That is, in some contexts, while I think "knowledge" might legitimately refer to something other than this (e.g. mere true beliefs; true beliefs that are justified in an externalist sense), there are ways in which internalist and infallibilist "knowledge" is distinctively important. I think the latter knowledge alone can provide grounds for full assurance of salvation or a defense of one's beliefs. With these qualifications in mind - and the importance of these qualification will become more apparent later on - Mr. Kemp's thesis seems sound.

Immediately following this thesis, however, Mr. Kemp says:

This result is particularly acute in readings of Scripture passages that seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God. I argue that the position put forward by Clark, Van Til, and Frame entails a reading of these passages that renders them useless as criteria of verification, even though, on the contrary, the passages present themselves as such. In short, the popular reply to critics of the Clark and Van Til school mentioned above does not succeed. (Without Excuse, pgs. 1-2)

As I initially read this, the first question I had was what Mr. Kemp thinks "verification" means. More on this below.

The second question I had was why Mr. Kemp seems to suggest that Clark, Van Til, and Frame had a singular "position" on this topic. From what follows in the rest of the chapter, Clark would have certainly disagreed with Frame et al. if, as Mr. Kemp thinks, these authors really were "insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means" (pg. 10). By at least the time he wrote "How Firm a Foundation?" in 1943 (also see below), there can be no question about how Clark viewed Scripture for the rest of his life. 

Clark did not think exactly as Frame and Van Til did. This fact is actually indicated by the only time Clark is even quoted in the entire chapter (in a section Mr. Kemp entitles, “Justification and Circularity,” no less!):

How do we know if a purported first principle is correct? Consider again the exchange about my birth city. If the Christian Scriptures are the first principle of reason, then it will not do for me to end the conversation by asserting that reliable witnesses, sensory experience, and memory ought to be believed. Even these principles require rational justification. Gordon Clark says,

Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically…Since therefore every philosophy must have its first indemonstrable axiom, the secularist cannot deny the right of Christianity to choose its own axiom. Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures. This is the Reformation principle sola scriptura. (Without Excuse, pg. 7)

Take another example of Clark's thought on this subject:

A recent book on Classical Apologetics tries to prove the divine origin and infallibility of the Bible on the premise that the Bible contains accounts of God’s miracles. This is circular reasoning: How do you know the Bible is God’s Word? Because it contains accounts of God’s miracles. How do you know that the accounts are true? Because they are in God’s inerrant Scripture! If anyone wish to prove that the Bible is a divine revelation, his premise cannot be the Bible itself. One does not prove the Pythagorean theorem on the basis that the squares of the other two sides equal the square of the hypotenuse. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pg. 314 [originally published in 1986 in his book, First & Second Thessalonians])

Is it not clear that Clark's position is different from any position which suggests that "first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means"? To my knowledge, there are only a few places one might try to find some indication that Clark approved of circular reasoning. The first comes from an article Clark wrote on "Apologetics" in 1957. In providing his understanding of Van Til's apologetic, Clark wrote:

In total opposition to Thompson's point of view, the Reformed apologist frankly admits that his methodology presupposes the truth of Christianity. Therefore "the issue between believers an unbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to 'facts' or 'laws' whose nature is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate" (p. 117). Since "there is one system of reality of which all that exists forms a part," and since "any individual fact of this system is what it is in this system," it follows that apart from Christian presuppositions "no facts mean anything at all" (p. 164). "All reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusions are always involved in one another" (p. 118). These quotations, of course, seriously abbreviate Van Til's exposition, but if one keeps in mind the acknowledged control of axioms over theorems, and the theorem's presupposing the axioms, in which case geometry itself may loosely be called circular reasoning, it will not be too difficult to grasp Van Til's thought. 

But apologetics is more complicated than plane geometry, and the matter of the starting point becomes involved with the notion of a common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and a theory of analogy.

In this discussion of the starting point with the example of the axioms and theorems of geometry, it is immediately obvious that there can be no theorem common to two systems of geometry. 

At least three observations mitigate against interpreting the above as evidence that Clark's accepted the epistemic legitimacy of circular reasoning. Firstly, Clark is expositing Van Til's thought, not expressing his own. As the rest of the article shows, Clark's "grasp" of Van Til of Van Til's thought cannot be equated with his acceptance of Van Til's thought. 

Secondly, anyone who believes that the above summary implies some measure of agreement between Clark and Van Til must first acknowledge Clark's own qualifications: axioms "control" theorems, circular reasoning is only "loosely" allowed as a referent to the geometric analogy (in particular), etc. This is not the language of traditional coherentism.

Finally, the above context is not only about Van Til's thought in general, it's specific to Van Til's thought on apologetics. The title of the article itself makes that obvious. This is important, as epistemology (the focus of Mr. Kemp's essay) is a distinct discipline. Apologetics is a discipline which itself presupposes epistemology. An allowance for self-reference or circular reasoning in a context in which one is defending his faith (see below) is entirely different from allowing self-reference or circular reasoning in a context of epistemic justification (see the above quotes from Clark). 

So much for this example. The only other location I could find that might afford reason for thinking Clark advocated circular reasoning is from an article he wrote in 1963 entitled, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?" He writes:

The first reason for believing the Bible is inspired is that the Bible claims to be inspired. When this reason is offered to an unbeliever, almost always his immediate reaction is derision. To him it is very much like putting a liar on the witness stand and having him swear to tell the truth. But why a liar? Do not honest witnesses also swear to tell the truth? Yet even a Christian with a smattering of logic may object to this procedure because it seems to beg the question. It is circular. We believe the Bible to be inspired because it makes the claim, and we believe the claim because it is inspired and therefore true. This does not seem to be the right way to argue.

It must be granted that not every claim is ipso facto true. There have been false witnesses in court, there have been false Messiahs, and there have been fraudulent so-called revelations. But to ignore the claim of the Bible, or of witnesses generally, is both an oversimplification and a mistake. For example, suppose the Bible actually says that it is not inspired. Or suppose merely that the Bible is completely silent on the subject – that it makes no more claim to divine inspiration than did Churchill. In such a case, if the Christian asserts that the book is inspired, the unbeliever would be sure to reply that he is going far beyond the evidence.

This reply is certainly just. There is no reason for making assertions beyond those that can be validly inferred from the statements of the Bible. But because this reply is so just, it follows that the unbeliever’s derision at our first remark was groundless. What the Bible claims is an essential part of the argument. The Christian is well within the boundaries of logic to insist that the first reason for believing in the inspiration of the Bible is that it makes this claim. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 2-3)

It may initially appear as if Clark is admitting as legitimate a circular "procedure." But even here, Clark admits that self-attestation simpliciter does not constitute a proof - as he puts it, "not every claim is ipso facto true." For example, the Bible claims to be God's word and the Quran claims to be God's word. Yet because the Bible contradicts the Quran, both claims cannot be true. An argument regarding the self-attesting nature of a source does not "prove" either is what it claims to be. 

But Clark does acknowledge that self-attestation is apologetically legitimate. A Christian can at least begin his defense of his faith by noting that the Bible claims to be God's word. But, for Clark, a "reason for believing the Bible" is not a suggestion that one's belief in the Bible is founded upon some more basic epistemic truth. Anyone who thinks that failed to read the rest of the article, let alone the rest of Clark's works. Clark clarifies:

Christianity is often repudiated on the ground that it is circular: The Bible is authoritative because the Bible authoritatively says so. But this objection applies no more to Christianity than to any philosophic system or even to geometry. Every system of organized propositions depends of necessity on some indemonstrable premises, and every system must make an attempt to explain how these primary premises come to be accepted. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21)

Note that for Clark, self-attestation is not purported to be a demonstration of the truth of Christianity. Rather, he emphasizes that an objection Christians face regarding circular reasoning can be applied tu quoque to the objectors. Clark agrees with Mr. Kemp that “If Scriptures forms the basis of all knowledge, then all arguments for the trustworthiness of Scripture are circular” (pg. 2) - and then he extends this point to other worldviews with stated first principles. An apologetic which uses circular reasoning (e.g. self-attestation), as a means of converting unbelievers is not deficient; after all, how can anyone who would attempt defend his own, primary, indemonstrable premises do so without first knowing such premises? 

Again, apologetics presupposes epistemology. Thus, Clark is not suggesting that one's own, primary, indemonstrable premises are epistemically grounded in or demonstrated by prior reasons. This would be incoherent. For those interested, I've written more on coherentism, foundationalism, and self-attestation here and here.

Divine Determinism: Engaging Eastern Orthodox Criticisms 16 Dec 2024 11:59 AM (4 months ago)

In a few posts, I've mentioned Eastern Orthodox apologist Russ Manion. Since numerous Eastern Orthodox apologists and philosophers seem to have been influenced by his [rather scantily available] work, I've found it useful to read him myself. Elsewhere, I've outlined how he borrowed from Reformed presuppositionalists in ways current Eastern Orthodox apologists have either failed to grasp or follow (link, link). 

I've also acknowledged that it is of course the case that I would find areas of disagreement with him. I'm not Eastern Orthodox, after all. This post will engage one such area. In the course of an hypothetical dialog on metaphysical naturalism, Manion writes (link):

“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature?” I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth. He was doing it again. It was obvious where he was going. I did not want to go there. But, I did not know how to stop it. His logic was seamless. Yet, I knew he must be wrong. After all, here I was reasoning with him, wasn’t I? I answered, “of course it is. As you have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I would not be a naturalist.” “Then they must all be determined, aren’t they?” He affirmed. And there it was. It was to easy. The point was succinct. There are few terms. There was very little room for error. But, I wasn’t about to help him. If he wanted the point, he would have to make it. “So, they are determined.” I said. “What has that to do with reason?” “I would think that is quite clear.” He began. “If all your beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn’t it?” “Now you’re stating the obvious.” I replied. “You’re taking awfully small steps aren’t you?” “Would you prefer I skip a step?” he countered smiling, “Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to believe it. It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it is the consequent of antecedent causes. You do not choose your beliefs. You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not.”

Objections were finally coming to me. I asked, “What if the antecedent causes are the reasons. Wouldn’t it be the case then that we are caused to believe something because it is true?” He didn’t even flinch. He simply responded, “That makes no difference. If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in naturalism. There are a couple of problems here. First, it does no good to cite your reasons for holding a position. If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid. Remember, as a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but every notion, justification, and thought you have. “The second problem has to do with the fact that there are those who disagree with you. As a naturalist you believe that the beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined. In fact, they are determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your naturalistic belief is. How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate between the two beliefs? If all caused beliefs are true, and all beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is not the case that all beliefs are true.”

Note again that the context of this dialog is between a metaphysical naturalist and a Socratic figure - the latter of whom also turns out to be a metaphysical naturalist (albeit a more "consistent" one in that he follows their premises to the absurd entailments). As we will see below, by the end of the conversation, the roles reverse, and the former protagonist for metaphysical naturalism will turn the tables on his Socratic interlocutor by abandoning the position.

Now, what I've highlighted above must be disambiguated from this context in order to assess whether the stated problem with the determinism of the protagonist is 1) in virtue of his "metaphysical naturalism" or 2) is a problem with determinism as such. I think Manion just has the former in mind - here, at least. If so, perhaps I wouldn't disagree with Manion after all. 

In fact, a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion's points if he indeed restricts the problem to the domain of "metaphysical naturalism," the definition of which can be hard to pin down (link) but seems to be associated by Perry Robinson - the author of the Eastern Orthodox blog in which this conversation was posted - with some form of materialism. In his final comment on the post, Robinson writes:

As for logic and the universe, the reason why the naturalist has a hard time with this is manifold. Presumably the laws of logic aren’t material things or reducible to material things.

If logic is immaterial and "good reason" presupposes logic, then it would indeed be impossible for a materialist to have determined beliefs which are held "on the basis of good reason."

A further reason a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion here is that unlike the metaphysical naturalists in his dialog, a Reformed Christian would say that effects are always determined by the "antecedent state of the universe." After all, unlike the metaphysical naturalist, the Reformed Christian will regard the "universe" itself is an effect - of God's free, non-necessitated choice. Just so, God's free choice may effect our beliefs by supernatural means (as well as by ordinary, second causes). An obvious example would be that Reformed Christians argue regeneration leads to belief in the gospel. I'll speak more on this below.

Another reason to think he only has metaphysical naturalism in mind is that his following statement seems to entail fatalism or necessitarianism, which a Reformed Christian is quite capable of denying (link, link, link): 

If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid.

To spell out a reply in a little more detail, while the Reformed Christian does indeed believe our positions are determined, we might not have held them were God to have decreed otherwise. Indeed, I think this argument in italics is quite weak, as the very next line concedes that "the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify." That being the case, it cannot be that even a metaphysical naturalist would hold a position "regardless of the reasons given" except insofar as naturalism is incompatible with logic (in which case my response would be the same as what I mentioned earlier) or is necessitarian (unlike Reformed theology). On the contrary, one's position is held precisely because of the reasons given - in other words, only certain means lead to certain ends, which is anti-fatalistic. 

Further, if one is determined to offer invalid reasons for a position, does that mean it is impossible for anyone whose discernments are determined to discern said invalid reasoning? Not for a Reformed Christian. God can determine that people hold [right] beliefs for right reasons or to discern when people (or, upon self-reflection, even oneself) hold beliefs for wrong reasons. Again, then, a charitable understanding of Manion would be that he is specifically arguing against metaphysical naturalism. The context of the above quote and later ones like it seem to confirm this interpretation: 

I sat around for weeks in an epistemic frump. I spent my time flipping through magazines and popularized treatments on modern physics. You know, Schrodinger cat stuff. Every once in a while I would get a surge of confidence and blurt, “Of course I know some things.” Then I would remember that as the chemical tide of my brain ebbs and flows, I would think such things whether they are true or not. Tide in, “I believe such and such to be the case because I have good reason to believe it.” Tide out, “I believe the universe is acting out in me the belief that such and such is the case and that I have good reasons to believe it, whether or not such and such is true.”

Now, it is often true that one might mistakenly believe that he has good reasons for a position. But this is true irrespective of whether one's belief [as well as his reasons] are determined. The point, then, is that apologists for Eastern Orthodoxy, Arminianism, et al. cannot misapply these arguments to the context of Reformed theology. 

A while later in Manion's dialog, we read:

"...Would it be fair to say I believe nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?” “Yes I think that would be an accurate statement,” I replied. “I don’t think it’s accurate at all.” He surprised me. “The language is not naturalistic. It originates from a time when the predominant metaphysical position was dualism. People thought reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed reality consisted of mind. They believed man was essentially transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material world. Man himself was not determined. But as a naturalist you have already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all phenomena of nature haven’t you?” I thought a moment, “Sure,” I said. He continued, “It would follow then, that we do not do anything. We do not act on nature. We are actions of nature. Our thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to us. My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is an idea that nature has in me. The “idea” is an event in nature that occurs in association with the event in nature called “me.” Do you agree with this?"

“I suppose I would have to. I do not believe we transcend nature.” I answered. “But this is in keeping with my robot paradigm. Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put into them. Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive. Obviously, they knew something the others didn’t.” He countered, “The robots know nothing. Simply, the ones set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don’t, don’t. Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the way? Does water that finds its’ way to the ocean know something that other water doesn’t? You see, water simply does what nature would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory apparatus, and programs would have them do. Their actions are caused. They cause nothing. In like manner we believe what nature would have us believe. We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature.”

“OK,” I said. “I already agreed everything is determined, and I’ll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in it. But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is what I am. I can live with that, and that is not nihilism.” “Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural world?” he asked. “Certainly,” I answered, “No one would question that.” “Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you than it does for me?” he asked. “No, of course not,” I replied. “Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that causes my beliefs?” he asked. “No, you know I believe there is only one natural world. Please stop trying to lead me,” I responded. “Then,” he asked, “how is it that you and I disagree?” I believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not. Yet, both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the antecedent state of the universe. Granted, we differ in our spatial and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which relationship is privileged to know the truth? I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid. I can think you are wrong only by assuming that my relationship is privileged, that it has caused in me truth and caused in you error. But, since you believe as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same assumption of privilege. And everyone who thinks, must make this assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold. In the end we must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on every subject. And on every subject all contrary opinions but one must be wrong. If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given. We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism.”

I felt as though the last door were closing. I didn’t have much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still had. “How can you be a nihilist then? You obviously believe in naturalism and reason.” “I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism. I said I use reason. I did not say I knew them to be true. More accurately, I would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and nihilism. It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can never know it. As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs in God and in truth. They cannot believe otherwise.”

There is quite a lot here to untangle. Once again, it seems as though Manion targets a specific kind of determinism: one in which our actions do not "transcend nature," in which our actions are "of nature," "naturalistic," etc. Does nihilism follow from this sort of determinism? Yes. If "nature" is all that is, then "nature" itself is meaningless; there are neither communicable, shareable, immaterial propositions nor corresponding metaphysical realities. 

Essential persistence and contingent change presuppose metaphysical grounding for a distinction between the two. If nature is all that is, there can be no distinction and you either have hyper-necessity or hyper-contingency. Eleatic monism is unintelligible due to its reductivity, and that which is unintelligible is meaningless; Hyper-Heraclitianism - on which the "man" changes as much as the "river" - is unintelligible for the opposite extreme of rejecting any commonalities. Hope for "meaning" utterly impossible, for "hope" is impersistent! There is no other option for the metaphysical naturalist, though, so nihilism follows. 

But Reformed theology is not subject to these criticisms (link). Man in particular transcends the rest of creation in being images of God. But our freedom is analogical to that of God. We will never be as God Himself is, so we don't function as the final, decisive factors who determine between contingent alternatives. God already did that according to His wisdom and good pleasure. Now, our freedom is genuine - we genuinely are free to desire, feel, think, choose. These have been determined - our freedom is a freedom "to," not a freedom "from" (especially not freedom "from" God's sovereign and eternal decree) - but these determinations could have been otherwise, and there is no resistance from us to that which we already [are determined to] want, do, believe, think, feel, etc. 

Criticisms such as that man must have an indeterministic freedom for it to be genuine really intend to suggest we must conceive of man's freedom as equivalent to God's freedom. Man is put too on par with God. It's idolatry. And raising man to equivalency with God will always, by the same token, lower God to the position of man. In this case, such is evident in that if man's freedom is indeterministic, God cannot be eternally omniscient. His knowledge would (per impossibile) depend on the temporal decisions of men. 

Does the theory fulfill its restrained but important aims? Suppose that in the actual world God constructs, at some time t0, a complete suppositional story that specifies the occurrence, at time t10, of such-and-such undetermined events including free human actions. Suppose that God then, at time t1, resolves to bring about all and only the states of affairs that the complete suppositional story says he directly brings about, and that at time t2 he starts implementing his resolution. There is no room in the story for anything to occur which defeats the suppositional justification either for the chronicle of events or for the epistemic conditionals which undergird it. But even assuming that God in fact strongly actualizes all the states of affairs which the story says he strongly actualizes, there is room in the actual world for events to occur which defeat the justification God has at t2 for believing that what in fact happens will not deviate from the story.

Bearing this point in mind, consider the propositions (P) The specified undetermined events will occur at t10 and (Q) There will be no defeaters for the justification of (P). Assume that at t2 God has adequate reasons for believing P. These very same reasons also constitute adequate reasons for his then also believing Q. But neither the truth of Q nor God’s having adequate reasons for believing it establishes that God’s adequate reasons for believing P are indefeasible. According to Kvanvig, ‘grounds are defeasible when it is possible for these grounds to fully justify a given belief and yet that justification be overturned by further learning’ (p.157); presumably he means epistemically possible. For any agent who is aware that adequate reasons for belief are sometimes defeated, the mere possession of adequate reasons for a specific belief does not exclude the epistemic possibility that the belief is false. I can see no way that Kvanvig can rule out its being epistemically possible, relative to the adequate reasons God has at t2 for believing Q, that P is false and that God will, at least by t10 and afterwards, have learned that P is false.

It might be replied: If, in the circumstances under discussion, God’s belief P is false, God has at t2 no way of obtaining evidence that this is so; but this contradicts Kvanvig’s general premise that no truths are inscrutable, a premise which implies that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can in principle become aware and which would thereby undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth.

The reply is mistaken. The general premise does not imply that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can here and now in principle become aware and whose use as a premise would undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth. After all, if scientists are currently justified in believing that no humans will exist 10 billion years from now, and their belief is in fact false, then defeaters for their current reasoning might not become cognitively available in principle until a million years from now. Hence if in the circumstances under discussion, God’s beliefs P and Q are false, the general premise is compatible with the proposition that God at t2 has no way obtaining evidence that P and Q are false.

In short, the moment one starts talking about the possibility of God having false beliefs (and how could this not be possible if God has prior beliefs about man's future, indeterministic decisions?), one has abandoned the sovereignty of God.

Certain statements made in what Manion says above might have been intended only to apply in the context of metaphysical naturalism. But if an analogy by parity of reasoning might be attempted, let's look at the result. Take the following statement from the dialog: "I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid." 

Now change "nature" to "God" and ask yourself if Manion might have made the same argument to a theological determinist. If not, well and good. If so, the desire to get "behind" God - as if! - is the same idolatry I mention above. And if what Manion says in here might have been analogized by him (or might be by other EOs) to the context of theological determinism, Manion's (or their) epistemology is flawed. To say that neither of two contradicting determinists could "know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given" presupposes that indeterministic freedom is a necessary criterion for knowledge. But what possible relevance could being able to indeterministically choose to have bad beliefs or reasons have to being able to know that one's current beliefs or reasons are true? 

In fact, we can't always "compare" beliefs and "evaluate" reasons. Everyone has to make an assumption for reasoning to even get off the ground. I've argued for foundationalism elsewhere numerous times. One can have immediate, non-inferential justification for at least one belief. So if I don't need indeterministic freedom there - if I don't need to "get behind" anything to compare the foundational belief to x, y, or z in order to know it - then why would I need it anywhere else?

I can imagine one final analogization from Manion's foregoing dialog: "“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature? ...We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature." Again, for the sake of argument, exchange "God" for "nature." 

Obviously, a Reformed Christian will hold to a Creator-creature distinction and deny that we are a part of God. As I said above, we have our own thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions. That these are caused does not make them any less ours. When God created the earth, His causing its existence does not imply that the earth was a part of God.  

Nor are we passive creations, mere vessels or repositories. We move. It's just that our movement is not by way of self-origination. Sometimes, only God moves, such as when He first gives us the regenerative grace necessary and sufficient for us to only then have the possibility - indeed, it determines us - to move back toward God. To use an illustration opposite to one I mentioned earlier, in regeneration, God, as He brings Himself near to us, changes our magnetic pole to such that we become drawn and move to Him. God is the originator of His and our movement, yet it is still we who move. And in our movement back to God, we are shown why indeterministic freedom is not needed to explain how co-operation or synergy with God is possible. 

Towards the end of the dialog, as the "protagonist" becomes more open to the idea of supernaturalism, he offers the following reflections against the skepticism of his metaphysical naturalist colleague:

What if there did exist an eternal being who’s very character was what we call moral and rational? What if he conceived and planed a created order? What if he then executed that plan and extended his rational and moral attributes to it? What if he then created other minds who, like his, were not mechanistically locked into the created order, but able to transcend and observe it? And what if he gave these minds the rational operational apparatus to evaluate their observations, to weigh them, compare them, and rationally extrapolate? Wouldn’t they then be able to learn and know?” “Wouldn’t knowledge then be possible? Wouldn’t the fact that nature was created as a rational system explain why it corresponds to rationality and why science is possible? Wouldn’t this solve the problems associated with determinism? Wouldn’t this allow us to say something is true for reasons rather than causes? Wouldn’t we be free to choose to believe the truth, rather than determined to believe what ever we are determined to believe? Wouldn’t this freedom make us morally accountable? That is, since we are ourselves the final determiners of our behavior, wouldn’t the final responsibility for our decisions lie with us? 

Various Debates on Eastern Orthodoxy 13 Dec 2024 11:10 AM (5 months ago)

In the past months, I've had several debates with those who are Eastern Orthodox on various topics. I will indent the comments of the various EO responders and not indent my own comments. One debate was on penal substitution (link):

------------------------------------------------------------

This is basically a repost of a video you made which is now private. I asked on that video (and did not receive a response): 

EO #4: I cited Canon 121 according to the Masterjohn translation of The Pedalion (Rudder). Canon 110 refers to people returning from Donatism and bishops. 

I agree with [EO #2] and The Church's teaching that infants aren't culpable because they haven't committed personal sin. However, they are liable for Adam's sin because they were found in Adam at the Fall, as all humanity was. We have our nature from Adam, and that nature was corrupted by his sin. Therefore, we fall under the same curse. You can find this language in St. Cyprian of Carthage, St. Ambrose, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Athanasius of Alexandria, St. Ephraim the Syrian, St. Hilary of Poitiers, and St. Symeon the New Theologian, and several other Church Fathers. 

Again, it depends on what you mean by guilt. St. Augustine used three words for that English word: culpa, reatus, and reus. 

As a side note, I don't really care what the average (or most, as you said...which is a claim that will be hard for you to prove) EO person today affirms. I care about what the dogmatically binding councils and Holy Scriptures say. Individual saints are not infallible. The consensus of the Fathers, which is borne out in the dogmatically binding councils, is. Carthage 418-419 is one of those councils.

From the Church Fathers I mentioned: 

But again, if even to the greatest sinners, and to those who had sinned much against God, when they subsequently believed, remission of sins is granted — and nobody is hindered from baptism and from grace— how much rather ought we to shrink from hindering an infant, who, being lately born, has not sinned, except in that, being born after the flesh according to Adam, he has contracted the contagion of the ancient death at its earliest birth, who approaches the more easily on this very account to the reception of the forgiveness of sins— that to him are remitted, not his own sins, but the sins of another.” – St Cyprian of Cathage, Epistle 58 

“In Adam I fell, in Adam I was cast out of paradise, in Adam I died. How shall God call me back, except He find me in Adam? For just as in Adam I am guilty of sin and owe a debt to death, so in Christ I am justified.” – St Ambrose of Milan, On the Death of His Brother Satyrus 

“Thus has the guilt of the disobedience that is by Adam been remitted; thus has the power of the curse ceased, and the dominion of death been brought to decay. And this too Paul teaches, saying, ‘For as by the disobedience of the one man, the many became sinners, so by the obedience of the One, the many became righteous.’ For the whole nature of man became guilty in the person of him who was first formed; but now it is wholly justified again in Christ. For He became for us the second commencement of our race after that primary one; and therefore all things in Him have become new.” 

“How did many become sinners because of Adam?… How could we, who were not yet born, all be condemned with him, even though God said, ‘Neither the fathers shall be put to death because of their children, nor the children because of their fathers, but the soul which sins shall be put to death’? (cf. Deut. 24:18) … we became sinners through Adam’s disobedience in such manner as this: he was created for incorruptibility and life, and the manner of existence he had in the garden of delight was proper to holiness. His whole mind was continually beholding God; his body was tranquil and calm with all base pleasures being still. For there was no tumult of alien disturbances in it. But because he fell under sin and slipped into corruptibility, pleasures and filthiness assaulted the nature of the flesh, and in our members was unveiled a savage law. Our nature, then, became diseased by sin through the disobedience of one, that is, of Adam. Thus, all were made sinners, not by being co-transgressors with Adam,… but by being of his nature and falling under the law of sin… Human nature fell ill in Adam and subject to corruptibility through disobedience, and, therefore, the passions entered in.” - St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on St. Luke's Gospel; Commentary on Romans 

“When Adam had transgressed, his sin reached unto all men.” - St Athanasius, Four Discourses Against the Arians and On the Incarnation of the Word 

“Just as Adam sowed sinful impurity into pure bodies and the yeast of evil was laid into the whole of our mass [nature], so our Lord sowed righteousness into the body of sin and His yeast was mixed into the whole of our mass [nature]” – St Ephraim the Syrian“ 

“Having been sent in a flesh in the likeness of that of sin, He did not have sin in the same way that He had flesh. But as all flesh comes from sin, that is, it derives from the sin of Adam the progenitor, He has been sent in a flesh similar to that of sin, because in Him sin does not subsist, but the image of sinful flesh.” – St Hilary of Poitiers, Commentary on Psalm 118 

“Human nature is sinful from its very conception. God did not create man sinful, but pure and holy. But since the first-created Adam lost this garment of sanctity, not from any other sin than pride alone, and became corruptible and mortal, all people also who came from the seed of Adam are participants of the ancestral sin from their very conception and birth. He who has been born in this way, even though he has not yet performed any sin, is already sinful through this ancestral sin.”

"Thus, in soul Adam died immediately, as soon as he had tasted [from the fruit of that tree from which God had commanded him not to taste, threatening him that if he should only taste of it he should die]; and later, after nine hundred and thirty years, he died also in body. For, as the death of the body is the separation of it of the soul, so the death of the soul is the separation from it of the Holy Spirit… Later, for this reason, the whole human race also became such as our forefather Adam became through the fall – mortal, that is, both in soul and body. Man such as God had created him no longer existed in the World.”– St Symeon the New Theologian, Homily 37:3; Homily 45:3

EO #2: You're either being obtuse or arguing just to argue I already stated as did ancient insights that liability was due to Adam's culpability being upon all men which makes us have a loss due to adams transgression so we are depraved of the inherentance, which you confuse and conflate every man has done what adam has done. We are still guilty because we are stricken with adams penalty by being his sons

EO #4: I'm staring right now at the 2006 Masterjohn version on my computer. It says what I posted in my comment. Which version are you looking at? You also accused me of citing Canon 110 of Carthage, so now you're changing your accusation. 

I'm happy to admit that those quotes were found on The Orthodox West's blog. I don't see where I found them having an impact on the content of the saints' words. The reason I brought up the various saints is to show that there's a wide consensus of the Church Fathers teaching original sin and that we are found guilty before God because of it before we even commit personal sins. That's why infants are baptized for the remission of sins. 

I would affirm St. Peter Mogila's confession, as did the Synod of Iași in 1642. The patriarchates of Jerusalem, Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria all signed on to it by 1643, making it dogmatically-binding. I'd especially affirm his response to Question 24, which is relevant here: 

"Whether all men are liable for the sin of Adam? 

As all mankind, during the state of innocence, was in Adam; so in him all men, falling from what he fell, remained in a state of sin. Wherefore mankind has become, not only subject to sin, but also, on account of sin, to punishment; which, according to the sentence pronounced by God, was (Gen. 2.17): “In the day that thou eatest of the tree, thou shalt surely die.” And to this the apostle alludes (Rom. 5.12): “Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.” So that we are conceived in our mother’s womb, and born in this sin, according to the holy psalmist (Ps. li.7): “Behold, I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin hath my mother conceived me.” This is called ancestral sin, first, because before this, man was free from all sin; although the devil was then corrupt, and fallen, by whose temptation this ancestral sin sprang up in man; and Adam becoming guilty, we all likewise, who descend from him, become also guilty. Secondly, this is called original sin, because no mortal is conceived without this depravity of nature." 

You'll get no argument from me about this statement. You might get some modernist EOs denying that, but they would be going against the tradition of The Church. 

For the record, I'm using the translation from Maksimologija because I couldn't copy the one made by J.J. Overbeck. The essence of the text is the same. 

Let me define my position better because I think we are talking past each other but might actually agree. If by culpable you mean liable for punishment because all of humanity was present in Adam when he sinned, then I would affirm that infants are culpable. If by culpable you mean that Adam and I (or infants) both chose to commit the original sin with the same level of intention, then I would not affirm that they are culpable. I believe St. Symeon is speaking of the former when stating that we are participants in Adam's sin. Therefore, I would say infants are culpable in the former sense mentioned above. 

I'm currently undecided between traducianism or creationism with regard to the creation of the soul because, as far as I'm aware (open to correction here), The Church has not dogmatically made a pronouncement. There were saints that held each of these views. St. Symeon's statement above would imply he affirmed some sort of traducianism. That said, I would say traducianism offers a simple explanation as to why Christ did not have original sin in His humanity (virginal conception by His mother). What IS condemned by The Church, however, is the preexistence of souls.

EO #4 The examples you shared with me are atrocious to hear as an Orthodox Christian. St. Augustine is always the strawman scapegoat for these types of people. They don't seem to actually read what he wrote, nor do they know that the "Eastern Fathers" also teach original sin. The article about inherited guilt in St. Augustine and St. Cyril on the Orthodox West's blog is helpful in this regard. Same with the Ancestral/Original Sin article. Anytime I hear "East vs West" nonsense, I walk away. 

I remember commenting on Bp Irenei's video. That statement is pretty darn close to Pelagianism. Even his walk back statement was still crypto Pelagian (see from 11:41-12:54 of the video). I wish more Orthodox people knew that Pelagianism (in the form of Caelestius and Julian of Eclanum) was condemned at the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus. In fact, Nestorianism and Pelagianism were both linked by St. John Cassian and Marius Mercator: 

"[T]he error of Pelagius ... that in saying that Jesus Christ lived as a mere man without any stain of sin, they actually went so far as to declare that men could also be without sin if they [chose]." - St. John Cassian, On the Incarnation against Nestorius 

Accusing Theodore of Mopsuestia of being the father of the Pelagian position: "T]hat the progenitors of the human race, Adam and Eve, having been created mortal by God, did not wound any of their descendants when they strayed by their transgression, but harmed only themselves; that they made themselves guilty of the command before God, but absolutely no one else." - Marius Mercator, Commonitorium 

Romanides is just...he shouldn't even be taken seriously. Same with Yannaras. 

Orthodox people are better off learning their own faith instead of pontificating straw men about other confessions. I remember someone telling me about the "Latin view" of original sin. The Catechism of the Catholic Church didn't even teach what that person was saying. It makes Orthodoxy look really bad when erroneous polemical statements are made. 

With regard to your questions, I don't know enough about the Protestant confessions (especially the Reformed position) to give positive or negative answers to your questions.

Are the Senses Trustworthy in Any Sense? (And What Did Gordon Clark Think?) 12 Dec 2024 7:09 PM (5 months ago)

A sarcastic tweet sparked a conversation I felt worthwhile to preserve. The initial tweet - which was reposted in a public facebook group of which I am a member - was:

It's impossible to trust your sense perception of the world, unless it's your eyes reading words on the pages of the Bible, then your sense perception is infallible somehow.

The idea is the same-old objection to Scripturalism: "Don't you have to read the Bible?" This horse has been beat to death because, as I said in my initial comment replying to this tweet:

This is a conflation of metaphysics (specifically, a question of causation) with epistemology (reasons). Clark actually made the same mistake, I think, which is why he opted for occasionalism (a metaphysical theory of causation) when such wasn't necessary.

Suppose our senses do function as secondary causes of our beliefs. So what? That doesn't mean I have to ground my belief in sensation (in terms of reasoning).

Getting burnt by boiling water might have functioned as a secondary cause according to which I decide to go to the hospital to get help. That doesn't mean my belief in the value of hospitals in helping me heal is grounded in my having been burnt by boiling water. Again, that conflates metaphysics and epistemology.

I've addressed this in old posts (link, link). I mentioned one of these links in reply to someone who asked if I had elaborated on my above comment anywhere else. And this is what kicked off the following, long conversation about whether the senses are trustworthy (in any sense) as well as whether there is evidence Gordon Clark thought the senses are trustworthy (in some sense).

The idea that both answer are yes might sound incredible to readers of Clark. Clark, of course, eviscerated empiricism in his lifetime. Note, though, that the question isn't whether Clark ever accepted empiricism but rather whether there is evidence Gordon Clark thought the senses are trustworthy (in some sense). And there is.

While the group is public, I'll avoid using the real names of my interlocutors. The comments of the first one will be indented, and my responses to him will not. His initial reply to me was:

So, and just to clarify what imo is the issue being raised, I think (and I may be wrong - I'm not the best at this) is the *trustworthiness* of "senses functioning as secondary causes of our beliefs". And 'trustworthiness' here refers to whether those beliefs so produced are true or not. Is it the case that senses function as secondary causes of *true beliefs* to the extent that senses are trustworthy? If I remember correctly GHC and JR both said that even if senses produced 1 error then it could not be trusted, etc.... could it be that this is why GHC opted for a different explanation for such beliefs (whether he was an occasionalist - I now admit I don't really know). Anyway thanks for considering.

You have the right idea.

"GHC and JR both said that even if senses produced 1 error then it could not be trusted"

So, are the senses as secondary causes of true belief trustworthy? Or to ask it as the pic does, is our sense perception of the world trustworthy?

I think we can generally trust our senses in that we have reason to believe the senses were designed to function as second causes of true beliefs. But note:

1. Our belief in God's word is our foundational reason for having any sense of "trust" in our senses in the first place.

"First, sensation or perception is untrustworthy"...etc.... Language and Theology. I think the 1st edition is 1980.

Right. He means they are not absolutely trustworthy, which I already said. The senses should not be the sound basis for one's philosophy. Read one paragraph just prior to your quote:

Clark makes no distinction between “absolute trust” and some lesser degree of trust (“general trust”) in reference to sense or perception. Empiricism fails because -firstly (among other samples)- sense or perception is untrustworthy*. Clark then dives into examples – neither does he attribute untrustworthiness to original sin. Clark never answers the question "Don't you (have to) read your Bible?" with something to the effect that "I think we can generally trust our senses in that we have [Scriptural] reason to believe the senses were designed to function as second causes of true beliefs". 

*for untrustworthy: “If a witness in a criminal case is shown to have perjured himself, how much credence do you give to the other statements he made. If your eyes deceive you once you can’t believe any of it.” From “What is Apologetics,” The Gordon-Conwell Lectures on Apologetics, 1981. Minute 36. See footnote 2 here https://www.douglasdouma.com/.../gordon-clark-on-the.../...

Somehow, I missed that you replied. In any case, please read the entire context of your citation here:
https://gordonhclark.com/audio-transcript-6-what-is.../

Does it follow from Clark's NOT explicitly affirming in that portion of the exchange that the senses are "totally untrustworthy" and by putting forth those conditionals, that he means to say the senses are "generally trustworthy" to function as secondary causes of true beliefs? I don't see how. As for context, why is it that just after your citation ends, when the student replies, in effect, as you have, and then asked about reading/hearing the Bible, that Clark said "I shall take up that question, but at present, I wish to show that you can’t trust your senses"? Anyway, I also refer you back to the quote (from Douma). As for your court citation -did it ever dawn on you that if Clark used "occasionalism" (as you alluded to previously) as his explanation for reading the Bible, then maybe just maybe that same "occasionalism" could also explain "examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document"?

Your hypothesis would mean Clark thought we could have had infallible, extrabiblical knowledge, whereas I've already shown in the very quote that he thought human courts could err.

Hypothesis? I'm not putting forward any such thing. I'm countering your insistence that Clark taught that the senses are 'generally trustworthy' to produce true belief. Your courtroom citation shows no such thing: "examining" (or reading the Bible for that matter) is just as compatible with what you call Clark's "occasionalism" as it is with your notion that the senses cause true belief. It's not a hypothesis, it's a logical point meant to show that your use of the citation is more innuendo than entailment. Again, I point you to what Clark actually said when discussing the matter of the trustworthiness of the senses. That's all I'm doing. No hypothesis building going on here.

You are avoiding my point: do you think Clark affirmed that God directly illumines/causes our minds to infallibly know extra-biblical information?

Here's what I think. You put forward the notion that Clark's "late acceptance of occasionalism was a result of succumbing to the pressures of objections such as those raised in the original post". Ok. Assuming you are correct (which I have no idea if you are), and since I have not really seen what Clark lays out as to exactly what this 'occasionalism' is or entails, I'd (in a fit of good will) suppose (at least at this moment in time) that late Clark's version of occasionalism (if there be such a thing) would at the very least be compatible with both (1) his definition of knowledge and (2) his account of the untrustworthiness of the senses (summed up as "sense or perception is untrustworthy", and "you cannot believe any of it") and would (3) have an account of human error such that everyday things like reading or examining evidence -replete with the possibility of human error- are as compatible with it as you think those things are compatible with your "general trustworthiness of the senses as secondary causes of true belief" (phraseology Clark never used when discussing the (un)trustworthiness of the senses).

I appreciate the civil response. I've basically been arguing what you have outlined, with the qualification that Clark sometimes uses the same word to mean different things (given different contexts). I'll give an example.

Thanks. Do you think that everyday things like reading or examining evidence -replete with the possibility of human error- are compatible with Clark's occasionalism?

If you're asking about my own perspective, I would reject that a thoroughgoing occasionalism is compatible with a sound epistemology.

That wasn't my question. How about another: Do you think Clark thought his occasionalism was compatible with those everyday things?

I do not think it is consistent to affirm that God directly causes false beliefs. This is the same thing I have already said: late Clark's occasionalism is inconsistent with his epistemology.

Again, that wasn't my question. Anyway, I will end my part in this convo (Thanks btw!) by pointing out that Clark was quite clear that when it comes to the senses, "you cannot believe any of it", but you'd have it that Clark, when it comes to the everyday things (eg reading, examining, etc..), would have us believe some of it. Other than not finding anything in Clark where he lays out what a sensation is and how it can then become a perception to finally result in a true belief (let alone trustworthy in a general sense), it's also curious to me that I have never seen any opponent of Clark jump on such an inconsistency let alone Clark try to clear up that inconsistency in the ways you describe. Too, when Clark was criticized by the likes of Nash et al way back in the 60s and Reymond etc in the 70s and others in the 80s, Clark never admitted that the senses were trustworthy in some aspect, or to use your terms, generally trustworthy as secondary causes of true belief. Also, when Reymond attempted to extract the trustworthiness of senses from Scriptures (like you recommend), Clark did not follow his -or your - lead in any way. Rather he attacked Reymond's exegesis - you can find that attack in more than one book btw. I'm sorry, but I just don't find your 'evidence' to be at all convincing. Again, Thanks for the convo (none of what I've said is a critique of your attempt to rework Clark's epistemology (others have engaged in that as well - Reymond may be a good example...), my focus was very narrow). Have a Great Weekend.

In order for Clark's epistemology to be "reworked," Clark has to be understood as he speaks in various contexts. While I mean no offense, but I don't think you understand the contexts of what has been cited. You repeatedly confuse contexts in which Clark discussed basic epistemology with contexts in which he is not.

/"Do you think Clark thought his occasionalism was compatible with those everyday things?" 

My reply is no. / Ok then find me a citation where *he* denied it. Not one of your citations shows that, nor do any of them show that Clark thought, as you do, that "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of true belief". You are still operating only at the level of innuendo at this point. Find for me where *Clark* explains, as you would have it, of the senses, viz, "In short, then, senses may function as second causes of true and false beliefs. Therefore, they cannot be absolutely trustworthy and cannot be leveraged to make a case for empiricism in conversations about basic epistemology. 

On the other hand, in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty (knowledge with a capital K)." Where does Clark ever teach anything like that? He does not. You want to prove your point? Find *that* citation. Sheesh.

If you want to continue the conversation after all, that's fine by me. But if so, I would recommend not getting frustrated.

I go forward because you spin. I see you have not been able to provide the requisite explanation from Clark himself. Too bad. Tell me, where does late Clark ever say that "will involve the senses" is enough for him to infer "the senses are generally trustworthy secondary causes of true belief".

The quote I provided comes from August of 1975, within the last 10 years of Clark's life. If you admit that the following refers to intentional use of the senses -

I asked for citations from Clark - so, where does Clark say, teach, or define the "intentional use of the senses" and that such use allows him to infer that "the senses are generally trustworthy secondary causes of tb", or to infer the senses are "by which one shall 'know'", further where does he admit that the courtroom scene refers to such "intentional use of the senses" in such a way as to "'know' the intent of the litigants". I see no such citations. We could do this over and over - but it's on you to come up with the requisite citations. Please do.

I'll rephrase what I've already said by yet again repeating the same citation you have yet to seriously engage:

I've already told you what I think about the court citation as far as my focus in this conversation goes. So, and what's very interesting to me, is you can't find a citation in Clark something along the lines of, viz, "In short, then, senses may function as second causes of true and false beliefs. Therefore, they cannot be absolutely trustworthy and cannot be leveraged to make a case for empiricism in conversations about basic epistemology. On the other hand, in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses [add: when used intentionally not accidentally] may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty (knowledge with a capital K)", and to go along with that, a citation to the effect that when using the senses intentionally not accidentally that the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of true belief?

You haven't told me if you think Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

Not good faith? What you have provided is a single citation that you used to "infer" that Clark thinks as you do. I've already expressed in various ways why I'm not buying that "inference". As for intention and everyday things, doesn't *later* Clark (ie the occasionalist as you'd have it) strongly recommend I read the Bible? To hear, read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the Scriptures? Where does that later Clark say anything to the effect that such intention shows "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb"? And, aside, where does later Clark ever let on that his occasionalism is just not compatible with his strong recommendation concerning such everyday things (hint: you already claimed above that Clark thought his 'occasionalism' was not compatible with such everyday things)? Again, I need better citations than the one you've provided to be in a buying mood.

Yes, you are not acting in good faith. You keep saying you've "already expressed in various ways why I'm not buying that "inference."" But actually, you haven't. You can't cite yourself once as providing an explanation of the citation I've provided. You still have not answered the same question I've asked 3 times, the same question I'm going to repeat until you actually answer it. Do you think

Maybe the hang up here is the term "true" before "belief"? I have seen [interlocutor #1] argue elsewhere for the distinction between belief and knowledge, and in support of belief in an everyday sense, in so far that a critic once again brought up the perennial complaint of Clark not knowing who his wife is. I "know" (pun intended) [interlocutor #1] has a place for belief within his thinking and makes careful distinctions in regard to this.

There is a difference between belief and knowledge. In fact, that's why I am highlighting why Clark's use of Matthew 7:16 in his defense before the Judicial Commission of the RPCES is an important point (among other ones I've mentioned).

Yep, I can see that. I sense that it's the term "true" that is the issue here in so far that it is being coupled with sensation. I think what you are getting at is something more akin to "as accurate as one can humanly be"? Not, as you say, the capital "K" or "certainty"?

Insofar as accuracy does involve true belief, sure. What you are mentioning is a point of epistemology. Well, all of us agree that the senses do not yield infallible beliefs.

Aiming is one thing, able to grasp is another?

Absolutely. Hence why our aim is not infallible. [Interlocutor #1] denies both. I accept the former, and while I deny that we can infallibly do the latter, I do think the quotes I've cited indicates that we can nevertheless place general (not absolute) trust in the senses. That is, the senses cannot be the foundation of our worldview. I think I quoted this in this long thread, but it's probably worth repeating:

Here is a fascinating statement Clark makes in an unpublished sermon:

I sense that you and [interlocutor #1] are actually not as far apart as you both may think. 

I also agree with you in so far that we ought to act with regard to the sensation of many things. The Scriptures actually call us to act in regard to what we believe to be accurate sensation. So, in this sense, yes, I do believe that Scripture is commanding us to place some trust in the senses. It's the distinctions that you highlighted earlier that become paramount, and are also found within Scripture too. 

I also agree with you that Clark was in fact aiming in this direction. Clark's claim was never that all sensation is incorrect or even that it should be discarded all together, never to see the light of a, to use the analogy in play here, court room again, only that it be put in its appropriate place. Which seems to be what you and [Interlocutor #1] are both attempting to do here.
Again, I actually think you are both closer to one another than perhaps you "believe" (pun intended) yourselves to be. 

The "general trust" here is bound within the framework of belief and not knowledge.

"Able to teach" as Paul puts it, requires an ability to gauge, through sensation, roughly, at what theological level the people you are teaching are at.

Were that it was so. I think the critical point is what I say here (I cannot find your comment to which I replied):

"I should add that I think the aim has to hit more often than not for Clark to cite Matthew 7:16 here." 

Doesn't that require some sort of reference though? For something to "hit more often than not," wouldn't that require some sort of ability to assess and therefore some sort of standard to assess by? Or are you only assessing through belief again?

That is one question further than Clark answers. Anything I say in response would be speculative. Here is my speculation: you are again bringing up a question of epistemology, and a recursive one at that.

Right, this is important though. The above I think demonstrates the care you are giving to not delve into epistemology, and stay squarely within the realm of metaphysics, and that with regard to Clark. 

Personally, I don't see any problems with what you are saying here. In fact, I tend to agree. I had a lengthy disagreement with a Van Tillian here on this forum recently with regard to the need to acknowledge contextual distinctions between terms like "know" within Scripture. [...] and [interlocutor #1] both did a great job of demonstrating this point well actually. 

So, I think it's only fair that we allow Clark the same privilege, he was "certainly" (pun intended, or perhaps this highlights the point well) careful enough with his thinking to make such differentials. 

I think the challenge here might be one of language. To really get your point across, it may be helpful to try to use terms not commonly associated with epistemology and to try and find other expressions. 

The same issue crept into the debate with the Van Tillians mentioned above. "Know" isn't always used in an epistemological sense within Scripture and is used in different senses at times. Context obviously is the key, even with regard to your comments. The problem though is that at times people can hyper fixate on terms. 

It's a challenge that I think Clarkians would do well to address because how we speak can be, and often is, misconstrued, either nefariously or in ignorance. It would help a lot to adjust our language toward that metaphysical foundation you refer to here.

Context certainly matters. Of course, even if Clark's focus is metaphysical (and again, I am speculating), there will be epistemic implications - even if left unrealized or unconsidered (for various reasons).

And what you mention about Van Til connects to this. Van Til was present at the presbytery meeting during which Stonehouse, another complainant, is recorded in a 1945 Presbyterian Guardian article as saying (the " " is a direct quote of Stonehouse):

Church History and Apologetics - Interview Transcriptions of Richard Price 27 Jul 2024 6:52 PM (9 months ago)

Having recently invested in and recommending that Protestants become more engaged in apologetics relating to church history (link), I would like to recommend Richard Price's works as an entry point for those who already have a basic understanding of Trinitarian and Christological heresies - many of which you can read for free here. 

Conversations in Theology 18 Jul 2024 9:19 PM (9 months ago)

In the past few years, I've taken part in a few conversations in theology on Puritanboard. At some point, I had thought I might edit each conversation to be more readable as a blog post. Life, my thoughts, and reading habits tend to move too rapidly for that to happen, though, so any polish I plan to add to those conversations will have to wait until and unless I synthesize them in a future book. Instead, I'll simply link to several of them - some of which also have further links I will leave to the reader to decide if they are worth the time - and provide a brief synopsis of some content covered. I also group multiple threads under similar topics:

Is Studying EO Worth It? If So, How? - when is it worth investing time in studying EO? How should one go about it if it is worth it?

Person/Nature Distinction - what is the distinction, and why is it useful to know?

What is Nestorianism? - and who is one?

Van Til and "Common Ground" - what "common ground" did Van Til think there was between believers and unbelievers? Mathison's posts are worth reading.

The Authority of Scripture - what does this entail? Does the Bible legitimate exercise of authority that is not explicitly found in the Bible (like when I tell my son to go to bed)?

Chalcedonian Christology - a question on enhypostasis and immutability

Ignatius - how should a Protestant understand references to an episcopate?

Deification - what is the Eastern Orthodox understanding of deification (theosis); how does it differ from sanctification in Reformed theology; a discussion of the Eastern Orthodox conception of the essence-energies distinction and apophaticism; a comparison of Eastern Orthodoxy and Reformed theology on the doctrine of God.

Narrative Apologetics - what is narrative apologetics; archetypal and ectypal storytelling (and storytellers); the meaning of the "word" of God.

Charles Hodge - the ground of the imputation of righteousness for which we are justified is union with Christ; debate with Matthew Winzer.

Original Sin and Apologetics - initial focus is on Eastern Orthodoxy and original sin; what to keep in mind when doing apologetics against Eastern Orthodoxy, with an emphasis on the early church; discussion pivots to a defense of the Reformed-realist view of original sin; debate with Matthew Winzer (cf. link and link for more conversations and debates on the realist view).

The Historical, Reformed View of Original Sin - what did the Reformers believe about original sin; reatus poena vs. reatus culpa; my defense of John Murray as correctly depicting the Reformed view against Charles Hodge; debate with Matthew Winzer (I expanded on this and the preceding link in a separate blog post).

Gordon Clark - an exposition of Clark's thought (with reference to unpublished material); critique of Clark as well as his 1940s interlocutors on alethiology and metaphysics; discussion of natural theology, univocal knowledge, Creator-creature distinction, a two-fold theory of truth, theology proper, and the historicity and [ir]relevance of certain theological terms to the 1940s debate; clarification of Clark's view and debate with various posters and interaction with Reformed authors who disagree with Clark; brief excuses on the realist view of original sin.

Presuppositionalism - the meaning of presuppositions and foundations; the scope of human understanding; apologetics.

Divine Simplicity - what is divine simplicity (cf. link); historical models allowable within Reformed theology; critique of Dolezal and Thomistic models (cf. link); tentative acceptance of Scotist model (formally distinct divine attributes).

Epistemology, Apologetics, and Full Assurance - varieties of presuppositionalism (cf. link); articulation and argumentation (cf. link for a conversation with more detail on epistemology and link for a recommendation to keep real-world apologetics concrete).

Images of God - symbols of the Trinity, words, and the 10 commandments.

The Covenant of Works - counter-factual reasoning, speculation, and underdetermination; eschatology; denial of felix culpa.

Imputation and Atonement - why pecuniary atonement and imputation of sin to Christ are wrong (cf. link); the nature of faith and infant salvation; the difference in meaning between the intent, application, and nature of Christ's sacrifice (cf. link and link). 

Aimee Byrd - a caution for when and how to properly engage and label heretics.

Free will - definitions (cf. link); Gordon Clark's view.

Emotions - prelapsarianism; morality; Gordon Clark's view.

Reformed voluntarism - problems with the extremities of absolute divine voluntarism and necessitarianism.

Dyothelitism - subjects and natures; minds and wills; Christology.

Seminaries and Church Oversight - why aren't seminaries under church oversight if they serve an ecclesiastic function; practical vs. a priori reasoning.

Textual criticism - its relation to epistemology, apologetics, and assurance (cf. link).

Creation - [scientific] assumptions of effect-to-cause reasoning; analogies to other miracles; discussion on alethiology.

Imputation - this includes discussion of the nature, intent, and application of the atonement (cf. link, link).

Simple Gospel, Solid Ground 28 Jun 2024 10:18 PM (10 months ago)

I've argued that "the historian is an apologist" (link), but it must also be true that the apologist is an historian - for if, as I've argued, "one cannot divorce Christianity from history," any defense of or attack on Christianity will entail a defense of or attack on a particular view of history. Simple examples would include that a Christian must defend the past historicity of the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15), the prophetic historicity of the final judgment (Revelation 20ff.), and so forth.

My interest in the history of the Orthodox Presbyterian church - of which I am a member - was kindled last year, and I am surprised how quickly that interest has enflamed into an attempt to more broadly understand post-apostolic Christianity. I'm only aware of Gavin Ortlund (link), Jason Engwer (link), Turretinfan (link), William Webster and David T. King (link), and a few other Protestants here or there who accessibly yet seriously engage church history. As usual, this probably speaks to my own limitations.

Now, while I would generally recommend these Protestant resources, I actually have not spent a dedicated amount of time listening to or reading them. One reason is that I think Protestants such as myself are better off asking question in and learning from the shepherds in local churches. Relationships, friends, and confidants are made in the real world. 

A second reason is that I like apologetic "shortcuts" in the sense that even if I mastered all the material put out by these or other Protestants, it wouldn't make much practical difference if I were to discover that non-Protestants raise concerns or ask questions which these Protestants don't cover. That is, doesn't it make sense for Protestants who are interested in the defensibility of Protestantism to read non-Protestants for a sense of what are regarded as problematic barriers to entry?

Well, I think the answer to this question is: it depends. A few weeks ago, I was speaking to a younger man after evening service, a man who is in the process of deciding which local church to join. I believe he is in his 20s. Our conversation spanned many topics, and at some point - speaking of "barriers to entry" - I mentioned that I had done some recent research into Eastern Orthodoxy and their apologists for reasons mentioned in this post.

He responded with more wisdom and boldness than is typical for someone his age. It was something to the following effect: "be mindful of how much you listen to their apologists; you might find yourself allured to or sympathizing with them." At this, I smiled. His concern (and other remarks he made in the course of our discussion) led me to complementing him on being very measured. His advice is sound!

James 1:2-8 Count it all joy, my brothers, when you meet trials of various kinds, for you know that the testing of your faith produces steadfastness. And let steadfastness have its full effect, that you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing. If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask God, who gives generously to all without reproach, and it will be given him. But let him ask in faith, with no doubting, for the one who doubts is like a wave of the sea that is driven and tossed by the wind. For that person must not suppose that he will receive anything from the Lord; he is a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways.

The young man was implicitly advising that I ensure that I am steadfast in the faith before encountering teachers who might otherwise toss me in[to] doubt. Likewise:

Colossians 1:22-23 he has now reconciled in his body of flesh by his death, in order to present you holy and blameless and above reproach before him, if indeed you continue in the faith, stable and steadfast, not shifting from the hope of the gospel that you heard...

2 Timothy 3:15 and how from childhood you have been acquainted with the sacred writings, which are able to make you wise for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus.

As a happy, blessed, and new father, I will not raise my child with an intention to expose him to false teachers (even for pedagogical purposes). Of course, I will point out false teachings, and there will come a time at which my son must become mature enough to hear and refute false teachers, but I am reminded of J. Gresham Machen's remark that the best way to spot a counterfeit is by having acquaintance with that which is authentic or true. 

For Protestants who consider themselves open to the possibility that Protestantism is false, I think that evidences a need to prioritize the shoring up of their faith. Such persons are not better off listening to false teachers, especially not those who pretend that one can more or less evaluate worldviews "neutrally" (link). By God's grace, I don't have any doubts about the truth of Protestantism, but this is not to say I think there is anything shameful in recognizing that one is at a stage in sanctification in which he is more benefitted from learning truth than in applying said truths to refute error. The former recognition is wisdom too.

With these caveats in mind, I sincerely believe that Protestants who truly understand sola scriptura and the weakness of arguments against it have nothing to fear in reading church history. In fact, more Protestant apologists are needed in this arena, for as I've listened to various non-Protestant groups (e.g. Oriental Orthodox, Assyrian, Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholicism), it is here that much interaction seems to be taking place. Lord willing, I plan to write more about this, for it is fascinating that those who oppose sola scriptura experience more disagreement about the contents and perspicuity of post-apologetic, so-called "infallible" authorities (cf. here and here), sometimes even within their own traditions.

But the advice of the young man remains: Christians must first learn from and be rooted in faith in God's word. Of course, God's word is taught and preached. Christians come to know this word by various, God-ordained means. But ultimately, because the Word of God is truth (John 14:6) and light (John 1:9), His words are light from light and give light: the sum of God's word is truth (Psalm 119), and by Him and it we are sanctified (John 17:17). Simply put, one ought to be solidly grounded in God's word before it is advisable to listen to the testimonies of others:

1 John 5:9 If we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater, for this is the testimony of God that he has borne concerning his Son.

Eastern Orthodoxy, Original Sin, Normative Authority, and Epistemology 4 Jun 2024 3:52 PM (11 months ago)

I'm struck by how incautious authorities within Eastern Orthodoxy can be regarding the significance of original sin. As one example, in a video posted recently, Eastern Orthodox bishop Irenei of London & Western Europe said (link): 

We are born spotless. There is no human ever ever born sinful, as if he were already a sinner by virtue of his constitution. God does not create like this, and every human being is born pure as Adam was fashioned pure. Yet we are touched by sin from the very beginning. By the time we open our eyes to the world, the sinfulness of the world is already having an impact on us.

But given their commitments to conciliarism - I'll return to this point later - the most "consistent" of Eastern Orthodox apologists will verbally state some kind of acceptance of original sin. But because they reject original guilt, I infer that laymen and even bishops will sometimes mistakenly reject any version of original sin. In a note in Michael Pomazansky's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, we read:

A Hodge-Podge of Reasonings on Original Sin 4 Jun 2024 9:44 AM (11 months ago)

For a recent exchange on original sin with Presbyterian Reverend Matthew Winzer, see the threads here and here in which I more broadly defended Augustinian-Reformed position on original sin against Charles Hodge's understanding and, more narrowly, defended the realist view. 

A point of appreciation I had was Winzer's willingness to own that his view is nominalistic. Of course, his pushback against certain arguments I made was expected. But while his explicit advocacy of nominalism was honest, his claim that Protestantism logically entails it is for that reason all the more dangerous. Unwitting third party readers may be attracted by Winzer's boldness and position, not realizing the high stakes involved in affirming nominalism. Robert Landis gives a sampling of these stakes in The Doctrine of Original Sin, a nigh-comprehensive refutation of Charles Hodge's implicit nominalism vis-a-vis his doctrine of original sin:

...let the serious-minded reader propound to himself, and frankly answer according to the spontaneous convictions of his moral nature and the impressions derived from the teachings of the divine word, the question, whether it can conceivably consist with the moral perfections of God, as revealed in His word and works, that He, on any ground whatever and by a mere act of the will, should constitute an innocent dependent creature depraved, apostate, and criminal, and then treat him or proceed against him as such? May He, in the case of creatures in whom sin or depravity does not exist, proceed, by a mere sovereign act of His will, first to produce it within them, and then to punish them for it according to the fearful inflictions of His punitive justice? In other words, Is it the prerogative of divine justice to pronounce sentence according to actually existing desert, e.g., in the case of apostasy or criminality of any sort; or are we to regard it as possessing the prerogative first to produce effectively that apostasy or ill-desert, and then to visit with its fearful retributions those who have thus been rendered subject to the infliction? If the latter, (and the latter is what Dr. Hodge teaches as our theology,) then the conception of divine justice in its relation to the creature, and as entertained by all rational or accountable beings, must certainly undergo an essential and radical modification, and along therewith the whole science of ethics and theology.

The arguments are so sufficiently clear that were it not for an interested reader who asked me some questions at the end of the second thread linked above (posts 31-32), I would have not thought an extended reflection worthwhile. The understanding and statements on the matter such as one may find in Landis, Samuel Baird, John Murray, George P. Hutchinson, and amongst contemporary scholars like J. V. Fesko and C. N. Willborne are uncontroversial and, I think, unrefuted, despite the impression one might get when reading Winzer. But as men like John Murray are no longer with us to defend themselves against Winzer's false portrayals, perhaps the following will in some manner help to set the record straight regarding the broader, Augustinian-Reformed position which I refer to above.

At the outset, it will be helpful to outline what is at issue. The theologians I mentioned just above (and others) contend Hodge's following statements are out of step with the Reformed tradition. In his discussion of the meaning of sin, Hodge writes the following in Volume II of his Systematic Theology: 

2. To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice. Hence the evil consequent on the imputation is not an arbitrary infliction; not merely a misfortune or calamity; not a chastisement in the proper sense of that word, but a punishment, i.e., an evil inflicted in execution of the penalty of law and for the satisfaction of justice. 

Straightforwardly, Hodge's statements in his Systematic Theology reject that the so-called "guilt" (for what is guilt without culpability?) of Adam's sin which is imputed to his progeny involves their culpability, criminality, etc. This is how all scholars of whom I am aware have interpreted Hodge. 

Frankly, it shocks me Winzer has ignored rather than paused to consider and respectfully engage the work of these men. I've also repeatedly asked Winzer to offer a scholar who thinks otherwise. Until he does, it is the obvious course to follow the evidence above to its natural conclusion: in the context of original sin, Hodge rejected the imputation of reatus culpa; therefore, Hodge divides reatus culpa from reatus poenae.

Prolegomena to Textual Criticism 31 May 2024 9:50 PM (11 months ago)

I've written elsewhere on how I situate "textual criticism" within the apologetic context of epistemic foundationalism (see the tags for this subject here). What follows will be a prolegomena of sorts to textual criticism.

Based on John 5 and other such passages, there is, I think, a Trinitarian parallel one can make between metaphysics, epistemology, and soteriology. For instance, we are saved in the Spirit through the Word sent from the Father, which Word is the very revelation of God (John 1, Hebrews 1, Romans 8, etc.). Just so, we are come to knowledge and are saved through [faith in the] words from the Father in the Spirit's breathing (Psalm 119, Matthew 11, 2 Timothy 3, etc.).

From, through, in. Keep those words in mind.

How might we tease this out? Divine revelation is indeed propositional. For example, the Scriptures cannot be broken (John 10), so if it were the case that the Scriptures are merely physical words, I could tear up its pages, silence the mouths of those who speak, etc. This propositional revelation is from the Father (as Christ is from the Father) insofar as it (and He) is revealed to those whom it pleases Him to learn its truth (John 6, Matthew 16).

That said, the mode through which this word is revealed is inscripturation. Likewise, the mode through which God's Son was sent as Savior was the incarnation. It is through the enfleshed w/Word that people are saved (Romans 10). We are not gnostics, after all.

Yet while the way through which we are caused to learn God's truth is via sensation, it is still the case that the objects of knowledge are propositional. Physical words may be means through which we are caused to understand revelation, but such representations always beckon us back to the archetypal propositions to which they correspond in a manner analogous to the way in which the Son beckons us back to the archetypal Father in whose image He is (Col 1).

Thus, in our Trinitarian formulations, the metaphysical beginning is the Father. So too in our revelatory formulations: the epistemological beginning is the propositions.

Now, the Word of God, Jesus Christ, was only made manifest in the Spirit. Likewise, the word of God, the Scriptures, are only made manifest in the Spirit. Christ's birth and baptism inaugurated his earthly life and ministry. Our rebirth and baptism in the Spirit inaugurates our salvific life (such that we become true words of the True Word; cf. link), and the Spirit's breath inaugurated the manifestation of the propositional word in His speech in the prophets and apostles (2 Peter 1, Ephesians 2; there is potential for drawing out themes in terms of progressive-revelation and [new] covenant[al life] here, but I will leave that aside for now).

Our encounter with the metaphysical Trinity is through Christ the Word. At the same time, this very Word testifies of His being sent from the Father from whom we must begin if we are to understand the Son and His Spirit-wrought purpose for us.

Moreover, our encounter with Christ is through the inscripturated word. And Christ's words - for Scripture itself is the word of the Word - testifies of the archetypal propositions from which we must begin if we are to understand the physical creation and its Spirit-wrought purpose for us.

Those who begin with the physical text already evidence a faulty set of presuppositions - not that there is anything wrong with the inscripturated word, mind you. But people won't understand it aright unless they understand from whence it comes.

Likewise, those who begin with, say, the "historical Jesus" already evidence a faulty set of presuppositions - not that there is anything wrong with the incarnate Word, mind you. But people won't understand Him aright unless they understand from Whom He comes.

Imputation in Various Contexts 12 Apr 2024 7:18 AM (last year)

Samuel Baird writes, "To impute, is, to attribute a moral act or attitude to a party" (The Elohim Revealed, pg. 471). In the historia salutis, three contexts in which some sort of important attribution or imputation is theorized include:

1. Sins are imputed to Christ when He suffered for the sake of His sheep.

2. Sin is imputed to us when we are born.

3. Righteousness is imputed to us when we are converted.

Let's look at these more closely:

1. Here is why I think this proposal is problematic: Christ never sinned, nor did He participate in sin... so how can He be truthfully attributed, regarded as, or charged with being a sinner? Now, I would agree that it is just for Christ to voluntarily experience the wrath of God (see note below) in anticipation of union with sinners such that His suffering satisfies the punishment due to them (penal substitution). However, it seems to me that the Father never falsely looks at Christ as something that Christ is not (a sinner). Thus, #1 is false.

Another problem: if sin's are said to be imputed to Christ at another time than His suffering, when would that be? Whilst He is reigning in heaven? That isn't intelligible. Or if sin is imputed to Christ at the time He suffered on the cross, whose sins are imputed? The elect's? If so, then why are the elect regarded as enemies of God and under God's wrath before they are converted? That would imply double punishment - the same sins are unjustly punished twice over. I write more on this point here (see the comment section as well).

[Side note: one doesn't need to suppose that the Trinity experienced ontological separation in order for Christ to endure the just wrath due to sinners. As an analogy, consider that we were "children of wrath" and "enemies of God" even while "in love He predestined us." A fortiori, Christ's experiencing the wrath of God - suffering in body and soul - does not suggest an internal rift within the Trinity. See, for example, Psalm 22:1-2 specifying the withdrawal of the experience of the presence of the Father at the time of the crucifixion.]

2. Adam's sin is imputed to us when we are born because we are born "in Adam." We are united to our prototypical father by having been naturally generated from or been begotten by him. In the case of Christ, He is of the same spirit - consubstantial - with Adam (and us) but is not from Adam's concrete spirit, having been born of a virgin. We, on the other hand, are not only of the same spirit but from his concrete spirit. Having been multiplied out of him, we can be justly regarded as having sinned in him. While we did not exist as persons, Adam's same, concrete spirit by which he sinned is now in us (paternal traducianism). 

To deny any of this seems to lead to irresolvable problems. Are we are punished for something for which we are not guilty? Are we guilty without having participated in that in virtue of which we are guilty? I plan to outline this participation in a separate post, but suffice it to say that I think #2 is true.

3. Whereas I have suggested that there is a sense in which "we" were "in Adam" when he sinned (and, thus, were participants in his sin), we were not "in" the last Adam at the time He lived perfectly or suffered on the cross (cf. John 7:39). Thus, we did not "participate" in Christ's work of redemption. That is, while the ground of our condemnation is our own wrong-doing, the ground of our justification is not on the basis of our right-doing.

On the other hand, justification is based on our union with Christ and, by extension, His work (cf. the Westminster Larger Catechism, Question 66). In fact, Galatians 2:20, Ephesians 2:5-6, etc. show that those who are in Christ are attributed, imputed, or regarded as experiencing crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, and seating with Christ. Christ's life forms the basis for and pattern of our salvation.

We bear an inverse relationship to the first Adam as we do to the last: pertaining to the spirit of the first Adam, by natural generation we are born out of him and his (and "our") sin. By contrast, pertaining to the Spirit of the last Adam, in regeneration we are born into Him and His righteousness (et al.). This inverse relationship explains why participation is necessary in the one case but not the other: the imputation of sin presupposes participation in said sin which, in turn, entails a real union with the first Adam. By grace, the imputation of righteousness does not require participation in the same sense, although said imputation does still require a real union with the last Adam. For more on this, see here. Thus, #3 is true.

Lane Tipton on Gordon Clark and Cornelius Van Til 5 Apr 2024 11:15 PM (last year)

Recently, I wrote on the importance of history (link). An example of this stems from a dialogue on Lane Tipton's book, The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til. I have since purchased the book, and below, I'll link to a video lecture by Tipton that covers much of the same content. Of initial interest to me was pg. 79 of Tipton's book:

...when we realize that Van Til speaks of God as "one person" in a manner synonymous with Bavinck's speaking of God as "absolute personality," we can discern that Van Til intends to add nothing beyond what Bavinck has already expressed. It is highly likely that Van Til uses such language to polemically sharpen his critique of Gordon Clark's conception of the divine unity as "mute substance." Clark's rationalistic notion of "mute substance" supplies part of the polemical context for Van Til's insistence that there is no impersonal dimension to God's unity as an absolute personality... (Tipton, The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til, pg. 79)

Further, on pg. 85, Tipton writes:

...we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark. Van Til’s comments on the incomprehensibility of God, especially in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, arise immediately from the context of the Clark–Van Til controversy. As a result, Van Til’s understanding of the Trinity and divine incomprehensibility is designed partly to correct the rationalistic distortions he detected in the formulations of Clark. What will prove instructive for our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity is the appearance, years after the controversy itself, of a motif in Clark’s theology that denies personality to God’s unity. While definitively dissenting from the personalists, Clark devised formulations that amount to the opposite error of the Boston Personalists in that he can affirm tripersonality only by describing the essence of God as mute or unconscious. The personalists deny personality with respect to God’s diversity, while Clark denies personality with reference to God’s unity. 

It is out of this matrix of Trinitarian reflection that Van Til deemed it appropriate to utilize the language that God is “one person” or “absolute personality,” while not allowing that affirmation to subvert the complementary truth that God exists as three persons or a tripersonal being. In Van Til’s mind, the formulations of both the Boston Personalists and Gordon Clark proved inadequate to convey the absolutely personal and incomprehensible character of God’s Trinitarian existence.

This has led other people to follow Tipton's conclusions. For example, Christopher Smith reviews of Tipton's book by stating (link):

This absolute personality means, contra Gordon Clark (1902–85), that self-consciousness can be found in the Triune God even while there is a self-differentiated existence as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, thus guarding against the tritheistic notion of three centers of self-consciousness. Van Til was reacting to Clark’s notion that in God there are three “distinct bundles of thoughts,” i.e. self-consciousness. Van Til’s opponents were broader than merely Gordon Clark, however. Indeed, his primary opponent was a school of thought Tipton identifies as “theistic personalism,” and Van Til’s thought was, in large part, a reaction to these views.

The first ‘‘edition’’ of this syllabus appeared some thirty-five years ago. Its title then was: An Introduction to Systematic Theology. Since then much has happened in theology. Yet the old syllabus is now made available again in a practically unaltered form. The author has dealt with the main developments of recent theology in other writings.

...in as much as the Absolute is often spoken of as revealing Himself or itself,—being regarded either as personal or as impersonal,—and in as much as this revelation is spoken of as inexplicable 18 , the Absolute is very clearly looked upon as Beyond... 

For McTaggart God is the logical universal immanent in all particulars or else he becomes one of the particulars Himself. Now on this basis it is not possible to maintain that the Absolute has any meaning except that which finds realization in the particulars. It is again quite true that Idealism does not wish to go that far with its emphasis on immanence. It continues to speak of the Absolute as “selfconscious” and “personal.” But is Idealism entitled to such an Absolute? It seems not; a logical universal has meaning only because of and for the particulars in which it is manifested.

Right or wrong, Van Til's thesis (so it seems to me) is that in contradistinction to Idealism, Christianity is entitled to "such an Absolute." 

Perhaps Tipton's other argument in his book are worthwhile, but I hope the above sets the record straight regarding Clark. As an addendum, I don't find Tipton's following line of argument convincing:

The theology of Gordon Clark finds affinity with the personalists in that it is motivated by a strong form of theological rationalism. However, the result of Clark’s rationalism for his doctrine of the Trinity amounts to a virtual denial of a personal essence or ousia in the Godhead – a point that has received little to no attention. Clark’s commitment to theological rationalism, together with his attempt to formulate a principle of individuation within the Godhead, yield a conception of the Godhead that granted self-consciousness only to the hypostases. If the rationalism of the personalists ascribed personality only to the unity of the Godhead, Clark’s rationalism relegated personality only to the diversity within the Godhead. This appeared most clearly in Clark’s argument that self-consciousness applies not to God as a self-identical subject, but only to the distinct hypostases understood as unique combinations of thoughts.

I do not find anywhere in the book that Tipton engages with Clark's points in his later works (flawed as they are) such as one can read in Clark's last letter to John Robbins (February, 1985):

Dear Dr. Robbins, The sheet from the Elders Handbook, which you sent me and Van Til also, held that God is both one Person and three Persons. This seems to be to be a form of Modalism, or Patripassionism as the early Church called it. The three names are names of three activities. When God creates, he is called Father, when he redeems he is called Son. In spite of the fact that Dr. Kuyper and Van Til speak of Three Persons, there is not much personality left, or perhaps I should say individuality. Look again at the seven lines you checked. I don’t know what these people do with “Only Begotten” or the “Procession” of the Spirit, or one of them speaking to another. In the study I am writing on the Incarnation, I preserve the distinction among the three Persons by arguing that although each is omniscient, they do not know, i.e. they cannot assent, the same set of propositions. The Second Person can know and say, “I became incarnate.” The Father cannot say this. The Father can say, “I begot the Son.” The Son begot nothing. What these modalists say on these points, I do not know. But it seems to me that the One Person would have to assert all these propositions, and to my mind that is plain nonsense.

For those interested in pursuing the doctrinal aspect of this debate further, I highly recommend Doug Douma's book The Grand Old Doc, in which he engages Tipton on this point (particularly, pgs. 115-117 and an apropos citation of John Murray).

The Clark Debate, The Calvin Forum, and the Intellect of Man 4 Apr 2024 11:40 PM (last year)

The statement by Gray is from just one from a series of exchanges between he and Edward Heerema in The Calvin Forum during 1946-1947. The back-and-forth covers several topics, one of which is (in contemporary times) a relatively undiscussed portion of The Complaint:

Dr. Clark does not deny the necessity or the fact of regeneration but he makes no absolute qualitative distinction between the knowledge of the unregenerate man and the knowledge of the regenerate man. With the same ease, the same “common sense”, the unregenerate and the regenerate man can understand propositions revealed to man (p. 20; 28:13-16; 31:13-17; 34:13-35:2).

The clear implication is that the complainants believed that unregenerates cannot "understand propositions revealed to man." Here is Clark's own response to this charge in The Answer:

If the complainants had quoted these passages from the transcript instead of merely referring to them, everyone could have seen that all but the last have nothing to do with the matter of regeneration, and that the last is contradictory to their assertion. The discussion had entered on the proposition “two times two equals four.” Dr. Clark had asserted that any man who knows this proposition knows it by means of the definitions of the numbers and by the laws of logic. Then the transcript continues: “Q. Where do we get those laws of logic? A. ‘Every man that cometh into the world.’ (Obviously the transcript omits part of the quotation.) Q. Is it possible that by the effective sin, man will not be able to deduce by the propositions concerning God? A. That is often the case.” In other words, the complainants imply that Dr. Clark holds that regeneration does not renew the mind or that sin has not affected it; whereas Dr. Clark said specifically that sin often causes men to commit logical fallacies. Thus the complainants cite evidence that is not only irrelevant, but also evidence that contradicts their charge. Some further study of the knowledge of a regenerate man and of an unregenerate man might prove profitable, but the subject can be accorded only the briefest mention. Both the regenerate and the unregenerate can with the same ease understand the proposition, Christ died for sinners. Regeneration, in spite of the theory of the Complaint, is not a change in the understanding of these words. The difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate lies in the fact that the former believes the proposition and the latter does not. The regenerate acknowledges Christ as Lord; the other does not. The one is a willing subject; the other is a rebel. Regeneration is not necessarily a change in understanding propositions. An unregenerate man may understand the proposition “Christ died for sinners,” but far from knowing it to be true, he thinks it to be false. Strictly speaking he knows only that “the Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners.” When he is regenerated, his understanding of the proposition may undergo no change at all; what happens is that he now accepts as true what previously he merely understood. He no longer knows merely “the Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners”; he now knows “Christ died for sinners.”

While that may suffice as a refutation, at the same time, it may also be of help to provide more information on the subsequent historical events with an aim to set a fuller context for just what was important about the 1940s OPC debate. Last year, I wrote quite a long post on the question of intellectual "understanding" as well as the distinct question of whether unregenerates can "know" truth (link). 

Since then, I've come across further details. Something of a side note the The Calvin Forum is that Fled Klooster's 1951 dissertation on The Incomprehensibility of God in the Orthodox Presbyterian Conflict makes an elementary blunder on this subject. Klooster writes:

Clark holds that the proposition and the knowledge of the proposition are identical. Therefore since the proposition as an object of knowledge is the same for both God and man, their knowledge of that particular proposition in its minimal significance is also identical. The knowledge a regenerate man has of the proposition, "Christ died for our sins’, is also the same as that which an unregenerate may have. The only difference is that the regenerate believes it and appropriates it. Therefore even the knowledge an unregenerate man has of the proposition, Christ died for our sins, can be identical with God's knowledge of that proposition.

Notice that Clark never held that “Christ died for our sins” is something that unregenerates can know. One only has to read "The Answer" carefully to see that Clark held, "unregenerate man may understand the proposition “Christ died for sinners,” but far from knowing it to be true, he thinks it to be false."

Thus, Klooster makes a double mistake in 1) conflating Christ's dying for "our sins" (about which Clark never spoke in the context of unregenerates) with Christ's dying for "sinners" and 2) supposing Clark believed that unregenerates know the proposition "Christ died for sinners" (because unregenerates do not believe said proposition, Clark points out they cannot "know" it).

Returning to Gray's reference to a speech in which Clark silenced his critics, more information would be possible were it not for the unfortunate pragmatism that the minutes of church assemblies can be only so detailed. For example, the Thirteenth General Assembly of the OPC does not contain any record of Gray's following account which took place during said assembly: 

While much of the discussion has been too abstruse for the average person, one statement of Dr. Clark's has been widely quoted as. a simple and clear evidence of his "error." I refer to the words, "regeneration is not necessarily a change in understanding propositions" (such as "Christ died for sinners"). On the floor of the assembly Dr. Clark silenced the criticism of this statement by quoting from Berkhof's formulation of historical faith and James Buchanan's work on the Holy Spirit.  

It would be helpful to have the references Gray had in mind, and I'll return to this question below. 

Now, as I mentioned above, Gray was corresponding (sparring might be a better adjective) with Edward Heerema, a minister and son-in-law of R. B. Kuiper, an original signer of "The Complaint." Here is how Heerema replied to Gray's statement:

At one point Prof. R. B. Kuiper declared that a vote favoring Dr. Clark would not end the "Clark case'', as some had indicated in their remarks, but would rather for him be only the beginning, as he would fight for these "precious" doctrines to his dying breath... 

In his letter Mr. Gray asserts that on a particular point Dr. Clark "silenced" the criticism by quoting from two well-known authors. Whether Dr. Clark actually "silenced" his critics on this important point still remains to be seen, of course. 

It seems Heerema himself was not content to remain silent, for while there is no record (of which I'm aware) of an engagement with Clark's sources, he wrote a book called Whither the Orthodox Presbyterian Church? which, as reported by John Muether, "contained the absurd claim that Clark was an Arminian" (Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, pg. 107). While I don't have access to Heerema's book, it seems he explains his reasoning in the April 1947 edition of The Calvin Forum: 

Original Sin, Guilt, Traducianism, and Eastern Orthodoxy 4 Apr 2024 12:07 AM (last year)

The following is an expansion of a criticism of Eastern Orthodoxy I have only touched on elsewhere: original sin. It seems several Eastern Orthodox adherents prefer to call it "ancestral" sin. In some cases, there is a complete lack of understanding, such as can be seen in this video (the first video that shows up if you search for "original sin eastern orthodox" on Youtube), which is explained by a Ph.D. and priest:

The Super-Sufficiency of Christianity 19 Mar 2024 9:38 AM (last year)

 A few months ago, I wrote:

...we should always keep in mind that we have no control over how others will respond to our engagement with them. And we can't forcibly change one's ethical orientation. Nevertheless, we can always do something. Calvinism is not fatalism, and what we do makes a difference. Thinking about or planning for different situations before they happen helps one to be prepared to actually follow through when it comes time to make good (whether proactive or responsive). The less we reflect, the more apt we may be to hesitate on how to rightly respond when particular opportunities arise for exemplifying particular fruits of the Spirit. 

Regardless of how others (or even we) respond, all things Christians experience have been ordained for a reason. The Spirit will use our experience to some end that is good for us, others, or both - even if, in the moment, we don't understand how. I tend to try to live with Romans 8:28 in the back of my mind, and it saves me from anxiety. In fact, my struggle is less with assurance (keeping the big picture in mind) and more with daily application (focusing on immediate needs). I tend to need to set conscious, proximate goals for myself or make little progress. My weakness may be another's strength and vice versa: each of us needs the support of others (Hebrews 10:24-25). (link)

Reformed Christians are often asked how they balance God's sovereignty and man's responsibility: if God is in control of all things, does what I do make a difference? Or: if God's grace is sufficient to work through the weakest means, then is there a "need" for me to worry about how I present the gospel to others?

As I mentioned in the post from last year, we should have assurance that God is able to use our most meagre of efforts for good. Even so, Christians should not neglect the importance of sanctificatory progress (such as in one's apologetic or evangelizing, although one might of course extend this to all areas of our lives). We should always pattern ourselves after the work of our God.

Christianity is a religion of super-sufficiency. Our God Himself is wholly sufficient for us, yet with how much more are we gifted? His grace extends far beyond our needs. Indeed, God has even ordained that the means by which we are ordinarily blessed is through His church. But this is already a surplus of divine favor!

Another example: we are all blessed each Lord's Day. What might have been a simple, sufficient reading of God's word is typically beautified homiletically, a clear product of the session's meditation upon God's word. A plain presentation of God's word would suffice for a sermon, but is it improper to say that we are more benefitted from a wise and didactically intentional application of it? I don't think so.

Surely we would agree our pastors don't think that the root of conviction in the minds of his congregants lies in his own efforts. The Holy Spirit works the conviction... through the preaching. That is, we wouldn't want to say the preaching was irrelevant to the conviction even while we acknowledge the Efficient Cause of its effectuality. I think that good efforts (such as a hard-worked sermon) tend to coincide with an increased manifestation of God's presence - even if not in the worker's own life (e.g. "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church").

Likewise, I think a simple, sufficient defense of the faith might be rhetorically beautified. Is this "necessary" in all cases? "Need" and "necessity" is a function of context. Apologetics, for instance, can function as a means towards several ends: to stop the mouths of unbelievers, to persuade, to increase the psychological or epistemic assurance of believers, to solidify good habits, etc. Different contexts might relevantly bear on one's decision to speak or act differently.

Suppose one considers the different ways to speak or act in a given context but that in each scenario, he will speak the truth. Is consideration "unnecessary" under these conditions? I think framing the situation this way tends to dampen the recognition that Christianity is a religion of super-sufficiency. Are not the different ways in which one might speak or act relevant to the outcome - even while we believe that it is only due to the Spirit that anyone will be convicted of the truth? 

Sola Scriptura and "The Primacy of Revelation" 1 Mar 2024 7:49 AM (last year)

I was pleasantly surprised to hear James White use the word "Scripturalism" in his opening statement in a recent debate on sola scriptura with Trent Horn (link). He even seems to mean something pretty near to Clark's position: that Scripture is our ultimate epistemic authority - see minute mark 17:30-21:00. If more mainstream, Reformed apologists are willing to go this route, it would make more clear "the dividing line" (pardon the James White pun). [Side note: less pleasant was listening to White's final cross-examination answers from minute mark 1:42:00-1:46:20.]

A comment on my recent post on Eastern Orthodoxy noted a few, anecdotal examples of nominally Reformed Christian moving to Eastern Orthodoxy due to issues they took with the doctrine sola scriptura. That Protestants would be more aware of the centrality of sola scriptura (if not the nuances) does not surprise me. Most - if not all - heresies are traceable to a faulty understanding or doctrine of Scripture. After all, it is a rare person who would claim to understand a biblical doctrine as true, claim to accept it as true, and later reject said doctrine despite still regarding it as true. 

I noted in the above link and elsewhere that Eastern Orthodox apologists appear quite willing to borrow concepts or appropriate arguments made by Reformed theologians - far more so than Roman Catholics (at least in my experience). Even in the case of sola scriptura, you are unlikely to hear a Roman Catholic make a statement such as this, for example: 

Though I think much of Dr. Svendsen’s critique of Roman theology can often be polemical and bitter because he sees as a corrupt institution, he is undoubtedly right about his insistence on the primacy of revelation as this is probably the main point that also divides Orthodoxy from Rome... Svendsen’s approach to the question at hand and insistence that divine revelation be the paradigm is far more acceptable of how an Orthodox approach these questions.

This is not an isolated observation. I'm aware of other proponents of Eastern Orthodoxy who would likewise state acceptance of something along the lines of "a primacy of revelation." Similarly, Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to disapprove of "natural theology" (example). Is it any wonder that upon hearing these sorts of things, nominally Reformed or Protestant individuals - particularly, certain presuppositionalists who deny any and all epistemic or apologetic utility in natural theology - might find themselves more receptive to apologists whose positions are seemingly similar to their own? 

Again, what is often missing is nuance. For one thing, Michael Sudduth has argued fairly persuasively in The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology that some kind of natural theology was accepted among virtually all Reformed theologians until the 19th century (see most of chapter 1, here and here) . I hope to do a further post on this book in particular, as its distinctions and explanation of the functions of natural theology are helpful. In brief, though, I agree with finding a proper place for natural theology within one's worldview, as Gordon Clark also accepted (link). This may come as a surprise to some.

Another missing nuance in deconversion stories related to sola scriptura is that to state agreement on "the primacy of revelation" does not outline what the content of divine revelation is. For those who are mistakenly dissuaded of sola scriptura, it makes sense that Eastern Orthodoxy is viewed as a leading alternative (despite problems I've mentioned elsewhere) in light of the mess that is contemporary Roman Catholic apologetics. Just have a look at the comments here or the numerous examples of Roman Catholic cognitive dissonance here (particularly on the question of private judgment; cf. link). Talk about buyer's remorse!

But in turn, does Eastern Orthodoxy stand in any better position relative to Protestantism? Take the Synod of Jerusalem. Most Eastern Orthodox apologists would say the synod was not ecumenical. In this case, then, one would think that an Eastern Orthodox believer should agree that it may err and therefore is not to be made the rule of faith, or practice (cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, 31.4). 

Nevertheless, some Eastern Orthodox apologists would appeal to it as an external confirmation of the canon of Scripture (link), whereas others would disagree and hold to a different canon of Scripture (link). How is this to be explained? What would motivate an Eastern Orthodox apologist to appeal to a fallible synod? 

1) Is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is infallible after all? If so, then there is disagreement among Eastern Orthodox believers regarding the canon of "divine revelation" vis-a-vis what counts as an ecumenical council. Many apologetic arguments one finds against Protestantism would thereby cut against Eastern Orthodoxy. [Side note: that Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy disagree on which councils were ecumenical already begs this question.] 

2) Or is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is fallible but supports a particular understanding of the canon of Scripture? If so, one can understand why Eastern Orthodox believers who take seriously "the primacy of revelation" and have a different canon of Scripture than this synod would not gainsay the epistemic weight of what they regard as infallible in favor of the determinations of a fallible synod. 

3) If an Eastern Orthodox believer doesn't wish to appeal to the Synod of Jerusalem at all, how then does he know the canon of Scripture? So-called ecumenical councils never listed the books of Scripture. In fact, who is to say that one's opinion of the canon of Scripture won't differ from a future, allegedly infallible ecumenical council?

In each case, how is disagreement about the content of divine revelation supposed to be resolved? There is no infallible table of contents for the Eastern Orthodox believer any more than there is for the Protestant. The Protestant is simply more honest about this and, if nuanced, able to argue that such a fact is really irrelevant (link). 

Sola scriptura is a species of sola revelation. If the Eastern Orthodox apologists I've referenced are representative of the whole, then the principle difference between Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy is not so much "the primacy of revelation" but the content of it. In that case, though, one who deconverts from Protestantism due to perceived issues with sola scriptura but then goes ahead to accept another form of sola revelation has simply exchanged one set of presuppositions for another without meaningfully considering 1) whether what he thought were issues actually are, and 2) whether said issues would also apply to his newfound beliefs. The issue of "private judgment" never disappears, nor the need for self-authenticity. Protestantism just turns out to be more defensible because Protestants self-consistently accept as God-breathed only the sort of content that is described as God-breathed: holy writ (2 Timothy 3:16-17).

WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.

Trinitarian and Anthropological Metaphysics 29 Feb 2024 7:33 PM (last year)

In the comments of a recent post, I was recently asked some challenging questions regarding Trinitarianism, Christology, and anthopology. In the past few years, I've mentioned several times the need for humility and balance when positing a doctrine of God (see here and pursuant links). On the one hand, I aim to do a better job of avoiding dogmatism on points of speculation. On the other hand, even in the case that answers to certain questions are underdetermined by biblical data, apologetic concerns warrant consideration of possibilities to prevent one's faith from being undercut. 

In what follows, my goal is to provide answers that are faithful to Scripture insofar as they are deducible from or coherent with it. Keeping in mind that this latter qualification - coherence - is a necessary but insufficient condition for truth, the questions I was asked will be indented:

I'm trying to also keep in my the Trinity, with the three persons united in one being. Being would be identical to nature (divine nature), would it not?

On the concept of "unity," this post would provide a helpful background for my own thoughts (excepting a few uncareful remarks in the final paragraph).

I don't think the Trinity are united "in one being" if that means persons are subsumed under nature. Don't get me wrong: natures don't exist without persons, and persons do not exist without natures. Yet insofar as "nature" or "being" discusses what is common to individuals, natures belong to and are predicated of persons, not persons to natures. "Enhypostasis" - nature is in the hypostasis. If persons were "in" natures, then Christ's having two natures would seem to imply Nestorianism.

Now, the members of the Trinity are consubstantial. In fact, I think the meaning of their being consubstantial is just the same as the meaning of you and I being consubstantial, although the manner of consubstantiality differs between Trinitarian members (eternal, necessary) and us as men (temporal, contingent). Regardless, they indeed are of the same nature. 

But I would balk at certain theories of divine simplicity that may be implicit in the phrasing of your question. That is, Trinitarian consubstantiality does not imply only one concrete nature. Recall that you mentioned mind is "indexed" to nature: if we subsumed the divine persons under or in a single, concrete divine nature, then, that would entail that there is just one divine mind. The problem with that - as you seem to recognize - is that it runs against biblical data suggesting the members have distinct, self-reflective thoughts (e.g. John 17). On that note:

So the mind of the Son would have self-referential propositions that the Father would not (e.g. "I am the eternally begotten one"), but that mind would not be coextensive with the person of the Son? What would be the remainder? Would it be something like the shared divine nature that extends beyond the self-referential thoughts of the mind?

While the mode of the Son's existence is eternal, He is also eternally begotten. Here is precisely where I think Clark, for example, went wrong: it is not merely that the Son thinks something of Himself that is different than His thought of the Father or Spirit; rather, this thought corresponds to something about the Son Himself. I argue Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in the 1940s led him to collapse persons into propositions/thoughts (link). I further argue I think Clark's reasons for rejecting it only pertain to a certain kind of correspondence theory of truth (link). 

What I am saying, then, is that the persons of the Trinity are not simply minds - and again, since you agree minds are "indexed" to nature, that would not constitute a differentiating principle between the individual Trinitarian persons anyway. Nor are the persons the thoughts of the mind (as if it is intelligible to suggest the divine persons are products of three minds?). On the contrary, the thoughts of the persons of the Trinity about themselves reflect or correspond to something unique about the way that they themselves are: unbegotton/originate, eternally begotten/generation, eternally spirated/process. Epistemological and ontological categories should not be collapsed. 

Also remember that in the original post on Clark and Nestorius, I was only attempting to provide a connotative definition of "person" in general. I was not talking individual persons/hypostases/subjects. For example, I think the Father, Son, Spirit, the angels, and humans are all "persons" because they have something in common: they each have a mind or minds. But this definition does not individuate any one individual "person" from any other. Well, that makes sense, for we agree that the having of a mind (or minds) is something properly belonging to the category of nature - not that we have the same nature as God, of course, but the overlap explains (at least partially) in what sense creaturely persons might be images of divine persons. 

So what individuates individual persons/hypostases/subjects? We might posit (as Clark did) that they can be individuated by their thoughts (of themselves). In a cursory analysis, this might be sufficient. But foundationally, note again that thoughts are products of thinkers. To the extent that an individual's thoughts of himself is relevant to this question, that to which the thoughts correspond - the individual himself - is all the more so. 

Let me suggest that an individual person is the correspondent of whatever may truly be predicated of him either timelessly (if His mode of existence is timeless, e.g. the Father) or at time t (if his given his mode of existence is temporal, e.g. an angel or human). What I "think" of myself is irrelevant, because my thoughts of myself are potentially false. Rather, true propositions about me (corresponding to my existence at time t) are those thoughts God thinks about me (corresponding to my existence at time t).

The above is perfectly intelligible to me. Even the case of Christ incarnate can be nuanced (example). Here is one catch, however: it suggests that the divine nature is concretized in the three persons. This should be obvious anyways if we accept a model of the Trinity on which each member of the Trinity has a distinct mind, but it should be noted. Not all (or even most) Trinitarian models would accept this. If we take Clark's definitions of thoughts/beliefs as involving volition, three concrete minds also entails three concrete wills.

Clark's own reasoning supports this, for he reject faculty psychology in the context of anthropology and Trinitarianism:

In the case of God, the simplicity of his reality should favor still more such a identification, rather than a development of divine faculty psychology. (April 3, 1937, Letter to J. Oliver Buswell)

A man is not a compound of three things, an intellect, a will, and an emotion. Each man is a single personality. (1943. On the Primacy of the Intellect. Westminster Theological Journal Vol. 5 No. 2, May. 182-195)

The question has to do with Ephesian 4 where it speaks of man’s mind being darkened. Well, I would include in the functions of mind the assent as well as the notitia, but I distinguish between the two functions. This is not faculty psychology, but it is two functions of the same spirit. (1977. A Defense of Christian Presuppositions in the Light of Non-Christian Presuppositions)

Just as in the post on "unity" I linked to above, these statements exhibit an internal inconsistency in Clark's thought. If the same spirit has two functions - assent and notitia or knowledge - then on what grounds could Clark affirm three distinct functions in one respect (self-knowledge) but not the other (assent)? If only the Son thinks "I am the Son," what does it mean to "think" if assent is not involved?

We can certainly differentiate the relationship between our persons to propositions we "know" (acquisitional, receptive) to the relationship between the Trinitarian persons and propositions they "know" (active, generative). In both cases, the objects of knowledge - truth-bearing propositions - are the same, although the psychological activity of "knowing" differs.

To reiterate, on the model I gravitate towards, the Trinitarian persons are consubstantial just as you and I are consubstantial. What it means for the divine nature to be "in" each person is the same, is true, and therefore corresponds to the existence of each person. There is just one "divine nature" that we conceptualize: all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, etc. Each member of the Trinity is all-wise, all-good, etc.

It's just that how consubstantiality cashes out is not in persons being found "in[side]" of a common nature but rather along the lines that a person who is a principle or "fount" (e.g. the Father; Adam) communicates his same nature to others who find their "origin" in him (e.g. the Son/Spirit; the rest of humanity). This bears on the unity of persons and explains the connection to traducianism, by the way, which I'll return to momentarily.

In the context of the Trinity, there is a necessary connection between the members. The property of the Father, the attributes of the divine nature He enhypostatizes, and mode of the communication of His divine nature to His Son and Spirit is such that the three persons 1) mutually depend on each other - for example, the Father is not who He is without His Son and Spirit - and 2) always act conjointly and agreeably. 

A comparison could reasonably be made between 1) three distinct knowers who distinctly and reflexively index the same, objective body of propositional meaning, and 2) three distinct operators or actors who necessarily produce one and the same conjoint operation or act (which, incidentally, includes the body of propositional meaning comprised of necessary and contingent truths).

A traducian friend of mine (Ken Hamrick) uses the language of "shared agency" to describe our participation in Adam's sin while the mode of "our" being was not yet (i.e. at the time of the Fall) as individuals but as the singular nature of Adam through which he sinned and out of whom we were not yet propagated as individuals (link). I agree with him, although how we think this analogizes to the Trinity differs. 

Ken would emphasize the numerical sameness of the spirit traduced to us and thereby argue for the numerical sameness of essence shared among the Trinity (link). I would emphasize that once we are propagated out of Adam, our possession of the same spirit is nevertheless concretely distinct and thereby argue that the Trinitarian persons exhibit an analogy to "shared agency" in the eternal communication of the divine nature through which the persons operate even as they are eternally individuated and individuals. As I mentioned at the outset, these are rather deep waters to stake out a dogmatic claim that one can confidently swim them. 

In either model - Ken's or mine - there is an analogy one could make between Trinitarianism and traducianism. There are also disanalogies in either case, of course. For Ken, whereas we have distinct, concrete natures (albeit inherited through our fathers once we are propogated out of them into a different mode of being, i.e. as individuals), the members of the Trinity would not. On my end, the manner of consubstantiality between the Father, Son, and Spirit would be eternal and grounded in their intrapersonal relations rather than temporal (such as my relation to my father). This interesting impasse at once suggests an argumentative parallel between Trinitarianism and traducianism regardless of which one of us is correct as well as that other reasons must be given for independent support for either of our positions.

I think my model goes some way in explaining biblical texts like John 17, the covenant of redemption, and the resonance between theology proper and anthropology. 

Further, on the subject of anthropology in general and traducianism in particular, I think this model (and Ken's) also avoids nominalism while affirming a realism in the contexts of original sin and justification which does not devolve into erroneous positions. For example, erroneous positions such as: 

1) one wherein Christ assumes a sinful nature (cf. uncareful statements of the doctrine of original sin), 

2) one wherein I am unjustly punished for sins which are really and completely alien to me (cf. representationalist theories of original sin), 

3) one wherein Christ assumes and glorifies a human nature under which all persons are said to be subsumed (cf. Eastern Orthodoxy and deification, despite the protestations of its apologists to believe that natures are in hypostases rather than the reverse), 

4) one wherein infused righteousness is argued as necessary for justification to be justly possible in this lifetime (cf. Roman Catholic apologists, although those who argue this are themselves inconsistent).

On several of these points, see here for more. Further potential advantages of this model are that it seems to cohere with other metaphysical ideas which have separate appeal: theistic propositional realism (i.e. divine conceptualism), a version of divine simplicity which allows for formal distinctions, an Aristotelian theory of universals, etc.

I've thought about this quite a lot, and while the above is not a full story, it's probably the best articulation I can come up with at the present. To your next question:

If by inheriting one's father's "spirit" means those immaterial attributes that he possesses (analogous to the material attributes one possesses), then I think I can get my mind around what "spirit" means. Just as our bodies are made from our parents's bodies without being identical to them, so our spirits are made from our parents's spirits without being identical to them.

But then what distinguishes mind and spirit, or are they the same?

I think they are the same. Christ assumed a body and a rational soul or spirit without assuming a person, so there is no Christological difficulty, at least. Ken has elsewhere suggested that the "spirit is the seat of the will regarding moral matters" (link), and I think this all dovetails with Clark's aforementioned thought that knowledge and assent are two functions of the same spirit.

Finally, I had written:

The separation of body and spirit is "death," and such is predicated of our persons; but so too is the separation of our spirit from the Spirit "death" also predicated of our persons... suggesting the relationship between man's body and his spirit is analogically related to the dependency of our spirit to God's Spirit?

Maybe all of this becomes simplified by looking at a case most Christians would agree with: Christians will be conscious in the intermediate state. Are these Christians still human? If so, then it appears that they just are, ontologically speaking, spirits. To say that the person experiences death is to say that his body has been separated from his spirit (i.e. himself). Men are not, ontologically speaking, composite beings, for although these spirits do normally have bodies, the separation of the normal unity between spirit and body does not ontologically change a person (spirit). Likewise, the separation of the designed unity between spirit and Spirit does not ontologically change a person (spirit). If physical death is not an ontological change, neither would be spiritual death.

Your question: 

As for the subsequent post wherein you discuss the intermediate state, have you considered also that our spiritual bodies may be of a different order than our physical bodies? Paul's statements about the natural body and spiritual body are puzzling. "Adam became a living being. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit." The first man was made of the earth from dust, the last man is from heaven. Is it not safe to say that even in our present state we not "fully human" but are "incomplete" because the body we were given (even Adam's sinless body) was only the seed of what will only be completed in the resurrection? So, it may be the case that there is no ontological change since the separation of the spirit from the body in death is part of the planned transformation from natural body to spiritual body (like the seed germinating).

Did you mean to ask whether it's possible that "even in our present state we [are] not "fully human" but are "incomplete""? If so, did the incarnate and yet-be-glorified Son assume a fully human nature? Further, when this Son died and was buried (prior to His resurrection), was He fully human or not? Surely the former. 

I would also keep in mind the question of whether or not the reprobate are fully human: they will experience a bodily resurrection too, but their spirit remains severed from the life-giving Spirit of God and, thus, experience a second death. These points cumulatively suggest that death entails no change in nature.

Now, my original comment was about whether is ontological change at the time of death. Here, on the other hand, I am here emphasizing that there is never a change to the human essence each of us has. Ontology is indeed a broader category than humanity, I just wanted to answer your specific questions by distinguishing between an eschatological telos and a change in nature.

East of Eden 23 Feb 2024 6:56 AM (last year)

1. Ecclesiastically, Eastern Orthodoxy is less centralized than Rome yet still has a hierarchy, meaning there isn't as much of a barrier to entry to the former as to the latter.

2. Because Eastern Orthodoxy is less centralized (and, in the U.S., less prominent), it is less apparent to outsiders how the inside truly looks or operates, warts and all. This is all the more true when I hear of Eastern Orthodoxy congregations which experience functional segregation due to distinctive cultural backgrounds of said congregants (read: Galatians 2). It is easy to romanticize the unfamiliar.

Further, Rome's councils and popes are constantly in the news as going the way of modernism. I don't read much news, but from what I see, Eastern Orthodoxy isn't as exposed. Former insiders to Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g. Joshua Schooping; see his free ebook here) are relatively unknown - at least, they unknown prior to one's converting to Eastern Orthodoxy - and becoming aware of such insiders after one converts might be too late (rationalizations set in). This is not unique to Eastern Orthodoxy, but they are not immune to it either.

3. Eastern Orthodox apologists and theologians largely stake their position on appeals to ecumenical councils or theologians whose theology is said to ground statements by ecumenical councils (Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus, John of Damascus, and Palamas being most prominent, if I am not mistaken).

Examples of fallacies to watch out for: because they are called ecumenical councils, they must be biblical councils. Equally fallacious: because some ecumenical councils are biblically grounded, one must accept that all others are too.

On the point of tradition, church history, etc., just like anyone else, people who claim to be Reformed can fall suspect to attempts to excuse their prior ignorance. For example: "church history is not in monolithic support of Reformed theology; I must have been ignorant/tricked; there must be a true monolith that is different from my prior (Reformed) conception." This is a non sequitur, but more importantly, the reason the fallacy occurs in the first place is because people have a false, a priori impression of how church history is supposed to look (monolithic). This assumption is the root of the problem; a symptom is to elevate historical theology above exegetical theology.

Of course, Reformed theology as such isn't anti-historical, although Reformed individuals could do a better job of having awareness of and emphasizing important events in church history on which we might find agreement with Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g. Christology, Trinitarianism). In principle, however, these are not distinctives which mark off Eastern Orthodoxy. Rather, I find those distinctives which do mark off Eastern Orthodoxy to be problematic (e.g. anthropology and theology proper; cf. link).