Russia’s Chernobyl-style reactors to keep operating until the end of the decade 6:05 AM (4 hours ago)

With supply lines tripped up by sanctions and Moscow’s economy oriented toward its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, progress to replace these dinosaurs of the civilian nuclear age is plodding.

But continued reliance on aging technology made infamous by the world’s worst nuclear accident is also making Russia’s neighbors nervous.

“The extension of the operation of these reactors for five years raises concerns among neighboring countries, both regarding their own safety and the potential consequences for the Arctic,” Dmitry Gorchakov, a Bellona nuclear expert, said in Bellona’s January nuclear digest. All of Russia’s RBMK reactors are located within about 70 kilometers of European borders, he noted.

“However, in the context of Russia’s confrontation with the West, international dialogue and discussions to address concerns will be impossible, and the opinions of neighboring countries will not be a factor that the Russian government takes into account,” Gorchakov wrote.

At the beginning of the year, Rostekhnadzor, Moscow’s technical oversight agency, extended the operating license of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant’s Unit 3 reactor, an RMBK-1000 model that came online on 1979. Originally slated to run for 30 years, the unit was later extended for another 15 years before receiving its most recent permission to run until 2030.

The reactor is one of four at the Leningrad plant—and one of 11 nationwide—that was built on the RBMK 1000 design. Four others were built during the Soviet era in Ukraine at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant—including the one that exploded in 1986—and two similar RBMK-1500 reactors operated at the now-closed Ignalina nuclear plant in Lithuania, which where shut down for safety reasons.

The Russian technical agency has also said it plans to extend the operating license of the Unit 4 RBMK reactor at the Leningrad nuclear plant, the Units 3 and 4 RMBKs at the Kursk nuclear plant, and the first three RBMK units at the Smolensk nuclear plant. All of these reactors began operation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and current extension plans envision running them until they reach 50-year operational lifespans.

The first two units at the Leningrad plant and the Unit 1 reactor at Kursk are the only RBMK’s in Russia that have stopped operation. While each of these RBMKs underwent comprehensive upgrades in the years following the Chernobyl catastrophe, no amount of remodeling was able to finesse their most deviling flaw as far as safe decommissioning and dismantlement are concerned—their graphite stacks.

A graphite stack is essentially bulky cylinder about 7 meters high and 11 meters across made of graphite bricks and weighing thousands of tons. Fuel is fed into the reactor via channels cut in the masonry, and the graphite acts as the moderator.

The concept originated in the late 1940s, when the Soviet Union and the United States began to build reactors to produce weapons plutonium—a time when considerations about how to dismantle them were not a priority. While most reactors in commercial operation around the globe are of the boiling water type, the Soviet Union’s first steps in civilian nuclear power were based on the unwieldy graphite moderated design.

And this, said Bellona nuclear expert Alexander Nikitin, presents big problems when it comes time to shut them down and disassemble them for environmentally safe storage. By the time the RMBKs are shut down, he said, the moderators represent some 3,800 tons of highly active graphite irradiated with Carbon-14 that takes 5,730 years to decay.

“No one—not just Russia—has yet found a safe technology to process and dispose of these stacks, but they are looking,” said Nikitin. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, robot dismantlement technology had made advances in stack dismantlement, but where those programs stand at present is unclear.

“Dismantling and burying these stacks is a major hemorrhoid,” Nikitin said.

New technologies have allowed for RBMKs to run past their original runtimes, which partly side-steps that issue, Nikitin explained. But just how much punishment the graphite stacks can take remains unclear. Unit 1 of the Leningrad plant, for instance, was taken out of service in 2018 when it was discovered the reactor’s graphite stack had begun to swell and crumble into pieces.

For now, as Russia continues to extend the engineered lifespans of their RBMKs, both their ongoing operation, and what’s left of them when they shut down, pose troubling issues for the environment both inside and outside of Russia.

The post Russia’s Chernobyl-style reactors to keep operating until the end of the decade appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, February 2025 14 Apr 5:03 AM (2 days ago)

In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for January can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Construction of the Emergency Ministry’s Rescue Center in Tiksi is delayed
2. Russia lacks the vessels required for operations along the Northern Sea Route
3. The Hydrographic Enterprise, a subsidiary of Rosatom, is planning to carry out large-scale dredging operations along the Northern Sea Route
4. More than half of the cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 was accounted for by liquefied natural gas
5. There are plans to establish an environmental monitoring center for the Northern Sea Route, as the current monitoring system is deemed ineffective

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
6. The European Union and the United Kingdom have imposed new sanctions against Russia
7. Russia and the United States held talks on joint energy projects in the Arctic following a meeting in Saudi Arabia
8. Due to sanctions, NOVATEK is relocating its LNG transshipment point from Belgium to the area near Kildin Island

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
9. Expansion of Oil and Gas Extraction in the Russian Arctic
10. NOVATEK plans to complete construction of the Murmansk LNG plant by 2030
11. Plans for lithium extraction in the Murmansk region may be reduced

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
12. In Chukotka, preparations are underway to raise another batch of sunken vessels from the seabed
13. Extremely High Temperatures at the North Pole and Other Negative Records
14. The research project “Arсtida” has compiled a ranking of Russia’s Arctic regions based on their progress in the energy transition

Northern sea route and shipping

Construction of the Emergency Ministry’s Rescue Center in Tiksi is delayed ↑

Federal and regional authorities acknowledge that there is no rescue infrastructure along a stretch of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) exceeding 3,000 kilometers. This refers to the section between Dudinka and Pevek in Yakutia.

To enhance safety along the Northern Sea Route, an emergency rescue center was commissioned in Pevek in June 2024. The next EMERCOM (Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations) rescue center is planned for Tiksi, but its development is facing financial challenges.

Port of Pevek on the Northern Sea Route. Photo: Consfone

Stanislav Alekseev, a representative of EMERCOM in Yakutia, stated that the construction of the center in Pevek, completed in June 2024, cost 2 billion rubles. Government funding for a similar center in Tiksi may only become available by 2028. An earlier launch would be possible only with co-financing from state corporations and mineral resource developers.

Russia lacks the vessels required for operations along the Northern Sea Route ↑

Sergey Buyanov, Director General of the Central Research and Design Institute of the Merchant Marine, spoke about the shortage of container ships in Russia. He noted that transporting cargo along the Northern Sea Route requires ice-class bulk carriers with a deadweight of up to 120,000 tons, multipurpose vessels (including those with ice-class capability), supply ships, and many others.

At the same time, the operating icebreakers are wearing out, but instead of being decommissioned, they are being repurposed for use in less demanding conditions. For example, the “Avraamy Zavenyagin” icebreaker, built in 1984 and previously used at the port of Dudinka on Norilsk Nickel projects, is now in poor technical condition. It is planned to be repaired in Arkhangelsk and then deployed for operations in the ice-covered areas of the Northern Dvina River, as well as the Dvina and Onega Bays — similar to the deployment of its sister ship, “Captain Yevdokimov”.

The Hydrographic Enterprise, a subsidiary of Rosatom, is planning to carry out large-scale dredging operations along the Northern Sea Route ↑

At the 8th Congress on “Hydraulic Engineering Structures and Dredging,” a Rosatom representative reported that the current volume of capital dredging underway along the Northern Sea Route amounts to 4.4 million m³. The projected volume at the project preparation stage stands at 28.6 million m³. The projected volume of maintenance dredging needed to maintain design depths is estimated at 34.4 million m³ by 2030.

Key sites include:

The port of Sabetta on the western shore of the Ob Bay in the Kara Sea – 4.8 million m³
The maritime channel leading to it – 19 million m³
The Utrenny terminal on the western side of the Gydan Peninsula – 5.4 million m³
Other sites (Tambey, Bukhta Sever, Syradasay, Nagleynyn, Tiksi) – ranging from 400,000 to 2.1 million m³

However, the available dredging fleet is insufficient to carry out the planned volume of work. According to estimates by the Hydrographic Enterprise, an additional eight vessels of various types will be required in 2025 to complete the tasks.

Andrey Chumachenko, Director of the Hydrographic Enterprise, proposed addressing the fleet shortage by using federal budget subsidies, loans, engaging contracting organizations, and entering into concession agreements with investors.

Large-scale dredging operations may have a significant impact on the ecosystem, raising concerns among environmentalists and local communities. According to Vladimir Bogdanov, a representative of the Institute of Plant and Animal Ecology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in the most vulnerable areas — such as certain parts of the Ob Bay — dredging could lead to the complete disappearance of several marine species unique to the region.

More than half of the cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024 was accounted for by liquefied natural gas ↑

According to data from the consulting firm Gecon, based on statistics from Rosmorrechflot, liquefied natural gas (LNG) accounted for 57.69% of the total cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route in 2024, amounting to 21.86 million tons. Oil accounted for 21.37% (8.1 million tons). The total cargo volume along the NSR reached 37.89 million tons.

The volume of LNG transported in 2024 increased by 8.6% (1.73 million tons) compared to the previous year. A Rosatom representative explained that this growth was driven by the launch of NOVATEK’s Arctic LNG 2 project. Mikhail Grigoryev, Director of Gecon, added that in 2024, NOVATEK did not suspend operations at Yamal LNG for scheduled maintenance, as it did in 2023.

The LNG carrier MERAK, built by Mitsui OSK Lines for Yamal LNG. Photo: kees torn

There are plans to establish an environmental monitoring center for the Northern Sea Route, as the current monitoring system is deemed ineffective ↑

The environmental monitoring center for the Northern Sea Route is planned to be established on the basis of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI). This center will be responsible for coordinating the monitoring system of the NSR’s marine ecosystems, collecting and analyzing data, and transmitting it to the State Environmental Data Fund and the Federal State Information System “Ecomonitoring.” The documentation package for the establishment of the center is currently at the legislative proposal stage, and the project itself is included in the Northern Sea Route development plan through 2035.

Currently, environmental monitoring along the Northern Sea Route is carried out by various organizations — the Russian Federal Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography (VNIRO), Rosatom, the Marine Research Center of Moscow State University, the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), and others. However, the coverage is incomplete, the methodological framework is insufficient, the collected data is fragmented, and there is no unified platform for data storage. According to Alexander Makarov, Director of AARI, it is not feasible to build an effective monitoring system based on existing structures, as none of them fully account for the specific characteristics of the Arctic zone, nor do they adequately cover the necessary parameters and monitoring targets across the NSR waters. A centralized system for aggregating all collected data is also required.

Bellona’s comment:

«To achieve the goals outlined in Russia’s strategic documents concerning the Northern Sea Route, the state lacks sufficient financial resources. There is ongoing discussion about the shortage of various types of vessels needed for NSR operations — icebreakers, cargo carriers, dredging vessels, and emergency rescue ships. Funding is also insufficient to build the necessary infrastructure within the planned timeframes, as illustrated by the case of the rescue center in Tiksi.

At the same time, the government’s ability to cover funding gaps appears to be diminishing. This is evidenced by plans to involve extractive companies in financing the construction of the rescue center in Tiksi, as well as the proposal to increase the cost of icebreaker escort services in order to fund the completion of new icebreakers.

Meanwhile, cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route grew by only 4% over the past year—an outcome that signals more of a failure than a success in meeting the goal of doubling cargo volumes by 2024. The future expansion of shipping along the NSR now depends largely on the launch of new oil, gas, and mineral extraction projects in the Arctic zone, the success of which, in turn, depends on the willingness of other countries to purchase these resources. Continued and expanded sanctions against Russian companies would mean stagnation in the development of NSR infrastructure.

On the other hand, the United States’ anticipated “trade war” with much of the world, along with the uncertain prospects for an end to the war in Ukraine, could lead to unpredictable outcomes in Arctic development — both on the part of Russia and other countries, particularly the United States.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

The European Union and the United Kingdom have imposed new sanctions against Russia ↑

On February 24, marking the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union adopted its 16th package of sanctions aimed at weakening the Russian regime’s ability to continue the war.

The new EU sanctions include:

A ban on port access and the provision of maritime transport services for 74 tankers belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet, which are used to transport Russian oil in circumvention of existing sanctions. This brings the total number of vessels sanctioned by the EU to 153. Additionally, owning or operating ships within the Russian shadow fleet is now considered grounds for imposing sanctions on individuals and legal entities. Some of these tankers operate in the Arctic, including Lokosao and Lorena Grand.
Additional restrictions have been imposed on the export of goods and technologies, particularly software related to the exploration of oil and gas fields.
A ban has been introduced on the provision of goods, technologies, and services for oil projects in Russia, specifically targeting the Vostok Oil project for oil extraction and export on the Taymyr Peninsula.
A ban on the temporary storage of Russian crude oil and petroleum products within the European Union has been introduced. The restriction applies to all such oil and petroleum products, regardless of purchase price or destination.
A ban on the import of Russian aluminum, a significant source of revenue for Russia, has been introduced. European buyers will be allowed to continue importing Russian aluminum under a quota system for one year, but by the end of 2026, all imports are to be fully phased out. In the Arctic zone, Russia extracts aluminum in the Murmansk region, specifically at the Khibiny deposit group.

On February 24, the United Kingdom announced its largest package of sanctions against Russia since 2022. The sanctions list includes 40 vessels from the “shadow fleet” transporting Russian oil, bringing the total number of such sanctioned ships to 133.

Russia and the United States held talks on joint energy projects in the Arctic following a meeting in Saudi Arabia ↑

On February 18, talks between Russia and the United States took place in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. This meeting marked the first official contact between the two countries since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

According to POLITICO, the talks included discussions on the possibility of joint energy projects in the Arctic. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), noted that while the discussion was general in nature, the parties did touch upon specific projects in the Arctic.

Nikita Lipunov, an expert at the Institute for International Studies of MGIMO University, believes that a priority for the United States in the context of potential cooperation could be the revival of the joint project in the Kara Sea. Until 2018, Rosneft and the American company ExxonMobil were working on field development there, but ExxonMobil withdrew from the project due to sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union.

Due to sanctions, NOVATEK is relocating its LNG transshipment point from Belgium to the area near Kildin Island ↑

Russia’s largest natural gas producer, NOVATEK, is preparing to relocate the liquefied natural gas (LNG) transshipment point for its Yamal LNG project from the Belgian port of Zeebrugge to the area near Kildin Island, not far from Murmansk. Sanctions banning the transshipment of Russian LNG within the EU are set to take effect at the end of March. However, according to the newspaper “Kommersant”, NOVATEK has already begun moving new tankers to the Kildin Island area.

LNG transshipment at this location has been taking place since 2020, but the company now plans to increase volumes and make it the primary transshipment point. The logistical changes are expected to affect only shipments to Asia, while exports to Europe are projected to remain unchanged.

Bellona’s comment:

«Against the backdrop of yet another round of sluggish sanctions from the EU and the UK targeting Russian companies and the shadow fleet transporting Russian oil and gas, the U.S. statement on the potential revival of joint resource extraction projects in the Russian Arctic came as a surprise — much like many other statements made by the new American administration.

It is too early to draw conclusions about the feasibility of these projects due to geopolitical factors. However, it is important to note that the mentioned potential joint project in the Kara Sea involves offshore oil extraction—an activity that could pose a serious threat to Arctic ecosystems, particularly given the lack of transparency, insufficient emergency infrastructure, and the fact that environmental safety is not a priority for either the current Russian or U.S. authorities.

Bellona advocates for a complete ban on offshore oil and gas extraction in the Arctic zone due to the disproportionately high risk of environmental damage in the event of an accident.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian arctic

Expansion of Oil and Gas Extraction in the Russian Arctic ↑

According to the Ministry of Natural Resources, at the current production rate, Russia has natural gas reserves sufficient for more than 100 years and oil reserves for approximately 64.5 years.

Russia’s largest gas fields — Urengoy, Tambey, and Shtokman — are located in the Arctic zone within the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. One of the country’s largest oil fields, Payakha, is also situated in the Arctic, in the Krasnoyarsk Krai region.

In the near future, production is expected to begin at the Parusovoye, Severo-Parusovoye, and Semakovskoye fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. These fields contain over 450 billion m³ of natural gas and more than 7 million tons of liquid hydrocarbons.

The head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug announced that the first batch of oil from Lukoil and Gazprom’s joint venture, Layavozhneftegaz, is scheduled to be produced in 2026.

NOVATEK plans to complete construction of the Murmansk LNG plant by 2030 ↑

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, speaking before the Federation Council, stated that the construction of the Murmansk LNG plant is scheduled to be completed by 2030. By the same time, the Volkov–Murmansk gas pipeline is expected to be built to supply the plant with feedstock. The gas for liquefaction is planned to be sourced from the Gydan Peninsula.

The plant is expected to have an annual capacity of 20.4 million tons and will consist of three trains, each with a capacity of 6.8 million tons. The first train is scheduled for completion in 2027, the second in 2029, while the timeline for the third train has not yet been specified.

Polar Lithium site. Photo: atommedia.online / Polar Lithium

The Murmansk LNG project was initially scheduled for launch between 2027 and 2029. However, on June 24, 2024, as part of its 14th sanctions package, the European Union banned new investments as well as the provision of goods, technologies, and services necessary for the completion of the Murmansk LNG plant. As a result, work on both the LNG facility and the associated gas pipeline was suspended.

In January, it was reported that construction of the LNG loading terminal in the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea—intended for the Murmansk LNG plant—had been accelerated. In 2024, a project proposal for the terminal was submitted for public review with a planned completion date of 2033; however, the hearings were canceled. According to new materials from the preliminary environmental impact assessment (EIA), the terminal is now expected to be completed by 2030.

Plans for lithium extraction in the Murmansk region may be reduced ↑

At a roundtable held on February 12 in the Federation Council on the topic “Extraction and Processing of Rare Earth Metals: Challenges and Solutions,” representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade acknowledged that the projected growth of domestic lithium consumption to 10,000 tons by 2028 may be overly optimistic. Currently, consumption stands at approximately 1,000 tons.

A significant increase in lithium consumption in Russia is unlikely, due to a decline in electric vehicle production. Meanwhile, the global lithium market is currently saturated with supply from major producers — Australia, Chile, and China.

Polar Lithium — a sanctioned joint venture between Rosatom and Norilsk Nickel—plans to begin lithium extraction at the Kolmozerskoye deposit in the Murmansk region by 2031. The company has not yet announced any adjustments to its plans.

Bellona’s comment:

«The past three years have shown that, despite sanctions imposed by the G7 countries and the EU, there remains demand for Russian natural resources on the global market, and workarounds for these sanctions continue to be found. As a result, Russia’s plan for mineral extraction in the Arctic is still being implemented — albeit at a slower pace than originally envisioned in strategic documents. The majority of extracted resources are expected to be exported, as is currently the case.

Domestic demand cannot support significant consumption due to the underdevelopment of the industrial sector. The case of lithium illustrates this clearly. Despite government incentives aimed at boosting domestic electric vehicle production, output is declining rather than growing—likely unable to compete with Chinese alternatives.

The accelerated construction of the LNG terminal in Murmansk is likely linked to European sanctions on the transshipment of Russian LNG at the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. For now, ship-to-ship transshipment is planned near Kildin Island, close to Murmansk. Whether this will be followed by a similar acceleration in the construction of the Murmansk LNG plant remains uncertain and will depend on the evolution of international sanctions. As of today, given its sanctioned status, the future Murmansk LNG facility is unlikely to secure buyers—much like Arctic LNG 2, which was forced to remain idle for much of last year.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

In Chukotka, preparations are underway to raise another batch of sunken vessels from the seabed ↑

The operation concerns five vessels that sank in Krest Bay near the settlement of Egvekinot. A diving survey is planned for this summer to determine whether the ships contain petroleum products or other pollutants, assess their condition, and, in some cases, establish their exact coordinates. The actual salvage operation is scheduled for 2026. A total of 8 million rubles has been allocated for this effort, which is being carried out under the federal project “General Cleanup.”

Earlier, in 2023 and 2024, three sunken vessels were raised in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug from the seabed near Emma Bay, close to the settlement of Provideniya. Approximately 150 tons of metal were recovered from the coastal seabed of the bay.

Extremely High Temperatures at the North Pole and Other Negative Records ↑

In early February, the EU’s Copernicus Climate Monitoring Service recorded a record-high temperature of 0.5°C at the North Pole—20°C above the seasonal average for this time of year.

The beginning of the year also saw another negative milestone. In mid-February, the combined sea ice extent in the Arctic and Antarctic dropped to 15.76 million square kilometers—the lowest winter ice coverage ever recorded.

Just a month earlier, Arctic sea ice extent was also well below average, measuring 13.13 million square kilometers— the second-lowest figure for that month since satellite observations began in 1979. And the month before that, an all-time record low for December sea ice extent was set.

The situation is no better for continental glaciers. A recent study by researchers from the United States and the United Kingdom found that the number of fractures in the Greenland Ice Sheet—the world’s second-largest ice sheet after Antarctica—has increased by 5% over the past five years, while the total area of ice damage has grown by 25%.

Husky dogs running on frozen sea pulling a sledge in front of a glacier, Qaanaaq, Greenland. Photo: Kedardome

The research project “Arсtida” has compiled a ranking of Russia’s Arctic regions based on their progress in the energy transition ↑

The ranking is based on an analysis of the development of renewable energy, electric transport, and energy efficiency measures in buildings across 10 northern regions of Russia. No region received high marks across all categories. Karelia, the Murmansk region, and Krasnoyarsk Krai showed the strongest performance relative to other regions. These areas have visible electricity generation from renewable sources (with 384 MW of installed capacity in Murmansk and 314 MW in Karelia, while the other regions have no more than 10 MW), infrastructure for charging personal electric vehicles, urban electric transport, energy-efficient new buildings, and plans under development to further improve these indicators.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, February 2025 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Bellona Nuclear Digest. February 2025 8 Apr 12:25 AM (8 days ago)

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activities in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office declared Bellona an undesirable organization.

Nevertheless, we continue to monitor developments in nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to international readers. Our aim is to analyze these developments in order to assess the extent of Russia’s influence abroad and the associated risks.

This survey covers events from February 2025 and includes commentary by Bellona’s Nuclear Project experts Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.

You can follow the links to read our three most recent digests for January 2025, November–December, and October 2024. Download a PDF of this digest here.

Subscribe to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for February 2025
1.1. Nuclear diplomacy events
1.2. Operational status of the ZNPP
1.3. Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team
1.4. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.5. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
2. Ukrainian government authorizes Energoatom to purchase reactors from Bulgaria’s Belene NPP project

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. KHNP signs supply contract with Centrus for enriched uranium
4. Construction of a new production hall begins at Urenco’s enrichment plant in the Netherlands
5. International sanctions on Russia in February

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
6. Rosatom and Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil sign contract for conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium
7. Rosatom resumes low-enriched uranium deliveries to the US
8. Rosatom-affiliated enterprise repairs imported equipment
9. Serbia considers cooperation with Rosatom
10. Baltic Shipyard files new lawsuit against Wärtsilä seeking damages
11. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for February 2025

Nuclear diplomacy events ↑

On February 4, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited Kyiv, where he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior officials. The meeting focused on the IAEA’s efforts to help prevent a nuclear accident amid the ongoing military conflict. This was his eleventh visit to Ukraine since the start of the war nearly three years ago.

One of the main issues discussed during the visit was the assessment of damage to power infrastructure vital for the safe operation of nuclear power plants, caused by recent Russian attacks.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during his official visit to Kyiv on February 4, 2025. Credit: Office of the President of Ukraine

In recent months, Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — have repeatedly been forced to reduce power output due to large-scale military activity affecting the electricity grid (see Bellona’s digests for October–December 2024 and January 2025). In September 2024, Ukraine and the IAEA agreed that the Agency would assess the risks and scale of damage to the country’s energy infrastructure and work on targeted technical assistance to help prevent a nuclear accident. Since then, IAEA experts have visited nine different power substations.

Before meeting with President Zelensky, Grossi personally visited one of these substations. In February, the IAEA continued its work to assess the condition of electrical substations critical to the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants that were damaged in Russian attacks on the power system. The information gathered is expected to help determine possible next steps or areas where the Agency could provide technical assistance to strengthen nuclear safety.

On February 5, a rotation of IAEA teams at the Zaporizhzhia NPP was scheduled to take place. However, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IAEA was forced to postpone the rotation due to Russia’s failure to provide the necessary security guarantees. The Ministry noted that this was not the first time Russia had resorted to blackmail and pressure on international experts, recalling that a convoy carrying IAEA staff came under fire on December 10, 2024, during a previous rotation at the ZNPP.

Russia, for its part, stated that it had provided security guarantees in advance, including a description of the previously used rotation procedure. However, two days before the scheduled rotation, the IAEA proposed changes to the agreed scheme for crossing the line of military contact. Russia refused to accept the changes, and as a result, on the morning of February 5, the IAEA cancelled the rotation.

On February 7, interagency consultations between the IAEA and Russia took place in Moscow. The Agency’s delegation was led by Director General Rafael Grossi. The Russian delegation included Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev, Rostechnadzor Head Alexander Trembitsky, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov, as well as representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian Armed Forces’ Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops, and the National Guard (Rosgvardiya). According to Rosatom, the discussions focused on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which is under Russian control, and of Russia’s domestic nuclear power plants.

It was noted that the issue of regular IAEA expert rotations at the Zaporizhzhia NPP was discussed specifically (the scheduled rotation on February 5 had been disrupted).

On February 12, the rotation of the IAEA team at the Zaporizhzhia NPP was disrupted for a second time. The IAEA reported that the cancellation was due to intense military activity in the region, despite earlier written security assurances provided by both sides.

According to a statement by Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia followed a familiar pattern: “First, the Russian side fails to agree on the point and time of the rotation for a long time, then gives vague signals about its alleged readiness to guarantee safe passage, but an hour before the start of the rotation opens fire or starts hostilities in the area. After that, Russian fighters appear with white flags and IAEA flags, and Moscow claims that ‘everything is ready’ for the mission. This is not the first time such actions have been repeated, but the security risks are getting higher every time.”

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, together with Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Energoatom Chairman Petro Kotin, visited the Kyivska substation during his 11th mission to Ukraine. Grossi was accompanied by Lydie Evrard, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, and Massimo Aparo, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards. February 4, 2025. Credit: IAEA

The Ukrainian side believes that in doing so, Russia is trying to force the IAEA to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by sending international experts to the ZNPP through temporarily occupied territories.

Russia blamed Ukraine for the disrupted rotation, stating that it began as planned but that the movement of IAEA representatives was blocked by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian military personnel reportedly waited for several hours at the designated location, but due to a deterioration in the situation (presence of drones and threat of shelling), the Russian team was withdrawn.

The Russian Foreign Ministry also published a video showing that during the withdrawal, the convoy — which included a vehicle identified as an IAEA vehicle — came under drone and mortar fire. Note that, unlike in footage from December, where a damaged IAEA vehicle displayed clear organizational markings, the vehicle in this video bore only an IAEA flag.

It was also reported that a drone crashed 300 meters from Unit 1 of the ZNPP. (According to the IAEA, its team at the ZNPP heard an explosion near the site on February 12, which coincided with external reports of a drone attack.)

IAEA Director General Grossi expressed deep regret over the cancellation of the rotation, emphasizing that IAEA staff are carrying out vital work in very challenging circumstances to help prevent a nuclear accident. He called the threat to their safety completely unacceptable.

Grossi stated that he is holding active consultations with both sides to guarantee the mission’s safety and to maintain the IAEA’s continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia NPP in support of nuclear safety and the protection of the facility.

The rotation was eventually carried out only on March 1. This was reported by Yury Chernichuk, the Russian-appointed director of the ZNPP, who noted: “It is fundamentally important that, for the first time, the route passed through Russian territory.” (Bellona’s note: through Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia.)

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko sent an official letter to Grossi, stating that the rotation cannot be carried out without the approval of the Ukrainian authorities and constitutes a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sent a note of protest to senior IAEA officials. The document emphasizes that Ukraine considers the IAEA’s actions a humanitarian evacuation carried out in response to threats to the life and health of Agency personnel.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the only reason for the decision to rotate the Agency’s experts at the ZNPP through Russian-controlled territory was to protect the lives of staff under extraordinary circumstances, and that any political considerations in this context were inappropriate. He also noted that the decision had been discussed with Ukrainian President Zelensky and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha.

Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi meeting, Moscow, February 7, 2025. Credit: Strana Rosatom

Following the IAEA Board of Governors meeting held from March 3 to 7, 47 countries issued a joint statement expressing their concern over the recent IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) rotation. The statement also emphasized the exceptional nature of this rotation and condemned “Russia’s actions that deliberately obstruct the IAEA’s work in Ukraine and place Agency personnel under unprecedented pressure in a high-risk environment.”

Meanwhile, on February 18, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated that, on his instruction, a program is currently being developed to put the Zaporizhzhia NPP into operation. “This includes obtaining the necessary licenses — for the facilities and for personnel operations. It also involves work with nuclear fuel, the creation of a power output system, and the calculation of electricity demand across different regions,” he said. According to Likhachev, the plant will be brought into operation as soon as the military and political situation allows.

More details about this statement and the potential technical challenges associated with restarting the ZNPP can be found in a separate article on Bellona’s website: “Rosatom head says Russia will restart seized Ukrainian nuclear plant.”

Operational status of the ZNPP ↑

On February 1, connection to the 750 kV power line, lost on January 29, was restored. Two external power lines were once again available to the ZNPP.

However, on February 11, the backup 330 kV line was disconnected. According to the Russian representatives at the ZNPP, the disconnection occurred due to the activation of the electrical protection system. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine informed the IAEA that the disconnection was caused by military activity that damaged the line. On February 27, the IAEA reported that connection to the backup line was restored approximately a week after the outage.

In information circular INFCIRC/1273 submitted to the IAEA, Russia describes the “actual situation” at the ZNPP for the period from November 13, 2024, to February 16, 2025. In the section on plant maintenance, it is stated in general terms that a repair campaign was launched on January 13, 2025. Scheduled maintenance is being carried out on safety systems and other systems important to the operation of the plant at Units 2–6. Work is also underway to reinforce emergency power supply and alternative water supply systems.

As for February, IAEA reports stated only that the Agency’s experts had been informed of the completion of scheduled maintenance on one part of safety systems at Reactor Unit 1 and the start of work on another.

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team ↑

The IAEA’s updates on the situation in Ukraine for February do not specify which particular areas or facilities at the ZNPP were visited by the Agency’s experts as part of their monitoring of nuclear safety and security. They only state that walkdowns continue to be carried out on a regular basis.

It is worth noting that in earlier updates, the IAEA provided a significant amount of information about the activities of its expert team at the ZNPP — including where they had or had not been granted access, as well as current technical issues and malfunctions (leaks, equipment failures and repairs, etc.). Since October 2024, such information has been published less frequently.

The same applies to the data provided by Russia in its information circulars. In October 2024, Russia stopped regularly submitting updates on the situation at the ZNPP. The above-mentioned Russian INFCIRC/1273, dated February 25, presents general information for the period from November 13, 2024, to February 16, 2025:

“During the specified period, the IAEA Secretariat experts visited the training centre with a full-scale simulator, the dry storage site for spent nuclear fuel, the central control room and the external radiation monitoring laboratory; the radioactive source storage laboratory… If the operational situation allows, IAEA Secretariat experts make weekly visits to Enerhodar, accompanied by security personnel and translators.”

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

Throughout February, as in previous months, the IAEA team at the ZNPP reported hearing signs of military activity at varying distances from the plant on an almost daily basis. Some explosions were heard at very close range. No damage on the ZNPP site was reported.

Russia informed the IAEA that between November 13, 2024, and February 16, 2025, 1,190 drone strikes were recorded, along with artillery attacks on Enerhodar and the ZNPP.

During talks with Rafael Grossi, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated that the risk of attacks in the area around the ZNPP is increasing, as evidenced by the number of intercepted drones and artillery strikes.

As for the drone attack in which a downed UAV fell onto the roof of the ZNPP’s training center, Grossi stated after his meeting with Likhachev — according to TASS — that the collected drone fragments do not allow for identification of their origin, but that these issues are being raised in discussions on international platforms.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities in Ukraine ↑

IAEA teams at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine NPPs, as well as the Chernobyl NPP, reported daily air raid alarms. There were also reports of drones being detected near the NPP sites. At the South Ukraine NPP on February 25, drones were detected three kilometers from the plant, along with anti-aircraft fire and a subsequent explosion at some distance.

On the night of February 14, a drone attack at the Chernobyl NPP caused a fire on the building confining the remains of the Unit 4 reactor, which was destroyed in 1986.

Ukrainian authorities reported that the strike hit the New Safe Confinement (NSC), a structure designed to prevent radioactive releases and protect the remains of the destroyed reactor from external hazards.

Firefighters promptly arrived at the scene and began extinguishing the blaze; however, it continued smouldering for several hours. IAEA representatives observed damage to the outer layer of the confinement structure caused by the explosion.

Ukraine informed the IAEA that the attack resulted in a direct impact on the protective shell of the confinement structure at a height of 87 meters. The explosion damaged both the outer and inner cladding of the NSC Arch, as well as equipment related to the main crane system. The resulting fire affected an area of 40 square meters of the structure.

More details about this incident and its potential consequences are available in a separate commentary on Bellona’s website: “Bellona’s Comment on the Military Drone Strike at the Chernobyl Reactor Shield.”

The following day, on February 15, firefighters continued to deal with smouldering hotspots. The IAEA team gained unrestricted access to the impact site and confirmed that the fire had affected a significant area. The explosion created a hole approximately six meters in diameter in the roof of the structure, damaging both the inner and outer cladding, as well as some equipment and electrical cables. However, the structural support beams were not significantly affected.

Radiation levels at the site remained within the normal range, as confirmed by measurements taken by the IAEA. The drone debris was collected by Ukrainian specialists for analysis. The IAEA team was informed that once the remaining smouldering hotspots are extinguished, repair work will begin and additional radiation monitoring sensors will be installed.

Impact of the drone strike on the New Safe Confinement over Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP. Credit: State Emergency Service of Ukraine, ChNPP

As of February 27, efforts to extinguish smouldering hotspots inside the confinement structure were still ongoing. The operation was complicated by the fact that the hotspots were located between layers of thermal insulation. Thermal imaging and a surveillance drone were used to detect them. More than 400 emergency personnel were involved in the response, working in shifts. It was only on March 5 that the IAEA reported no smouldering hotspots had been detected in the preceding two days.

Air raid alarms repeatedly sounded at the Chernobyl site, forcing a temporary suspension of firefighting efforts. The IAEA also received information about drones being detected within a five-kilometer radius of the site, including two drones observed over one of the intermediate spent fuel storage facilities.

In Kyiv, IAEA experts examined drone debris that, according to Ukrainian authorities, had been collected after the strike. They concluded that it was consistent with a Shahed-type UAV but did not make any assessments regarding its origin.

Commentary by Bellona:

Ukrainian government authorizes Energoatom to purchase reactors from Bulgaria’s Belene NPP project ↑

On February 11, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved legislation allowing Energoatom, the operator of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, to purchase equipment from Bulgaria’s suspended Belene NPP project for the completion of Units 3 and 4 at the Khmelnytskyi NPP.

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the decision is of great importance for the country’s energy system: “Completing the construction of the Khmelnytskyi NPP is a strategic priority for Ukraine.”

Several Ukrainian politicians opposed the legislation, arguing that Ukraine should not purchase Russian-made equipment at a non-transparent price during a time of war with Russia. However, Energy Minister Halushchenko emphasized that there would be no Russian involvement in the project — specifically, no Russian fuel or servicing. All work will be carried out by Ukrainian and US companies.

On February 5, Westinghouse confirmed that it would be able to supply compatible fuel assemblies for Units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnytskyi NPP if the reactors are completed using the VVER-1000 (V-466B modification) design.

Plans to purchase equipment from the unfinished Bulgarian project were also discussed during a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on February 6. The IAEA is providing technical support and consultations on nuclear safety as part of this project.

Negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria on the purchase of nuclear island equipment for the two units began in July 2023 and sparked debate in both Ukraine and Bulgaria.

Preserved equipment at the Belene NPP site. Credit: Ministry of Energy of Bulgaria

On February 12, a political party in the Bulgarian parliament proposed cancelling the negotiations on the sale of Belene NPP equipment. At the same time, Tsanko Bachijski, head of Bulgaria’s Nuclear Regulatory Agency, stated that a review is underway to determine whether the steam generators included in the list of equipment planned for sale could be used at the Kozloduy NPP. This issue has been raised several times in recent years, as some components originally intended for Belene have already been used to extend the operational life of Units 5 and 6, and Unit 6 may soon require replacement of a steam generator. The view that Belene equipment could be used at the Kozloduy NPP is also supported by organizations such as Greenpeace Bulgaria.

On March 13, the law on purchasing equipment from the Belene NPP was signed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

On March 14, Halushchenko stated that Ukraine is now awaiting a decision from the Bulgarian government.

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

KHNP signs supply contract with Centrus for enriched uranium ↑

On February 4, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP) and Centrus Energy Corp. signed a 10-year contract for the supply of enriched uranium, formalizing a conditional supply commitment reached in September 2024.

A press release by the Korean company notes that Centrus is currently the only company in the United States licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to produce high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). The agreement will thus provide KHNP with access to fuel for both existing reactors — low-enriched uranium (LEU) — and future next-generation reactors.

In its 2024 annual report, Centrus notes that its LEU supply portfolio includes contingent contracts and commitments totaling $2.0 billion, $1.2 billion of which are in support of potential construction of LEU production capacity at the company’s facility in Piketon, Ohio.

South Korea’s KHNP and US-based Centrus sign enriched uranium supply contract. Credit: KHNP

The agreement signed with KHNP formalizes $0.8 billion of the $1.2 billion in contingent commitments. The report also states that fulfilling these contingent LEU supply contracts and commitments depends on Centrus’s ability to attract substantial public and private investment.

According to the media outlet Business Korea, KHNP is expanding cooperation with the American supplier as part of its efforts to diversify sources of nuclear fuel, including reducing dependence on supplies from Russia. The contract is expected to strengthen energy security in both South Korea and the United States by supporting the development of US uranium enrichment capacity. The same publication reports that from 2019 to 2023, South Korea imported about one-third of its enriched uranium from Russia.

Construction of a new production hall begins at Urenco’s enrichment plant in the Netherlands ↑

On February 6, Dutch construction company BAM Bouw en Techniek announced that it had begun work on a new production hall at Urenco’s uranium enrichment plant in Almelo, the Netherlands. The implementation agreement for the construction between BAM and Urenco was signed in July 2024.

The company has now moved from the basic design phase to detailed design and has set up the construction site, where the first foundation pile was driven on January 7, 2025. Construction is expected to be completed in the summer of 2026.

As a reminder, in March 2024 Urenco held a ceremony marking the start of a project to expand production capacity at the Almelo site by 750,000 SWU per year. The first additional cascades are scheduled to be commissioned in 2027.

International sanctions on Russia in February ↑

On February 24, the European Union adopted its 16th package of sanctions against Russia, targeting sectors such as energy, trade, transport, infrastructure, and financial services. The energy-related measures focus on the oil and gas industry. (Switzerland aligned its sanctions list with the EU’s restrictive measures.) The package does not include any companies associated with Rosatom.

Australia and New Zealand also expanded their sanctions lists on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. New Zealand imposed sanctions on FSUE Atomflot — a step already taken by many other countries.

On February 14, the United Kingdom added Rosatom Additive Technologies to its sanctions list. The company had previously been sanctioned by the United States and Ukraine.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Rosatom and Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil sign contract for conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium ↑

On February 27, Rosatom announced the signing of an agreement between its subsidiary Internexco GmbH and Brazil’s state-owned company Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) for the conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium at Russian facilities. The contract is valued at approximately $40 million.

Later, on March 11, INB reported that the deal involves the export of 275 metric tons of uranium concentrate (U₃O₈) produced at the Caetité uranium production facility in Brazil. The enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), with an enrichment level of up to 4.25%, is expected to be returned to Brazil by December 2027.

The contract was awarded following an international tender in which the selection criterion was the lowest overall cost, provided that INB’s technical requirements were fully met.

Uranium concentrate production facility in Caetité, Brazil. Credit: INB

It was also noted that conversion is the only stage of the nuclear fuel cycle not performed by INB. The company’s uranium enrichment plant is being commissioned in phases at the nuclear fuel production facility in Resende (Rio de Janeiro state). Once fully operational, the plant will be able to supply about 70% of the enriched uranium needed for each fuel reload of the Angra 1 reactor.

Rosatom also has an existing contract with Brazil for the supply of 330 metric tons of Russian enriched uranium between 2023 and 2027.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom resumes low-enriched uranium deliveries to the US ↑

On February 24, the pro-Kremlin outlet EADaily, citing the ImportGenius database, reported that Rosatom’s subsidiary Tenex (Techsnabexport) had resumed deliveries of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the United States. According to the outlet, the previous shipment of LEU had taken place in November 2024.

On November 14, 2024, Russia imposed temporary restrictions on LEU exports to the United States in response to US sanctions introduced in May 2024, which included limitations on imports of Russian enriched uranium and a complete ban starting in 2028. As a result, Tenex — which supplies LEU to the US company Centrus — lost its general export license and was required to obtain separate licenses for each shipment.

In its annual report, Centrus states that, as of now, Tenex has received three specific export licenses from the Russian authorities. Centrus plans to use most of the delivered LEU to fulfill delayed orders. Tenex has also informed Centrus of its intention to apply for additional export licenses to meet its delivery obligations under the Tenex supply contract for other current and future orders. However, there is no certainty that the Russian authorities will issue further licenses. Even if new licenses are granted, it remains unclear whether they will be issued in a timely manner or might be revoked before shipment.

Centrus had preliminarily applied for waivers from the US ban on the purchase of Russian enriched uranium and received the necessary licenses for deliveries in 2024 and 2025 from the US Department of Energy.

According to EADaily, in March Tenex also supplied LEU to the US subsidiary of French company Framatome and to Global Nuclear Fuel.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The issue of resumed Russian enriched uranium deliveries to the United States is covered in a separate article by Bellona’s Nuclear Project expert Dmitry Gorchakov, published by The Moscow Times.»

Rosatom-affiliated enterprise repairs imported equipment ↑

Rosatom reported that one of its enterprises — the power generating company Quadra (part of the Rosatom Infrastructure Solutions division) — has, for the first time, carried out repairs on a foreign-made gas turbine at the Voronezhskaya CHPP-2 without the involvement of the original equipment manufacturer. The turbine in question is an LM6000 model produced by General Electric. According to the report, more than 500 components and assemblies were either replaced or restored. (It is likely one of the two turbines in the combined-cycle unit commissioned in 2010.)

As of today, Quadra operates a fleet of 19 imported gas turbine units. Following the start of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent withdrawal of a number of foreign suppliers from the Russian market, Quadra and other power generating companies have faced refusals by manufacturers to service or repair turbines. In addition, deliveries of original spare parts have ceased.

Serbia considers cooperation with Rosatom ↑

On February 13, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev held talks in Belgrade with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and other senior officials. The parties discussed plans to deepen cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the participation of Serbian companies in Rosatom’s international projects, training Serbian students in nuclear disciplines at Russian universities, and prospects for joint work in high-tech sectors in Serbia.

Since 1989, Serbia (then part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had a law banning the construction of nuclear power plants. The law was adopted three years after the Chernobyl disaster. However, on November 29, 2024, the Serbian parliament lifted the moratorium.

The topic of nuclear energy became increasingly relevant for Serbia following the First Nuclear Energy Summit held in Brussels in March 2024. The summit focused primarily on growing interest in developing nuclear power among European nations and other participating countries as a means to achieve net-zero emissions and promote sustainable development.

In his speech at the summit, Aleksandar Vučić noted that while Serbia has no prior experience in nuclear energy, the country is facing pressing energy challenges and is interested in building at least four small modular reactors (SMRs) with a total capacity of about 1,200 MW. However, Serbia faces three main obstacles on this path: identifying a technology provider, securing financing (including the possibility of support from leading European countries), and addressing public opinion.

Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev meets with President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. Belgrade, February 13, 2025. Credit: Rosatom

According to Serbia’s Minister of Mining and Energy, Dubravka Đedović Handanović, the country’s new Energy Development Strategy considers the potential integration of nuclear power plants into Serbia’s energy system after 2040. At this stage, the government is studying available technologies and seeking solutions that would be suitable for the country.

Russia is one of the countries with which Serbia is holding consultations on cooperation in nuclear and related technologies — not limited to nuclear energy, but also including areas such as nuclear medicine. Following his visit to Belgrade, Alexey Likhachev stated that Rosatom had offered the Serbian leadership a wide range of cooperation opportunities and expressed optimism about the prospects, despite the existing competition.

Baltic Shipyard files new lawsuit against Wärtsilä seeking damages ↑

Baltic Shipyard, which is building Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers, has filed another lawsuit in the Arbitration Court of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region against Finnish company Wärtsilä and its subsidiaries — Wärtsilä Corporation, Wärtsilä Solutions, Wärtsilä Finland, Wärtsilä Norway, and Wärtsilä Technology.

The shipyard is seeking to recover over €235,000 and 1,200 Swiss francs in losses incurred during international arbitration proceedings, plus interest for late payment.

The court denied Baltic Shipyard’s request for interim measures to freeze Wärtsilä’s patents in Russia. The court justified its decision by citing a lack of evidence that Wärtsilä or its subsidiaries are taking actions that could hinder enforcement of the ruling, a lack of direct connection between the requested interim measures and the subject of the lawsuit, and the fact that the existence of debt (as determined in previous rulings) alone is not grounds for granting interim measures.

Legal disputes between the Russian shipbuilder and the Finnish company began in 2022, when Wärtsilä exited the Russian market following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As a result, despite advance payments, shaft line equipment kits for the icebreakers Yakutia and Chukotka were never delivered.

Baltic Shipyard has previously filed claims in Russian courts seeking €7.6 million and €5.1 million in damages. In both cases, rulings were made in favor of the Russian shipbuilder. In addition, a series of lawsuits against the Finnish supplier from other United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) enterprises are currently being reviewed by Russian courts.

Wärtsilä attempted to have the dispute transferred to the Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce but was denied by the Russian courts.

At the end of 2023, the Baltic Shipyard reported losses of almost RUB 19 billion. The company ended 2024 with a profit of about RUB 4 billion, but due to accumulated losses totaling RUB 32.2 billion, there is a high probability of bankruptcy, according to RBC, citing the company’s annual report.

The shipyard’s management attributes its financial difficulties to the broader crisis facing the shipbuilding industry.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On February 11, Bloomberg reported that Russia and Turkey are negotiating a plan to settle payments for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP using natural gas instead of money transfers, in an attempt to circumvent restrictions on cross-border transactions that have become more difficult following tighter US sanctions introduced in June 2024.

According to the outlet’s sources in both countries, the proposed scheme would involve Turkey covering part of the construction costs for the $20 billion plant (Bellona note: Akkuyu is being built under a build-own-operate model financed by Rosatom). Rosatom would then reimburse this amount to Gazprom in rubles, after which Gazprom would deduct it from Turkey’s monthly gas import payments.

Although Rosatom, Gazprom, and the Akkuyu project are not formally under sanctions, cross-border transfers between the two countries have faced delays due to increased caution on the part of foreign banks.

The Akkuyu NPP under construction, Turkey. Credit: JSC Akkuyu Nuclear

On February 2, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US Department of Justice suspects Russia and Turkey may be using the Akkuyu project to circumvent US sanctions against the Russian Central Bank. In a short period, more than $5 billion was transferred from Russia to Turkey through US banks JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup. While the funds were formally designated for NPP construction payments, they may have been used for other purposes. As a result, in 2024, $2 billion in Russian payments to Turkey under the Akkuyu project were frozen at JPMorgan.

Meanwhile, at the construction site, the start-up and adjustment phase began on February 3 for the main equipment of the on-shore pumping station at Unit 1. On February 21, the first standby diesel power plant for this unit was launched. On February 26, the diaphragm separating the Unit 1 pumping station from the Mediterranean Sea was dismantled.

China. On February 10, Rosatom announced the shipment of equipment for nuclear power plants under construction in China — a set of four reactor coolant pump casings for Unit 4 of the Xudapu NPP and four pump units for Unit 7 of the Tianwan NPP.

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. February 2025 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Russia rebuffs US notion of taking over embattled Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant 7 Apr 2:50 AM (9 days ago)

Days after the Trump administration floated the idea of assuming control of Ukraine’s embattled Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant as part of the nascent peace deal the US is trying to broker between Kyiv and the Kremlin, Russia’s foreign ministry has pushed back, warning the US to keep its hands to itself.

The bluntly worded statement released last week offers one of the first outright claims of ownership to the plant iterated by the Russian side since its troops overran it in early 2022. The Foreign Ministry’s remarks go on to describe the plant not as something captured by Moscow from Ukraine, but rather as real-estate Russia is simply repatriating, offering a notable glimpse into what conditions the Kremlin may demand of any lasting peace deal.

Since its capture, the ZNPP has sat perilously close to the frontlines of the biggest war in Europe since World War II. Though its reactors have been idled to avoid a larger nuclear accident should they suffer a direct hit, the plant’s outside power sources— necessary to keep the reactors cool and prevent meltdowns—have been repeatedly cut in military skirmishes. In August, a drone struck the cooling tower of one of the plant’s reactors, casting into bold relief the plant’s precarious position.

The International Atomic Energy Agency—which has warned repeatedly of the dangers of fighting a war around a nuclear power plant—has proven unable to keep the plant safe, though its on-site inspectors report regularly on near misses.

The possibility of the US assuming control of the ZNPP, which operates six reactors, had initially arisen during a telephone conversation between Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, both leaders confirmed last week.

But Russia has other ideas.

“ZNPP is a Russian nuclear facility,” wrote the Russian Foreign Ministry, referring to the abbreviation for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. “The return of the plant to Russia’s nuclear sector is a long-established fact—one the international community simply has to acknowledge.”

It added that: “Transferring the plant itself, or control over it, to Ukraine or any other country is out of the question.”

In the following days, Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, which previously had been reluctant to acknowledge its oversight of the plant following the invasion, published plans on restarting the ZNPP in its weekly PR newsletter—also a first.

According to Alexander Nikitin, one of Bellona’s nuclear experts, the vice grip Moscow has on Zaporizhzhia plant tracks with changes in the Russian constitution that recognize the Zaporizhzhia Region, where the plant is located, as Russian territory—regardless of what the Ukrainians have to say about it.

“The ZNPP is lost for Ukraine, but while a ‘hot’ war continues, it will not be put into operation without the risk of organizing a nuclear-radiation collapse,” he said.

If it does eventually produce electricity, Nikitin said, Russia would likely use it to power the regions it powered before to the war—the industrial Donbas region, which Russian forces have occupied, and Crimea, annexed by Moscow in 2014.

Like Ukraine’s three other Soviet-built nuclear stations, the Zaporizhzhia plant was ceded to Kyiv when the Soviet Union was dissolved, and Ukraine became an independent nation.

Since then, the plant has undergone numerous Westernizing revisions that have divorced it from the Russian nuclear industry, including computer updates sponsored by the European Union and a shift to burning nuclear fuels developed by the US nuclear giant Westinghouse. As a result, any reabsorption of the plant into the Russian nuclear industry would be a daunting technological task.

“Russia will have to somehow settle relations with the American company whose nuclear fuel is currently loaded into four ZNPP reactors,” Nikitin said.

Beginning operations in 1985 while Ukraine was still a Soviet republic, the ZNPP was once viewed as a jewel of party engineering operating on then newly designed VVER reactors. A bustling company city called Enerhodar sprang up around it to house its one-time population of 11,000 workers and technicians and their families. The war has hollowed that population out, leaving mostly Russian workers transferred to the site, and a handful of Ukrainians, many of whom were forced to sign contracts with Rosatom.

The post Russia rebuffs US notion of taking over embattled Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Nuclear Crimes without Punishment: Why Are World Mechanisms Powerless? 5 Apr 3:23 AM (11 days ago)

The following interview with Bellona’s nuclear expert Aleksander Nikitin originally appeared on Uatom.org.

Since 4 March 2022, the Zaporizhzhia NPP has been occupied by Russian troops. For three years, the largest NPP in Europe has been used as a military facility, in violation of all safety standards and agreements related to such sites. The Russian Rosatom corporation announced appropriation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and is working to connect the power units to supply electricity to the occupied territories. Ukrainian personnel at the plant have been subjected to kidnappings, murders, and inhumane treatment, which has increased the risk of nuclear incidents and accidents. Despite the presence of IAEA experts at the Zaporizhzhia NPP since 1 September 2022, the situation remains unchanged: the power plant is still occupied and Russian military groups continue shelling the ZNPP site and nearby areas.

Russia has repeatedly resorted to nuclear blackmail, particularly at the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP. Despite an agreement to rotate IAEA inspectors from the territory controlled by Ukraine, the rotation on 1 March 2025 was carried out via Russian-occupied territory. By deliberately blocking the safe exit of IAEA experts through Ukrainian-controlled territory and keeping them without rotation for 80 days—far beyond the planned period—Russia actually deprived international experts of their freedom of movement and used them as tools of political pressure on the international community. Therefore, the IAEA’s actions should be regarded not as a rotation of experts at Zaporizhzhia NPP but as a humanitarian evacuation under threat to the life and health of the Agency’s personnel. Ukraine submitted a note of protest to the IAEA leadership, condemning the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity and warning against any repetition of such actions in the future.

The effectiveness of the IAEA in the context of the seizure of nuclear facilities and ongoing shelling—posing threats to nuclear safety and potentially leading to radiological consequences—is a matter of great concern among politicians, experts and the public. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Norwegian international science-based environmental non-profit organization Bellona has published four reports: The IAEA’s Role in Times of War, The Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia NPP: Analysis of Technical and Political Aspects, Rosatom’s Role in the War in Ukraine, and The Radiation Risks of Seizing the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

The Uatom.org Editorial Board spoke with Bellona representative Aleksander Nikitin about nuclear and radiation safety during the war in Ukraine and the IAEA’s role in the situation at the occupied ZNPP.

– Mr. Nikitin, tell us about Bellona’s activities over the past three years. Has Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had an impact?

– Before the war, Bellona had two offices in Russia—in Murmansk and St. Petersburg. The day after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a decision was made to close these offices. All staff who wished to do so were transferred to a new office in Vilnius. In addition, Bellona cut all ties with the official Russian structures and representatives who supported or tacitly endorsed the war. In April 2023, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia declared Bellona an “undesirable organization.”

Following its exit from Russia, Bellona shifted its focus to information and analytical work on nuclear energy. Special attention continues to be paid to safety issues, the influence of Rosatom on the international nuclear sector and economy, the participation of Russia’s nuclear agency in the war, and the crimes committed against Ukraine. Today, our work centers on analysis and dissemination of information.

We traditionally study and analyze all available sources (primarily open ones) and present the information based on our knowledge and experience. Bellona’s nuclear projects involve two nuclear physicists and one engineer specializing in nuclear propulsion systems and nuclear safety. We also engage external experts and take into account the views of our Bellona colleagues. Since 1994, these methods allowed Bellona to prepare and publish over 50 major reports and working documents on nuclear energy and safety.

– You mentioned Rosatom’s influence internationally. In your view, how does Rosatom currently influence global energy policy, and has that influence changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

– After the start of the full-scale invasion, we prepared a working document titled “Rosatom During the War: How Militarization of the Russian Nuclear Giant Took Place,” which examines Rosatom’s domestic and international projects. We are now finalizing a second similar document covering Rosatom’s activities in 2023 and 2024.

Our analysis showed that Rosatom has practically withdrawn from the European Union, remaining active only in Hungary and Slovakia. Its other projects have either been terminated or are in decline. I don’t know what will happen next, given recent events, but it has lost many ties with the United States. In response, Rosatom has refocused its efforts on the so-called Global South and is developing partnerships with African countries that have little prior experience in nuclear energy.

In summary, Rosatom enjoys full political and economic backing from Russia and has substantial funding. Sanctions against Russia have not actually affected Rosatom. Those with some effect—such as restrictions on the Northern Sea Route or certain research institutions—do not significantly affect its financial situation.

– What are the key nuclear and radiation safety challenges arising from the war?

– The war causes human casualties, environmental destruction, and damage to energy infrastructure. It creates hazardous zones contaminated with mines and other dangerous substances, and poses new challenges for states with civilian nuclear energy and technologies that become dangerously unpredictable in wartime.

– When you refer to challenges for countries with civilian nuclear energy, what exactly do you mean?

– At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, everyone realized what it meant to be dependent on Russian oil and gas—or that of any other country. Everyone wants energy, but no one wants dependence on one or two supply sources.

In Ukraine, we see new challenges related to the war and military operations. We see what is happening at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, while other plants are constantly under threat. The recent attack on the Chernobyl NPP (Uatom.org editor’s note: referring to a Russian drone strike on the New Safe Confinement above of the Shelter over Chernobyl NPP Unit 4) highlights this.

We are saying that even the UN and its agency, the IAEA, were unprepared for the kind of scenario we are facing today. While some countries may have anticipated theoretical risks, Ukraine is facing real, practical ones.

– Does Bellona cooperate with Ukrainian or international governmental structures to improve monitoring? What are the main challenges you face in your work on nuclear and radiation safety analysis in Ukraine?

– Having understood that without contact and cooperation with governmental structures it is impossible to achieve the goal of nuclear safety, Bellona has strived to interact as much as possible with official institutions and the scientific community of every country where it had interests (EU, Norway, USA, UK, Ukraine, and Russia before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine). In Ukraine, Bellona worked with experts such as Georgiy Lysychenko, Mykola Steinberg, Dmytro Chumak, Andrian Prokip, Sofia Shutyak, and others when preparing reports “The Ukrainian Nuclear Industry” and “The Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant – Ukraine’s Uranium Heritage” (Yuriy Tkachenko).

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have prepared several reports on the Zaporizhzhia NPP and now publish a monthly digest analyzing current developments, especially in Ukraine’s nuclear industry.

As for challenges, I’ve been working with information for a long time, and I always say that information is never enough. What is adequate today may be insufficient tomorrow. We are convinced that accurate and timely information is critical for making sound decisions.

– In your report you mention the IAEA’s insufficient effectiveness in nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine under full-scale invasion. Is there a way for the IAEA to act more effectively?

– It’s a difficult question, but I’m convinced that effectiveness can always be improved. It depends on willingness, capabilities and methods. Each time the IAEA does something, there is usually still room to do it better, faster, or more comprehensively. For example, consider the IAEA’s key principles to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia NPP to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure plant integrity. It is unclear why it took 15 months to prepare such a short but critically important document.

At the same time, this brings us to the matter of powers, as the IAEA has repeatedly acknowledged that both the “Pillars” and “Principles” have been violated, but the Agency has no tools to enforce their implementation. That’s why we noted in our report that the IAEA’s basic capabilities must be revised or strengthened. It must be able to work more effectively and not only to monitor but also to make decisions that are binding. The system and principles upon which the UN and agencies like the IAEA were founded are no longer effective in today’s geopolitical context. Currently, the IAEA lacks influence—such as at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. They can only serve as diligent observers and accurate reporters. But that is not enough.

The IAEA today is a structure with very limited legal authority and resources—not just in terms of funding but also its ability to carry out what falls within its mandate. If the Agency lacks authority, it cannot enforce the implementation of its own requirements, including the “Pillars” and “Principles.” Perhaps the IAEA was sufficient for peacetime. Maybe now it’s not. Bellona hadn’t previously paid close attention to the IAEA’s work, powers or limits. It was only after the full-scale invasion that we began to ask: “Why is this happening, and what international mechanisms or organizations can stop the seizure of civil nuclear facilities and take real steps to ensure their nuclear safety?”

– What is your opinion on the deployment of IAEA monitoring missions at Ukrenergo facilities?

– Bellona believes that placing IAEA monitoring missions at Ukrenergo facilities is one of the Agency’s most important decisions that have been implemented in practice. Of course, Russia could still strike facilities where inspectors are staying, but that would raise the level of international accountability. Even Russia is reluctant to escalate tensions or even break relations with the IAEA. The IAEA missions at Ukrenergo facilities serve as a kind of “umbrella” shielding the facilities from attacks, which is why Russia was very dissatisfied with this decision by the Agency.

– You analyze the speeches of Alexey Likhachev at the IAEA General Conferences in your report. In your opinion, does the legal succession of the USSR create additional preferences, levers of influence on the IAEA?

– In our opinion, Russia’s legal succession in no way affects the place, rights, preferences and opportunities it should have in the IAEA. The IAEA has documents stipulating that all members have equal rights and voting power. And that’s it. The fact that Likhachev constantly emphasizes that the USSR was one of the IAEA’s founders and that Russia regularly finances IAEA projects is simply a form of blackmail or an illegitimate attempt to gain undue advantages.

In addition, Ukraine quite rightly drew attention to the fact that many responsible and managerial positions in the IAEA leadership (including Deputy Director General, Head of Department of Nuclear Energy) are occupied by representatives of Russia, who can influence the decisions made by the Agency, which is unacceptable in this situation. Therefore, the question arises about the possibilities of decision-making within the IAEA structure and rapid response when critical situations occur.

We analyzed the figures showing who contributes and how much to the IAEA’s main budget: as of 2024, Russia is in the 13th place among the IAEA member countries (Uatom.org editor’s note: the largest contributions in 2024 were made by IAEA member countries such as the USA, China, Japan, Germany, Great Britain and Italy). However, the Agency has budgets for different projects, which are usually closed to public access. Therefore, when Likhachev said that they fulfill their financing obligations, he most likely meant that they finance certain projects.

– How could the IAEA enhance its role in preventing nuclear hazards in wartime? Does the IAEA use all its resources to de-occupy ZNPP?

– It is difficult to say what available resources the IAEA could use today. You would have to be “inside” the organization to know that. However, the main issue, which Grossi constantly raises, is that the IAEA is a technical organization without political, legal, investigative or other functions for resolving issues arising from war or the armed seizure of civil nuclear facilities. The IAEA probably lacks the authority and resources. The IAEA has no practice or experience in gathering additional resources in a situation of full-scale invasion, such as the one we are witnessing in Ukraine. The IAEA has no legal mechanism to gather such resources.

We are witnessing how Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi travels around the world and collects money for IAEA projects in Ukraine. This should not happen. In the event of military conflict, a mechanism should be activated to provide the IAEA with international resources and multifaceted support.

As for ZNPP deoccupation, in my opinion, this is a political and military issue that is not within the competence and responsibility of the IAEA today. We have not seen any IAEA decisions on deoccupation that would have resulted in actions. We see only some recommendations that have no political or legal force.

– Is the IAEA able to influence the recognition of attacks on civil nuclear facilities as international crimes? Does the IAEA have mechanisms to identify and punish those responsible for threats to nuclear and radiation safety? If not the IAEA, what structures are responsible for identifying and punishing those responsible for creating threats to nuclear and radiation safety?

– No, and in the current situation this is more likely a question for the UN Security Council. The IAEA is too technical and limited structure today to make such decisions. Even if the IAEA were to make recommendations (which is almost impossible for many reasons), they would be immediately blocked in the UN Security Council, since Russia holds veto power.

There are no other international structures authorized to make such decisions. A clear example is the reaction to some decisions of the UN International Court, which recognized Putin and several other figures as international criminals.

As for identifying and punishing those responsible for threats to nuclear and radiation safety, as I said, the IAEA has no such mechanisms either. Moreover, there are no international structures responsible for punishing the guilty, especially when crimes in nuclear and radiation safety are committed during wartime by states possessing nuclear weapons and holding permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

– You are proposing in your report the idea of splitting the IAEA into two separate organizations: one would focus on developing nuclear science, civil technologies and production, and the other would focus on monitoring and ensuring nuclear safety at both civil and military facilities. Could Russia’s invasion of Ukraine force the international community to reform the nuclear safety oversight system? What international mechanisms should be developed to prevent repeated nuclear power plant seizures in the future?

– We should hope that this war will prompt the international community to reconsider the framework for nuclear and radiation safety. It is necessary to remember that, firstly, nothing is over yet and the outcome remains uncertain and, secondly, the situation could repeat itself. All the prerequisites are there.

In our opinion, the entire international system for making and overseeing political decisions that ensure safety needs to be reformed. The UN and its structures, starting with the Security Council, have failed to cope with this (as exemplified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine).

A mechanism is required that would provide for the early prevention of threats to civil nuclear facilities (including armed international protection in the event of such a threat), rapid investigation and identification of those responsible, accountability, and real punishment of offenders.

– What further research or initiatives do you plan to implement for nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine?

– I would outline five areas:

facilitate the technical and economic implementation of the project to eliminate the uranium legacy at the Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant;
provide information and analytical support for Ukrainian projects aimed at the safety of radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian NPPs (including Zaporizhzhia NPP) and nuclear historical sites;
activate efforts on projects aimed at developing power industry in Ukraine to promote and develop energy sources with low emissions of CO₂ and other harmful gases and energy saving;
prepare the second part of the Report, to describe the experience of nuclear energy performance and maintenance in Ukraine under war conditions (including the Zaporizhzhia NPP); we are looking for partners in Ukraine for this effort;
analyze and understand the capabilities of Ukrainian civil society and their cooperation with the state structures in the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Uatom.org Editorial Board

The post Nuclear Crimes without Punishment: Why Are World Mechanisms Powerless? appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Could the US assume control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant? 25 Mar 1:00 AM (22 days ago)

During a call between President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine and US President Donald Trump, the US leader reportedly floated an unusual idea—that Kyiv’s leadership consider giving ownership of Ukraine’s power plants to the US for long-term security, according to a White House statement.

The idea came as a surprise to Kyiv. Zelensky appeared to reject the idea on Thursday during a visit to Norway, saying that nuclear plants were state-owned and could not be privatized, although he welcomed economic cooperation with the US side. He added that the issue of US ownership of all of Ukraine’s power plants had not been directly addressed during the call.

Only one of Ukraine’s four nuclear plants — the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, or ZNPP, now under Russian control — had been discussed in the conversation, Zelensky said.

“If the Americans are thinking about how to find a way out of this situation, if they want to take it away from the Russians, invest in its restoration, this is an open question,” he told a news conference during a visit to Oslo.

Whatever the particulars of the two presidents’ Wednesday chat, one thing is clear: Trump is pushing for a big economic stake in Ukraine as part of a peace settlement he is attempting to broker between Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Trump has previously demanded access to Ukraine’s mineral resources, and the White House statement echoed these sentiments, saying that US economic involvement in Ukraine would serve as a bulwark against further Russian aggression, as Moscow would be less likely to target a country where America has economic interests.

As far as the unorthodox shocks the Trump administration has delivered to the world of international diplomacy go, Bellona’s nuclear experts say the idea of the US taking the ZNPP under its wing isn’t the craziest idea.

“It is difficult to make predictions without knowing the details,” said Bellona’s Dmitry Gorchakov. “But any peace agreement that initiates the process of transferring control of the plant away from Russia—whether to the Ukrainians, the US or an international coalition—would be preferable to the current situation and better for Ukraine and would also reduce the nuclear risks associated with the ongoing war.”

Since early in the war, the plant, which runs six Soviet-built VVER style reactors, has been in constant danger of becoming one of the war’s casualties, keeping the international nuclear safety establishment in a perpetual state of worry. The International Atomic Energy Agency—which maintains rotating groups of observers at the plant—has repeatedly warned Moscow and Kyiv that the plant’s proximity to the war’s front lines risks nuclear catastrophe.

While the ZNPP’s reactors have been in cold shutdown since the plant was taken by Russian forces in March of 2022—thereby limiting the chances of a major nuclear accident should they suffer a direct hit—localized contamination from stores of spent nuclear fuel remain a possibility.

Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin says a potential US takeover of the plant would be better than allowing it to remain a hostage to the biggest miliary conflagration in Europe since World War II.

“The ZNPP is a special object for Ukraine and they are interested in preserving it even if the owner or co-owner is an American company,” he said. “It is better and easier for Ukraine to solve the ZNPP problem in this way than, for example, by military means, since Russia will not simply voluntarily give it up.”

Gorchakov, agreed, telling The Washington Post that Putin “may be willing to hand [the ZNPP] over to the United States, especially since the plant uses a lot of Western and American equipment and systems, and four of the six power units were already converted from Russian fuel to Westinghouse fuel before the war.”

Ukraine’s Soviet-era nuclear power plants have been the backbone of its energy network during the war, supplying up to two-thirds of the country’s electricity. While Moscow has relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s thermal and hydroelectric power plants in an effort to cripple its grid, it has seemingly avoided striking nuclear facilities out of fear of triggering a radiological disaster.

Against that tumult, the Ukrainian government has initiated plans to build more nuclear reactors, arguing that it is the only viable solution to ensuring long-term energy security.

It is here where US involvement could make sense. Shortly before the war, Westinghouse, an American nuclear technology company, signed a deal with Energoatom, Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear corporation, to build five reactors. After Russia attacked, the number was increased to nine and the two companies agreed to further cooperate to deploy smaller plants in Ukraine.

With Westinghouse already acting as the main fuel source for the ZNPP—which to supplied some 20 percent of Ukraine’s electricity before the war—the US corporation would clearly profit should the plant become a ward of the US.

Gorchakov said “a proposal for US involvement in the management of the plant or even its transfer to US ownership could be part of a broader package of agreements between the US and Russia, potentially covering issues beyond just the situation in Ukraine.”

But Gorchakov also asserted that, whatever comes of the negotiations, the future of the ZNPP has to be decided with the Ukrainians, and not just between the US and Russia.

“The best outcome would be the return of the plant to full Ukrainian control through negotiations. However, there is little hope for such a scenario, as it remains unclear what Putin would gain from such a move, and he is certainly not going to hand over the station to Ukraine for nothing,” he said.

It remains unclear whether Trump discussed the fate of the ZNPP with Putin of Russia in a call on Tuesday.

Bellona will continue to report on developments with the ZNPP.

The post Could the US assume control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant? appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, January 2025 24 Mar 6:34 AM (23 days ago)

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for December can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route remains unavailable
2. During the “Safe Arctic 2025” drills, emergency scenarios on the Northern Sea Route were simulated only in its western part

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. New Sanctions from the U.S. and the U.K.
4. Consequences of the Sanctions Imposed on January 10
5. The EU will not include a ban on Russian LNG imports in its next sanctions package
6. Novatek’s LNG Tankers Adjust Routes Due to Sanctions

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
7. Based on the results of geological exploration in 2024, estimated reserves increased by 103 million tons of oil and gas condensate and 633 billion cubic meters of natural gas
8. Norilsk Nickel News: Profit Decline in 2024, Additional Capital Expenditures for Extending Field Development in Murmansk Region
9. Development of Other Mineral Deposits in the Russian Arctic

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
10. Scientists have detected mercury and cadmium in the bodies of walruses living in the Arctic
11. Existing permafrost monitoring capacity in the Arctic is insufficient, with the situation being worst in the Russian sector
12. Among all Russian regions, permafrost degradation poses the greatest threat to the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area. However, other regions are also facing related challenges
13. A third of the Earth’s northern regions have transformed from carbon sinks into carbon sources
14. The temperature of Norway’s coastal waters has increased by 2°C over the past 90 years

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Northern sea route and shipping

Year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route remains unavailable ↑

Despite forecasts from Russian officials that year-round navigation on the eastern route of the Northern Sea Route would begin by the end of 2024, this has not happened. As in previous years, shipping is currently limited to the western route with icebreaker escort. This was reported by Ilya Chernov, a representative of Russia’s Ministry for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, on January 29.

Nevertheless, officials continue to express hope for year-round navigation. On January 23, at a roundtable held at the House of the Russian Historical Society on the history of the Northern Sea Route’s development, Vladimir Panov, Deputy Chairman of the State Commission for Arctic Development, stated that establishing year-round navigation along the entire route is a ‘top-priority and urgent task.’ He also noted that experimental voyages had been successfully conducted in cooperation with Sovcomflot and Novatek. This likely refers to the voyage of the LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie, which traveled the Sabetta – Jiangsu (China) – Sabetta route in January-February 2021 under the escort of the icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy.

Panov also announced that a target speed of 10 knots has been set for vessels navigating the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route in winter. In 2024, the average navigation speed along the route was 10.6 knots, compared to 9.8 knots in 2023. Additionally, promoting the history of the Northern Sea Route was named a priority for the Russian Historical Society.

The gas tanker Christophe de Margerie, intended to service the Yamal LNG project, under the escort of the nuclear icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy, 2021. Source: Atomflot

During the “Safe Arctic 2025” drills, emergency scenarios on the Northern Sea Route were simulated only in its western part ↑

From January 29 to 31, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) conducted the interagency exercises “Safe Arctic 2025” in 10 Arctic regions of Russia. EMERCOM head Alexander Kurenkov noted that the active development of the Arctic and the increase in cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route inevitably lead to new challenges and threats.

Over the three-day drills, 19 emergency scenarios specific to each region were simulated and practiced, including a train collision, a bus falling through ice, an avalanche at a ski resort, and others.

Two emergency scenarios were simulated in maritime areas:

An accident involving a vessel trapped in difficult ice conditions while navigating the Northern Sea Route in the Arkhangelsk region.
An accident on a nuclear submarine in the Murmansk region.

Meanwhile, the drills did not include scenarios for responding to oil spills in maritime areas, nor did they simulate emergency situations in the eastern part of the Northern Sea Route.

A significant portion of the drills focused not on practical emergency response training but on additional activities, such as educational campaigns, workshops, and sports events. More than 60,000 people participated in these supplementary activities.

Bellona’s comment:

«Russian officials continue to reiterate the mantra of year-round navigation on the Northern Sea Route, but its economic viability and safety remain highly uncertain. The experimental LNG tanker voyage from Yamal to China in the winter of 2021 has not been repeated. In 2024, navigation on the route was closed earlier than usual due to unfavorable weather conditions.

While rising average temperatures in the Arctic are causing increased ice melt, they do not make navigation on the Northern Sea Route any safer. Nevertheless, at every public event, officials claim that year-round navigation is about to begin or that it has already started on the western section of the route. This appears to be an attempt to convince China and other countries that year-round shipping on the Northern Sea Route is both feasible and achievable.

At the same time, serious concerns remain about the safety of navigation on the Northern Sea Route, particularly in its eastern section. Emergency response infrastructure along the route is insufficient for rapid intervention, and vessels trapped in ice often have to wait weeks for assistance. There is a shortage of ice-capable rescue vessels, and their construction is lagging behind plans. EMERCOM aviation does not cover most of the maritime area. The absence of emergency scenarios for the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route in the recent ‘Safe Arctic 2025’ drills is likely another reflection of the inadequate infrastructure.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

New Sanctions from the U.S. and the U.K. ↑

On January 10, the U.S. Treasury Department announced new sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. This move is part of the Biden administration’s final measures to increase economic pressure and prevent a weakening of support for Ukraine ahead of Trump’s inauguration on January 20.

The sanctions aim to limit revenue from Russian energy exports, which partially fund military operations against Ukraine. According to Russia’s Ministry of Finance, oil and gas revenues accounted for approximately 31.7% of total budget revenues from January to November 2024.

Sanctions targeted more than 180 vessels transporting oil and gas, including Russia’s ‘shadow fleet,’ as well as oil traders, service providers in the oil industry, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials. The restrictions affected two major extraction companies, infrastructure facilities, and vessels involved in the development of hydrocarbon fields in the Russian Arctic.

Extractive companies operating in the Arctic zone that have come under sanctions:

“Gazprom Neft” – One of Russia’s largest oil producers, ranking among the top three in terms of oil production and refining volumes. It was also the first company to begin offshore oil production in the Russian Arctic at the Prirazlomnoye field in 2013. In 2014, it launched the first maritime shipments from the Novoportovskoye oil field on the Yamal Peninsula. A significant portion of Gazprom Neft’s operations are located in the Arctic.

“Surgutneftegaz” – Another major oil producer in Russia. The company operates in the Beloyarsky District of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, which was incorporated into Russia’s Arctic zone in March 2024.

More than two dozen subsidiaries of Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegaz have also come under sanctions. Additionally, the document states that all subsidiaries are subject to blocking, even if they are not explicitly listed in the sanctions list.

The UK Foreign Office also announced sanctions against both companies on January 10.

In addition, in January, the U.S. imposed sanctions on 183 vessels, including those involved in hydrocarbon development in the Russian Arctic and servicing the Prirazlomnaya project in the Pechora Sea, the Novy port project in the Ob Bay, and the Varandey Terminal in the Barents Sea:

The largest shipping operator, Sovcomflot, including 54 oil and petroleum product tankers, as well as four LNG carriers—Christophe de Margerie, Pskov, Veliky Novgorod, and Vostochny Prospekt—has come under sanctions. Restrictions also targeted operators Fornax Ship Management FZCO (UAE) and Stream Ship Management FZCO (UAE), which manage tanker fleets and provide services to Sovcomflot.

The floating storage vessels Umba and Kola, each capable of holding up to 300,000 tons of oil and moored in the Kola Bay, have also been sanctioned. Several tugboats involved in transshipment operations, as well as the companies LC Volga and RPK Nord, which own these storage vessels and tugboats, were also targeted.

The shipping company Rosnefteflot and its 14 tankers have come under sanctions.

Gazpromneft Marine Bunker (a subsidiary of Gazprom Neft), a Russian fleet operator and bunkering service provider, was also targeted.

Tankers of the so-called shadow fleet, currently used to transport Arctic oil from the Kola Bay, have also been sanctioned.

Sanctions also targeted two insurance companies, Ingosstrakh and the Alfastrakhovanie Group, which provide coverage for tankers transporting Russian oil and petroleum products. Previously, both companies had been sanctioned by the United Kingdom.

For the first time, U.S. sanctions have targeted oil tankers still under construction at the Zvezda shipyard.

The investigative project Important Stories estimated that the U.S. sanctions imposed in January affected vessels that transported one-fifth of Russia’s oil exports in 2024. According to analytics firm Kpler, the sanctions target tankers carrying about 42% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports, primarily to China.

Arctic projects sanctioned by the U.S. on January 10:

Rosneft’s major oil production project, Vostok Oil, includes the development of oil fields in the Krasnoyarsk region and the construction of infrastructure for oil extraction and transportation on the Taimyr Peninsula.

The Lavna Seaport, a major transshipment port complex on the shore of the Kola Bay in the Murmansk region, which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2024 but is still under construction, was also included in the sanctions list.

Polar Lithium – a joint venture between Norilsk Nickel and Rosatom, established to develop the Kolmozerskoye lithium deposit in the Murmansk region. The project is intended to cover ore mining, processing, and the production of battery materials. The first stage of the mining and processing plant, designed to produce 400,000 tons of ore, is scheduled to launch in 2026. Reaching full capacity of 2 million tons is planned by 2030.

On January 21, changes were made to the Russian state register indicating that Polar Lithium’s charter capital was increased by 1.6 times to 4 billion rubles. Rosatom and Norilsk Nickel each raised their stakes in the company from 1.3 billion to 2 billion rubles.

The Barents Observer links this measure to the sanctions, noting that the capital increase is aimed at strengthening Polar Lithium’s financial stability and securing additional resources for project implementation.

On January 15, the U.S. imposed additional sanctions aimed at undermining Russia’s defense-industrial base and countering sanctions evasion. The list included Novy Kosmos, a company developing the Oculus project—an ice navigation platform intended for use along the Northern Sea Route.

Consequences of the Sanctions Imposed on January 10 ↑

Although the U.S. sanctions include a grace period until February 27 for cargo loaded before January 10 to reach its destination, some vessels have already started canceling their voyages.

According to Bloomberg, several tankers not subject to sanctions have also adjusted their routes. Notably, two vessels en route to the Arctic port of Murmansk—where sanctioned storage and shuttle tankers are stationed—turned around near Tromsø, Norway, and then headed toward the Baltic Sea.

Sanctions are forcing Russian oil tankers to change flags. The Barbados ship registry announced that it will delist 46 vessels by the end of the month, while Panama has already begun removing 68 sanctioned vessels from its registry.

At the same time, India has expanded its support for Russian insurance companies to ensure coverage for tankers transporting Russian oil. The Indian regulator has authorized the insurance company Soglasie to provide insurance for vessels calling at Indian ports until February 2026. India continues to accept Russian oil tankers that have come under sanctions. According to shipping data obtained by Bloomberg, at the end of January, three sanctioned tankers departed from the Arctic port of Murmansk and headed toward the Suez Canal, with their final destinations listed as Indian ports.

Additionally, the new sanctions have disrupted the Arctic LNG 2 project’s ability to obtain critical equipment. Chinese company Wison New Energies had manufactured modules for the third production line of Novatek’s plant, which were to be delivered by the Chinese vessel Wei Xiao Tian Shi. In January, Wison’s shipyard in Zhoushan was sanctioned by the U.S. for providing substantial support to the Arctic LNG 2 project. Nine months after the voyage began, the vessel returned to China without delivering its cargo.

The EU will not include a ban on Russian LNG imports in its next sanctions package ↑

On January 29, it became known that the European Commission did not include a ban on Russian LNG imports in the draft of its new sanctions package due to the risk of a shortage of alternative supplies, including U.S. gas, whose export capacity is limited. Despite the EU’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian fuel, the lack of reliable alternatives has forced a postponement of a full embargo decision.

Earlier, ten EU countries—Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Ireland—called on the European Commission to ban or gradually phase out Russian LNG imports. These nations have already stopped purchasing Russian gas and seek to deprive Russia of revenues that could be used to fund the war. However, France, Belgium, and Spain continue imports, citing energy security, and in 2024, Russian LNG deliveries to the EU have even increased.

Novatek’s LNG Tankers Adjust Routes Due to Sanctions ↑

The 15th EU sanctions package, introduced in December 2024, disrupted gas transportation from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects. In early January, five Novatek-linked tankers—Christophe de Margerie, North Way, North Mountain, North Air, and North Sky—became stranded in the Pechora and Kara Seas, unable to continue their voyages due to EU sanctions.

In early January, the sanctioned LNG carrier Mulan, transporting natural gas from the Arctic LNG 2 project, was spotted in the North Sea, maneuvering between Norwegian oil platforms for a week. The vessel has a complex ownership structure and is owned by Plio Energy, a company sanctioned by the U.S. for its involvement in circumventing Russian gas supply restrictions.

Yamal LNG facilities in Sabetta. Photo: KadnikovValerii

In late January, two new LNG carriers, North Light and North Moon, were spotted heading to Russian Arctic waters to load gas from the Yamal LNG plant. These tankers are part of a series of seven North-class LNG carriers built at the Hanwha Ocean shipyard in South Korea and originally intended for the Arctic LNG 2 project. According to Tradewinds, the two new tankers are managed by White Fox Ship Management, a Dubai-based company sanctioned by the UK in September 2024.

Bellona’s comment:

«Despite the seemingly extensive sanctions against Russia’s oil and gas sector, they have failed to significantly impact export revenues from hydrocarbons to G7 countries and the EU. In 2024, Russia’s budget revenues from oil, gas, and coal sales declined by just 3% compared to 2023 and only 8% compared to the pre-war level in 2021. This is due to the reluctance of Western countries to destabilize global and domestic energy markets, as well as their inability to swiftly implement measures to replace suppliers and restructure energy consumption.

A telling example is the EU, which has been unable to find alternative suppliers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for three years to replace 19% of its LNG imports. The inclusion of Novatek’s tankers in the EU sanctions list is highly selective and does not threaten shipments from Yamal LNG to European ports—five tankers are still operating under the flag of an EU country, Cyprus, and are managed by a Greek company.

That said, it would be incorrect to claim that sanctions have had no impact on Russia’s oil and gas industry. Unlaunched projects are facing significant delays, logistics costs are rising, and social and environmental programs are being cut.

Currently, the future of sanctions directly depends on the success of newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in mediating a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. Unlike the EU, the U.S. likely has the capacity to tighten oil sanctions against Russia to the extent that they would significantly reduce revenues in the short term. However, whether this aligns with the objectives of the current U.S. president remains unclear.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Based on the results of geological exploration in 2024, estimated reserves increased by 103 million tons of oil and gas condensate and 633 billion cubic meters of natural gas ↑

Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources reported that 39 new hydrocarbon deposits were discovered in 2024. Among the most significant finds, the ministry highlighted the Mitykyakhskoye gas condensate field in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area and the Severo-Baikalovskoye gas field in the Krasnoyarsk region, both located in the Arctic.

According to the State Commission on Mineral Reserves, in 2024, the increase in Arctic reserves amounted to 103 million tons of oil and gas condensate and 633 billion cubic meters of natural gas. By comparison, in 2023, these figures were significantly lower—13.4 million tons of oil and condensate and 60.6 billion cubic meters of gas.

In 2024, Russia carried out the first stage of the federal project “Geology: Revival of a Legend,” under which geological exploration was conducted at eight hydrocarbon sites considered key to the creation of a new gas cluster intended to support cargo volumes along the Northern Sea Route. The main criterion for selecting exploration sites was their transport accessibility to the Lena River in Yakutia, which simplifies logistics and future field development.

In 2025, Rosnedra will hold auctions for the rights to mineral deposits explored with federal funding between 2022 and 2024 under the “Geology: Revival of a Legend” project. Among the Arctic sites to be offered are the Kiryavolakhtinskaya area (Karelia), Pinkeljavr (Murmansk region), and the Deputatsky ore cluster (Yakutia). The Deputatsky cluster contains ore-grade silver, lead, and zinc; Pinkeljavr hosts iron ore deposits; and the Kiryavolakhtinskaya area contains large-flake graphite.

Norilsk Nickel News: Profit Decline in 2024, Additional Capital Expenditures for Extending Field Development in Murmansk Region ↑

Norilsk Nickel, a leading Russian metallurgical company and a key player in the Russian Arctic, has published its results for 2024.

According to the report, nickel production fell by 2% to 205,000 tons, while copper output rose by 2% to 433,000 tons. Palladium and platinum production increased by 3% and 0.5%, respectively. The company’s financial performance declined, with revenue down 13% to $12.5 billion and net profit dropping 37% to $1.8 billion. At the same time, capital expenditures decreased by 20% to $2.4 billion as part of a program to improve investment efficiency.

According to the company’s forecast, nickel, copper, palladium, and platinum production in 2025 is expected to remain at 2024 levels.

Norilsk Nickel also announced plans to invest over 25 billion rubles in the development of the Severny mine in Zapolyarny (Murmansk region). Its subsidiary, Kola MMC, plans to launch the initial phase of a project in 2028 to access and develop the Zhdanovskoye, Bystrinskoye, and Tundrovoye copper-nickel deposits at the Severny mine. This will extend copper-nickel ore extraction at the site until 2048, with annual production volumes expected to reach 7 million tons starting in 2028.

Full completion of construction is expected by 2031, with mining operations reaching a depth of minus 730 meters, and potential future expansion to minus 1,400 meters, extending the mine’s lifespan until 2100. The development of the Severny mine deposits has been underway since the 1930s.

Development of Other Mineral Deposits in the Russian Arctic ↑

In the Yamalsky District, the development of the Tambei oil and gas condensate field is planned, including the construction of a marine terminal and infrastructure. The Department of Natural Resources of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug has announced public discussions on the environmental impact assessment of the project.

In Yakutia, tin extraction increased in 2024. The company Yanolovo extracted 800 tons of tin, exceeding the 2023 figures by 41% and ranking second in Russia in tin mining. The Tirekhtyakh deposit, developed by Yanolovo, is part of the emerging Kyuchus Mining and Industrial Cluster in the Arctic region of Yakutia. In addition to tin, gold and silver extraction is planned at the Kyuchus deposit. The cluster’s energy center will be the world’s first land-based small modular nuclear power plant (SMR) in the Ust-Yansky District of Yakutia. It will supply energy to the cluster’s enterprises as well as to the settlements of the Ust-Yansky and Verkhoyansky districts.

Bellona’s comment:

«Russia continues to systematically explore and develop mineral deposits in the Arctic, primarily oil and gas, aiming to replace depleting oil fields and increase the production and export of natural gas, which Russian authorities view as a promising global energy resource. Сurrent efforts focus on onshore exploration, offshore Arctic fields are also being considered strategically, despite the significant environmental risks associated with their development.

In the case of Norilsk Nickel, the decline in revenue and profit—despite only minor changes in nickel and copper production levels—may be linked to a drop in global nickel prices in 2024 compared to the previous year. It is worth noting that EU countries continue to purchase nickel and copper from Russia. In 2024, the EU imported Russian nickel and copper worth $1.3 billion, down from $2.1 billion in 2023.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

Scientists have detected mercury and cadmium in the bodies of walruses living in the Arctic ↑

Scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences have presented findings on the concentration of heavy metals in Pacific and Atlantic walruses, both of which inhabit the Arctic.

In Pacific walruses, cadmium was detected as early as the embryonic stage, with concentrations in the internal organs of embryos and calves in some cases exceeding those found in the mothers. In older animals, high levels of mercury and cadmium were observed in the kidneys and liver. Elevated concentrations of heavy metals may affect the animals’ immune systems, hormonal balance, reproductive health, and the survival of offspring.

In addition, since the walrus is at the top of the food chain and has a lifespan of around 40 years, it serves as a good indicator of pollution in its habitat. Collecting samples over different years will help illustrate the dynamics of environmental contamination.

The concentration of heavy metals in the internal organs of the Atlantic walrus has yet to be determined, but it is already known that its skin contains higher levels of heavy metals compared to the Pacific walrus.

Existing permafrost monitoring capacity in the Arctic is insufficient, with the situation being worst in the Russian sector ↑

A new study by George Washington University (USA) has found that existing permafrost monitoring systems in the Arctic are insufficient to adequately and promptly respond to emerging risks, including those related to infrastructure damage. The study highlights that monitoring systems are least developed in the northern part of Eurasia, the vast majority of which lies within Russia.

Currently, 78 observation sites of the State Permafrost Background Monitoring System are operating across 12 regions in Russia. These sites were commissioned in 2023–2024 by the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI). The monitoring system is expected to be fully established by 2025–2026, when the number of data-transmitting boreholes will reach 140. In addition to boreholes, scientists from George Washington University recommend using other ground-based observation methods as well as satellite monitoring.

Among all Russian regions, permafrost degradation poses the greatest threat to the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area. However, other regions are also facing related challenges ↑

The current Russian permafrost monitoring system indicates that the issue of permafrost degradation is most acute in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area, according to the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. It has recorded the presence of degrading permafrost in the southern parts of the region.

Data from the institute show that the western part of the Eurasian Arctic is generally the most vulnerable, due to the stronger influence of warm atmospheric and oceanic masses. This is reflected in higher permafrost temperatures at the depth of annual zero amplitudes: -3.3°C in a borehole on Svalbard, compared to -9.1°C on Franz Josef Land. The depth of seasonal ground thawing decreases from west to east.

Nevertheless, similar issues are observed in the eastern part of the Russian Arctic. A working meeting was held at the Ministry for the Development of the Arctic and the Affairs of the Peoples of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) to discuss the results of a new study by the Permafrost Institute named after Academician P.I. Melnikov. The event focused on practical measures to ensure the safety of infrastructure in the village of Tiksi, known as the “Sea Gates of Yakutia” – a transport hub on the Northern Sea Route. Specifically, measures were discussed to counteract the thawing of the ground beneath buildings’ foundations in the settlement.

A third of the Earth’s northern regions have transformed from carbon sinks into carbon sources ↑

Over the past two decades, about a third of the total territory of the Arctic and the adjacent regions of North America and Eurasia have transformed from carbon sinks into one of the largest sources of carbon dioxide emissions. This was reported by the press service of the Woodwell Climate Research Center (WCRC).

Scientists reached this conclusion based on an analysis of data collected between 2001 and 2020 by two hundred climate stations located in Canada, Alaska, Greenland, Scandinavian countries, including Svalbard, as well as in the Russian Arctic. A significant portion of the Northern ecosystems still acts as carbon sinks, but the increasing frequency of wildfires and the growing number of CO2 emission sources are rapidly reversing this trend, WCRC warns.

The temperature of Norway’s coastal waters has increased by 2°C over the past 90 years ↑

The Norwegian Institute for Marine Research emphasizes that this is directly linked to global climate change. The data was obtained from eight hydrographic stations located along the entire coastline of Norway, including its Arctic region. The rise in temperature is affecting ecosystems along the coast, particularly negatively impacting the cod’s spawning, as it cannot lay eggs in water temperatures above 10°C. Additionally, there has been an increase in the number of fish species typical of warmer waters. This is also relevant for the Barents Sea, which washes the Arctic coast of Norway.

Accidents and incidents in the Northern sea route ↑

On January 26, in the Kara Sea, the Russian nuclear icebreaker “50 Years of Victory” collided with the bulk carrier “Yamal Krechet” while icebreaking around it. As a result of the incident, no one was injured, the nuclear icebreaker sustained non-critical hull damage, which did not prevent it from continuing operations in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. The bulk carrier also did not require assistance and continued its voyage along the route.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, January 2025 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Bellona Nuclear Digest. January 2025 20 Mar 2:08 AM (27 days ago)

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for January 2025 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the latest three digests for November-December, October and September. Download a PDF of this digest here.

Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for January 2025
1.1. Technical state of the ZNPP
1.2. Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team
1.3. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.4. Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine
1.5. Attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. US sanctions
3. Kazakhstan completes visits to potential suppliers for its NPP project
4. France’s Orano and Mongolia sign agreement on join development of uranium deposit
5. Import of Russian uranium to Germany increased in 2024
6. Vietnam restarts nuclear energy program

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. Extending the operating life of RMBK reactors
8. Rosatom expands its logistics business
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for January 2025

Technical state of the ZNPP ↑

On 12 January the plant’s last remaining 330-kV back-up power line was disconnected for 13 hours for maintenance.

The IAEA team was also informed by ZNPP representatives that work had commenced on a safety train in unit 4 and on one of the emergency diesel generators that are designed to provide on-site power in case of a total loss of off-site power (similar works were completed on units 2 and 6 in late December).

On 23 January, the IAEA reported that the team had been informed that another three new diesel generators were being procured for the ZNPP, similar to those received at the end of 2024.

On 24 January during a walkdown of the containment building of unit 5, the IAEA team observed condensation – water drops on the floors and walls, and were informed that the Russian management of the ZNPP was aware of this issue.

On 29 January, the sole remaining 750 kV- power line was disconnected due to the activation of a protection system, and the ZNPP received electricity by the 330 kV back-up power line (the IAEA report does not indicate what caused the protection system’s activation).

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by the IAEA team ↑

The IAEA reports that the team of experts at the ZNPP continues to make regular walkdowns of plant facilities, despite problems from nearby ongoing military activity.

The IAEA report for 17 January states that over the previous week the team inspected:

units 1-6: main control rooms (made note of staffing levels);
unit 6: emergency diesel generators (checked fuel levels), observed the switching of the spent fuel pool cooling pump from one safety train to another;
the cooling pond area, including in the vicinity of both cooling towers, one of which was damaged in a fire in August 2024 (an area where the team was previously denied access);
unit 2: turbine hall (as usual, access to the western part was denied);

The next period is described in the report for 23 January:

main and emergency control rooms of four reactor units (without indicating which ones);
turbine hall of one of the reactor units (also without indicating which one).

Additionally, at the end of January the IAEA team was allowed access to the 750 kV open switchyard for the first time since late last year. The team members confirmed that maintenance on the voltage stabilizers had been completed.

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

On 5 January the IAEA team at the ZNPP reported hearing two loud explosions coming from outside the perimeter three hours apart, which coincided with reports of a drone attack on the training center. Additionally, the team heard machine gun fire coming from the site.

The Russian side reported that the drone attack hit the roof of the G building of the training center. No casualties or damage to the center or plant equipment was reported.

The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that air defense systems in the region of the ZNPP and Enerhodar shot down eight drones, and that one of the drones shot down exploded and caught fire on the roof of the training center.

The IAEA team also reported that on this day the intensity of military activity in direct proximity to the NPP increased, including numerous explosions at various distances from the site.

Later throughout the rest of the month IAEA team reported that explosions could be heard almost daily, including near the plant.

Military threats at other nuclear facilities of Ukraine ↑

In January, reports of increased military activity came not only from the IAEA expert team at the ZNPP but also from the teams at the three operational Ukrainian NPPs – Rivne, Khmelnytsky, and South Ukraine – as well as at the Chornobyl NPP site. The IAEA teams at these sites reported multiple air raid alerts. Drones were detected at various distances from the Khmelnytsky, South Ukraine, and Chornobyl NPP sites.

The IAEA reports stated that on 14 January two drones were spotted flying close to the industrial area of the Chornobyl NPP, and gunfire was heard (noting that drones had flown over the area repeatedly in the past two months).

On 15 January, drones were also spotted flying as close as 5 kilometers from the site of the South Ukraine NPP.

The following week at the Khmelnytsky and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site, the IAEA teams were informed of drones detected at distances ranging from 2 to 30 km from the sites.

In the information circular to IAEA member countries, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine provided a list of incidents near the South Ukraine and Khmelnytsky NPPs in January, based on reports from Energoatom, indicating the date, time, and number of drones spotted.

Attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine ↑

On 15 January, Russia carried out another massive missile attack affecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. As a precautionary measure, the Rivne NPP temporarily reduced power generation at one of its units, which returned to nominal capacity later the same day.

On 29 January, one of the two 750-kV power lines was disconnected at the South Ukraine NPP due to military activity. As a result, one of its three reactors decreased power output for several hours. (On 6 February, the IAEA reported that the power line had not yet been reconnected).

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

US sanctions ↑

On 10 January, the Unated States announced new sweeping sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. Although they mainly concern the oil industry, senior officials of Rosatom were also added to the SDN list:

Director General Aleksey Likhachev;
Deputy Director General for International Activities Nikolay Spassky;
First Deputy Director General for Development and International Business Kirill Komarov;
First Deputy Director General for Development of New Nuclear Energy Products Alexander Lokshin;
Deputy Director General for Execution of State Powers and Budgeting Sergey Novikov;
Deputy director general for security Konstantin Denisov;
Director For Public Policy on Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Decommissioning Oleg Kryukov;
Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions Andrei Nikipelov;
Deputy Director General for State Safety Policy in The Defense Uses of Atomic Energy Yury Yakovlev;
Deputy Director General for Development of Rosatom’s Production System Sergey Obozov;
Deputy Director General for Science and Strategy Yury Olenin;
First Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy, head of Atomstroyexport Andrey Petrov (listed as the Director General of Rosenergoatom, but since June 2023 this position has been held by Alexander Shutikov instead of Petrov);
Deputy Director General for Economics and Finance Ilya Rebrov;
Deputy Director General – Director of The Northern Sea Route Directorate Vyacheslav Ruksha.

It is stated that senior officials of Rosatom have publicly declared that Rosatom enterprises are developing weapons systems, including those intended for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Furthermore, individuals included in the sanction lists facilitate Rosatom’s involvement in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and defense sector, the export of nuclear power plant construction, the development of advanced technologies and materials, the expansion of non-uranium mining industries and related businesses, as well as malign activities, including the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.

It is noted that the inclusion of the company’s senior management in the sanctions list brings the total number of US sanctions related to Rosatom to nearly 70 subsidiary companies and associated individuals. This move aligns US actions with previously imposed sanctions on Rosatom board members by the United Kingdom and Canada.

Referring to the justifications used in the US State Department’s press release, Likhachev stated that the new sanctions look more like an awards list than a sanctions decision, as they highlight the achievements and merits of the state corporation. He also noted that inclusion in the SDN list has no impact on Rosatom’s leadership, as they do not have assets in the US.

Inclusion on the SDN list results in the freezing of assets in the US belonging to sanctioned organizations and individuals, as well as a ban on American citizens and companies conducting transactions with them.

Additionally, on 10 January, the company Polar Lithium, associated with Rosatom, was added to the SDN list. It is a joint venture between Nornickel and Rosatom Nedra, the mining division of Rosatom (formerly Atomredmetzoloto).

Polar Lithium holds the rights to develop Russia’s largest lithium deposit on the Kola Peninsula and aims to become the country’s first producer of lithium-containing raw materials.

Rosatom Director General Aleksey Likhachev. Source: Rosatom

On 15 January the US announced sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base, and the SDN-list included several subsidiary companies of Rosatom:

FSUE Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant – an organization established in October 2022 with the aim of unlawfully claiming ownership rights over Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP. (The Operating Organization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was added to the US sanctions list on 24 February 2023.)
Science and Production Association Centrotech LLC – a Rosatom subsidiary engaged in the production of gas centrifuges;
FSUE Mining and Chemical Complex – a Rosatom subsidiary conducting scientific research in the field of nuclear energy.

Additionally, the following entities and individuals were added to the SDN list:

The Turkish shipyard Kuzey Star Shipyard Denizcilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi for its ties with FSUE Atomflot, which was sanctioned by the US in March 2023. In September 2024, this shipyard completed the construction of a floating dock for servicing nuclear icebreakers, including Project 22220 icebreakers and nuclear service vessels.
Director General of FSUE Atomflot Yakov Antonov (has held this position since September 2024);
Director General of FSUE Zaporizhzhia NPP Vladislav Isaev.

Commentary by Bellona:

Kazakhstan completes visits to potential suppliers for its NPP project ↑

On 21 January, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan announced the completion of a series of visits to potential technology suppliers for the country’s nuclear power plant, which began after the national referendum in October, which approved the decision to build the plant.

Details of the visits that followed the referendum at various levels can be found in our digests for October and November-December 2024. Potential suppliers under consideration include CNNC (China, HPR1000 reactor), Rosatom (Russia, VVER-1200 reactor), KHNP (South Korea, APR1000, APR1400 reactors), and EDF (France, EPR1200 reactor), each offering specific features.

In January, the final visit was a working trip to Russia led by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliyev. The delegation visited the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant to study the operational experience of nuclear power plants and the technology of III+ generation reactor units with VVER-1200 reactors.

A delegation of the Kazakhstan Energy Ministry led by Minister Almasadam Satkaliyev visits the Leningrad NPP, 21 January 2025. Source: Leningrad NPP

On 30 January, as part of a working visit by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, talks were held with Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektanov about bilateral cooperation between the two countries. The Russian delegation included the Director General of Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev. After discussions with the Kazakh side, Likhachev told reporters that based on the context of the discussions, Russia and Kazakhstan are ” moving towards a joint decision” on the issue of building a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakh media outlet Orda.kz noted that Likhachev’s comment gives the impression that Rosatom’s participation in the project is almost decided. However, the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan emphasized that the final decision on selecting a supplier or consortium for the implementation of the project has not yet been made and is expected to be taken in 2025, taking into account national interests and international obligations.

Also, on 30 January, during an extended government meeting, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev ordered the acceleration of the construction of the first nuclear power plant and to begin the search for a site for the second plant. Minister of Energy Almasadam Satkaliyev stated that the second nuclear power plant could be built at the same time as the first one, given the projected electricity deficit in the country.

It should also be noted that inJanuary, the second deal involving the sale of Russian uranium assets in Kazakhstan to Chinese companies was completed. Uranium One Group sold a 30% stake in the companies Khorasan-U and Kyzylkum to China Uranium Development Company Ltd., whose ultimate beneficiary is China General Nuclear Power Corporation.

The first deal, involving the sale of Rosatom’s 49.979% stake in JV Zarechnoye to SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, whose ultimate beneficiary is State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd., was completed in December of last year.

France’s Orano and Mongolia sign agreement on joint development of uranium deposit ↑

On 17 January 2025, an investment agreement was signed in Ulaanbaatar between the French company Orano and the government of Mongolia. The document provides for the development and operation of the Zuuvch-Ovoo and Dulaan Uul/Umnut uranium deposits.

According to the terms of the agreement, the project will be carried out by a joint venture, Badrakh Energy, established by Orano and the state-owned Mongolian company MonAtom. This company had previously conducted research to justify the feasibility of future development of this deposit.

It is expected that the deposit will be developed over four years, after which it will reach a nominal production capacity of 2,500 tonnes of uranium per year.

The total investment is estimated at $1.6 billion over 30 years, with $500 million planned to be invested at the initial stage, before the deposit is brought into operation.

Zuuvch-Ovoo is considered one of the largest uranium deposits in Mongolia, with estimated reserves, including the adjacent Dulaan-Uul/Umnut area, amounting to about 90,000 tonnes of uranium.

Commentary by Bellona:

Import of Russian uranium to Germany increased in 2024 ↑

On 3 January, the German outlet Spiegel, citing data from the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony, reported that uranium imports to Germany from Russia increased by almost 70% in 2024 compared to the previous year. It was specified that last year, at least 68.6 tonnes of uranium (most likely low-enriched uranium, LEU) were imported from two Rosatom subsidiaries to the fuel element production plant of Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) in Lingen, Lower Saxony.

We have already written about this plant, owned by the French company Framatome, which is used to produce fuel for European PWR and BWR reactors (including Sizewell B in the UK, Doel in Belgium, and Ringhals in Sweden).

Bellona analyzed the total purchases of enriched uranium by EU countries based on Eurostat data for the first 10 months of 2024 and concluded that when comparing the import volumes to Germany not only with 2023 but also with previous years, there was no significant increase in import volumes. For the Lingen plant, imports from Russia make up only about a quarter of all imported raw materials.

It can also be seen that within the EU, in 2024, only French companies bought LEU from Russia – about 30 tonnes were imported directly to France, and the 70 tonnes mentioned by Spiegel were purchased by the Lingen plant. Total purchases for the first 10 months of last year came to under 100 tonnes of LEU, less than half the amount for 2023 (about 250 tonnes) and much lower than in 2022 and 2021, which stood at around 430-480 tonnes.

At the same time, Russia’s share in the segment of low-enriched uranium supplies to EU countries decreased to 15% in 2024, while in some years prior to 2022, it even exceeded 50%.

Deliveries of enriched uranium from Russia to the EU (excluding the UK) from 2002 to 2024, not including enriched uranium contained in nuclear fuel supplies, in tons. Data for 2024 given for the first 10 months. Infographic by Bellona based on data from Eurostat

Commentary by Bellona:

Vietnam restarts nuclear energy program ↑

On January 14 in Hanoi, during an official visit of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to Vietnam, a series of agreements were signed between Vietnamese and Russian departments, including a memorandum on the development of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

Rosatom and the state energy company of Vietnam EVN agreed to step up cooperation in the nuclear sector, although the details of the agreement were not disclosed.

The day before, on January 13, a meeting took place between Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Rosatom Director General Aleksey Likhachev.

In November 2024, the Vietnamese government announced its intention to restart its nuclear energy program.

In 2010, Vietnam and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement for the construction of the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant, with two reactors of a total capacity of 2.4 GW. Russia was expected to provide a loan of $8 billion for the project. Construction was initially planned to begin in 2017 and to be completed by 2023-2024.

Vietnam also had an agreement to build a second NPP with the International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co., Ltd. (JINED).

In late 2016 the country abandoned these two projects with a total capacity of 4,000 MW due to the estimated cost rising to $18 billion, and for environmental and financial reasons.

On 30 November 2024 the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a resolution approving the continuation of the Ninh Thuan NPP project, and approved further research in the field of nuclear energy development.

On 10 January, 2025, Vietnam established a Steering Committee for the construction of a nuclear power plant, headed by Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. At the committee’s first meeting on 15 January, the Prime Minister stated that Vietnam’s first nuclear power plant, located in the central province of Ninh Thuan, must be completed within five years and put into operation by 2030, coinciding with the 100^th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

After the negotiations in Hanoi, Likhachev announced that Rosatom is starting the process of updating the agreements with Vietnam regarding the construction of the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant. A number of parameters will need to be revised, but some of them will remain unchanged. Specifically, Rosatom will propose the construction of two VVER-1200 reactors.

Likhachev also stated that a decision has been made to build a new research reactor of Russian design for Vietnam, with construction planned to begin in 2027.

In December 2024 Japan also confirmed its readiness to resume cooperation with Vietnam on an NPP construction project.

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Extending the operating life of RBMK reactors ↑

The Russian nuclear regulator Roskomnadzor has extended the operating license for Unit 3 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (LNPP) with an RBMK-1000 reactor of the second generation until 2030, following modernization and replacement of components that had reached the end of their service life. Since its commissioning in 1979, the reactor has generated over 290 billion kWh of electricity. Previously, after modernization, the operating life of this unit was extended by 15 years. (Units 1 and 2 of the RBMK-1000 reactors at LNPP were decommissioned after 45 years of service, in line with the shutdown of similar units at the Kursk NPP.)

Map of location of NPPs with power units with extended operating life. Infographic by Bellona

Other units with RBMK reactors are also currently being prepared for an extension of their operating life:

unit 4 of the Leningrad NPP, also until 2030 (commissioned in 1981),
units 3 and 4 of the Kursk NPP (1983 and 1995 respectively)
units 1, 2 and 3 of the Smolensk NPP (1982, 1985 and 1990 respectively).

The plans to extend the operating life of these units to 50 years were included in the general plan for the placement of power generation facilities in December 2022 to compensate for the lag in the pace of construction of replacement capacities in the coming years.

The implementation of a comprehensive set of measures to justify and ensure the possibility of their further operation will make it possible to retain about 7 GW of generating capacity.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom expands its logistics business ↑

Rosatom reported that in 2024, FESCO’s (a company under Rosatom’s management) import maritime shipments increased by 39%, reaching 324,000 TEU (a standard unit of cargo capacity based on the volume of a 20-foot intermodal ISO container). The total expected volume of all maritime shipments by FESCO in 2024 exceeded 617,000 TEU, which is 18% higher than the previous year’s figure.

In particular, in 2024, FESCO increased maritime container shipments between Vladivostok and China by 14% (amounting to approximately 250,000 TEU), while land transportation grew by 66%. Cargo shipments between India and Russia also increased.

After becoming part of Rosatom, FESCO launched new maritime container routes and corridors in 2024 aimed at increasing Russia’s trade turnover. In particular, a direct cargo delivery line from China to Novorossiysk was launched, and the geography of freight transportation to India was expanded. The group began container shipments to ports in Kenya and the UAE and, for the first time in nearly 20 years, launched a regular route without calling at Russian ports, connecting Vietnam and Malaysia.

FESCO is also involved in providing logistical support for Rosatom’s projects. In 2024, it handled the transportation of heavy and oversized equipment for the construction of power units at the Kudankulam NPP in India and the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey. Additionally, FESCO retained its status as the sole logistics operator at the Vostochny cargo terminal, located at the Akkuyu NPP construction site.

Rosatom took control of FESCO in November 2023 when the state transferred to it nationalized shares (a 92.4% stake) in the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO’s parent company.

One of FESCO’s former co-owners, Ziyavudin Magomedov, who was sentenced in 2022 to 19 years in a high-security prison on charges of organizing a criminal network and embezzling billions in public funds, filed a lawsuit in a British court in September 2023. He accused former FESCO managers, its current and past shareholders, as well as Transneft and Rosatom, of engaging in a “global conspiracy” to expropriate his assets for the benefit of state structures and themselves.

In January 2025, the court dismissed Magomedov’s lawsuit, ruling that there were “no serious issues to be considered” regarding Transneft, and that any case against Rosatom should not be heard in London.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On 31 December 2024, the Egyptian Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) received permission from the National Nuclear and Radiation Control Authority (NRRA) to construct a dry storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant site. Construction is scheduled to begin in 2025.

Kudankulam NPP, India. On 15 January 15, Rosatom shipped the reactor vessel for unit 6 of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant to India.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On December 30, 2024, Akkuyu Nuclear announced that the reactor vessel had been installed in its design position at Unit 3 of the Akkuyu NPP. Additionally, the first batch of fresh nuclear fuel for Unit 2 was delivered to the site.

Meanwhile, on January 4, Rosatom CEO Aleksey Likhachev announced that legal action would be initiated against Siemens for the disruption of equipment deliveries for the Akkuyu project. The equipment, a complete electrical gas distribution system needed to supply power to the energy grid, was ordered and paid for in 2020.

In September 2024, Turkey’s Minister of Energy, Alparslan Bayraktar, also spoke about the legal consequences, stating that Siemens’ inability to deliver critical equipment (due to the company being unable to obtain export licenses from the German government) had delayed the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project by several months.

In October 2024, Bayraktar announced that the supply issue had been resolved during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Turkey on October 20. The German leader assured Ankara that the equipment would be delivered. However, the Turkish Minister of Energy added that Rosatom had already reached an agreement to use Chinese equipment and that there was a “99% probability” that the German equipment would not be used.

On 6 February, Siemens Energy told DW that it had finally received the export license from the German authorities, and is now ready to fulfill its obligations to the client, with talks on this issue already in progress.

“We have noted the media reports about the intention to file a lawsuit, but at present no legal action has been taken against us,” commented Tim Proll-Gerwe, spokesperson for Siemens Energy, in a written response to DW’s inquiry regarding Likhachev’s statement. Additionally, in response to DW’s question about cooperation with Russian companies, Proll-Gerwe stated that Siemens Energy has ceased all business activities in Russia and no longer has any contractual relationships there. The company is only obligated to fulfill existing contracts signed before the start of the war in Ukraine.

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. January 2025 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Enriched Uranium Fuels Russia’s War Machine. But the US Still Imports It 18 Mar 8:02 AM (29 days ago)

This piece by Bellona’s Dmitry Gorchakov originally appeared in The Moscow Times.

On Feb. 24, the pro-Kremlin outlet EA Daily reported that Tenex, a subsidiary of Rosatom, had resumed exporting low-enriched uranium to the United States. Citing data from the procurement tracking service ImportGenius, the report said that on Feb. 12, the vessel Atlantic Navigator II delivered a total of 100 tons of enriched uranium to the port of Baltimore.

In mid-November 2024, the Russian government imposed a temporary ban on exporting enriched uranium to the US until the end of 2025 and revoked current export licenses. This measure was a response to a US law passed six months earlier, which prohibits the purchase of enriched uranium from Russia starting in 2028. Until then, purchases are allowed only for limited quantities and require special approval to prove they serve US interests.

Russia’s restrictions likewise include exceptions, allowing for one-time licenses to resume exports to the US According to the Kremlin, export permits are granted when they align with “Russia’s interests.”

What are Russia’s interests in this situation? More specifically, what are the interests of the Russian government and Rosatom?

First, there is the financial aspect: Rosatom earns approximately $1 billion annually from exporting enriched uranium to the US.

Additionally, Rosatom’s reputation is at stake. The Kremlin values the state corporation as an instrument of both economic and political influence abroad. Given that Rosatom is one of the largest players in the global nuclear market, operating in dozens of countries and remains one of the few Russian exporters not heavily sanctioned, maintaining its status as a reliable supplier is crucial for both the Kremlin and Rosatom — at least as long as it remains possible.

This is why Rosatom’s subsidiaries are keen to fulfill American contracts and continue operating in the US market. The United States is one of their most profitable and long-established markets, accounting for nearly half of Russia’s enriched uranium exports. When Russia introduced its export restrictions in November, it was expected that they would have little impact on overall supply plans. Rosatom and Tenex were anticipated to request — and receive — approval to continue exports to the US.

On Feb. 6, Centrus, the primary American buyer of Russian enriched uranium — which then resells it to other US consumers — said in its 2024 annual report that “as of today, Tenex has received three special licenses allowing it to export low-enriched uranium to us.” Additionally, Centrus reported that “Tenex has informed Centrus of its plan to request additional export licenses to fulfill its contractual supply obligations.”

Centrus preemptively requested exemptions from the US ban on purchasing Russian enriched uranium last year. The company obtained the necessary licenses from US government authorities for deliveries in 2024 and 2025.

As a result, business entities on both sides of the ocean continue their trade relations despite formal bans, securing approvals and permissions from their regulatory agencies. Business is operating in a way that is convenient and familiar, receiving government endorsements despite the often harsh rhetoric from officials.

The aggressive rhetoric itself may serve as another propaganda tool for the Russian leadership. The purpose of mirror responses to Western sanctions is to demonstrate that, first, these sanctions do not intimidate Russia, and second, that Russia can retaliate just as strongly. But does Russia actually want to retaliate?

There is no evidence that any contracts have been disrupted due to the Russian ban. On the contrary, Tenex (as well as the US side) continues to request and receive the necessary licenses to fulfill its contractual obligations, as I previously predicted. Moreover, while the US market accounts for about half of Rosatom’s enriched uranium exports, Russian uranium only covers about 25% of USdemand. So, it is not entirely clear who is more dependent on whom.

Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the two-and-a-half-month gap in deliveries — from Nov. 19, 2024, when the last shipment was made, to Feb. 12, 2025, when deliveries supposedly resumed — was caused by the Russian ban rather than other factors. Unlike gas or oil, which are needed continuously in massive quantities, uranium deliveries —even between major partners—rarely exceed a few hundred kilograms per year. Deliveries are sporadic and do not follow a monthly schedule. For example, according to Comtrade trade data, intervals between shipments in 2024 lasted as long as three to four months.

US business, represented by Centrus, remains hungry for Russian uranium and is obtaining the necessary permits to continue buying it. However, this arrangement will not last forever. Starting in 2028, US law will completely ban all uranium imports from Russia. Until then, purchases under special permits are limited to a maximum of 476.5 tons of enriched uranium per year — and not more than 459.1 tons in 2027 — which is less than the US has been purchasing in recent years.

Infographic by Bellona based on Comtrade data.

In 2023, amid uncertainty and panic over future supply chains, the US purchased a record volume of enriched uranium from Russia — the highest since 2013 — exceeding 701 tons and totaling $1.2 billion. This made Russia the largest foreign supplier of enriched uranium to the US in both 2022 and 2023.

However, in 2024, purchases from Russia nearly halved, dropping to 335 tons worth $624 million, according to Comtrade’s international trade data. Since Russian export restrictions — if they can even be called that — only took effect at the end of 2024, this decline in imports is certainly not due to any ban. Overall, the US imported less foreign enriched uranium in 2024 — 1,924 tons compared to 2,575 tons in 2023. Shortfalls were made up by suppliers like France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

*Data compiled by Bellona based on Comtrade data on transactions with goods under customs code HS 284420 (“Uranium; enriched in U235…”)*

It is too early to say for certain that US imports of Russian enriched uranium peaked in 2023 and that the decline in 2024 reflects efforts by the previous presidential administration to boost domestic production, increase purchases from allies and reduce dependency on Russia. There are too many unknowns within the opaque nuclear industry, even in the West. However, US bans appear to be backed by far more tangible actions and intentions than Russia’s.

In recent years, Western countries have moved to reduce their reliance on Russian enriched uranium. Major companies such as the European consortium Urenco and the French company Orano have already begun expanding and restarting their own enrichment capacities. As Bellona predicted over a year ago, given the current expansion plans, Western countries could replace at least 60% of Russia’s current enriched uranium supplies by 2030.

In 2024, following the passage of the US ban on Russian enriched uranium imports, the Biden administration selected six companies from the US and Europe for contracts to supply uranium enriched domestically, allocating around $3.4 billion for the purpose. This initiative aims to stimulate the expansion and construction of enrichment facilities within the US, which currently meet only about one-third of the country’s demand.

Despite his opposition to many of Biden’s policies, President Donald Trump also supports investment in US uranium production. While he does not acknowledge the importance of low-carbon energy to mitigate climate change, his administration backs nuclear power as part of the US energy security strategy.

It is difficult to predict Trump’s future actions, including how far his admiration for President Vladimir Putin might push him toward lifting sanctions. However, the measures aimed at strengthening US domestic uranium production and reducing reliance on foreign suppliers — not just Russia — align with Trump’s broader goals and are likely to remain in place.

Russia may therefore attempt to frame the resumption of uranium exports to the US as a goodwill gesture, despite strained relations. However, in reality, this is merely an attempt to extract as much profit as possible within the conditions set and dictated by the US.

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Rosatom head says Russia will restart seized Ukrainian nuclear plant 4 Mar 12:01 AM (last month)

Russia will restart the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant—occupied by Moscow’s troops since the beginning of their three-year-old invasion of Ukraine—as soon as “military and political conditions allow it,” Alexei Likhachev, head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, said last week in remarks reported by Russian state media.

An apparent plan to push the plant back into service could be approved within the next six weeks, Likhachev told state channel Rossiya 24 in a widely quoted interview, saying it would address issues of licensing the plants six reactors as well schemes for fueling them and distributing their electricity.

But bringing the plant—which sits on the Dnipro River athwart the front lines of the war—back online would freshen worries about a nuclear accident at a facility that has come under fire numerous times since Moscow’s invasion began. A Bellona report from last year considered these concerns when Russia first began airing the notion of bringing the besieged facility back online to produce power.

Yet, even beyond the technical dangers of doing so, argues Dmitry Gorchakov, a nuclear expert with Bellona and author of that report, a potential renewal of the plant’s operations under Russian control would mark a new and more dire challenge the principles governing nuclear energy worldwide.

“If Russia launches and starts operating someone else’s station, this will be a new stage in the destruction of the international nuclear safety system, normalizing the taking of nuclear facilities as military trophies,” he said.

Likhachev’s remarks were some of his first that seemed to publicly acknowledge that Rosatom does indeed intend to absorb the Zaporizhzhia plant—Europe’s largest civilian nuclear power facility—into its enormous bureaucracy, making it the 12^th nuclear power plant under Moscow’s direct control. It would also mark a stunning appropriation of several billion dollars’ worth of Ukrainian nuclear energy infrastructure—a first in modern warfare.

Throughout the war, Rosatom has held itself at something of an arm’s length from the embattled plant, announcing as recently as last May that it had no plans to restart the plants six reactors, which have remained in various stages of shutdown for safety reasons since early in the invasion. But signals on this count have been mixed, with President Vladimir Putin himself telling the International Atomic Energy Agency only a month before that Russia would, in fact, restart the plant.

“Clearly, discussions of a restart have surfaced against the backdrop of discussions on a possible settlement of the military conflict in Ukraine and negotiations toward this with the United State,” said Gorchakov. “Most likely, a ‘suitable military and political situation’ for restart means reaching diplomatic agreements leading, on the one hand, to a cease-fire, including around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and on the other, to a consolidation of Russia’s control over the captured territories and plant itself.”

But Gorchakov also pointed out that any reactor restart at the Zaporizhzhia plant — which, prior to its seizure by Russian forces provided a fifth of Ukraine’s electricity — would present huge technical challenges.

For one, the massive outflow of Ukrainian technicians since the Russian seizure has slashed staff numbers from 11,000 before the war to a skeleton crew of about 3,000.

The plant itself has also undergone numerous changes since 1991, when the Soviet collapse left Ukraine as an independent country. The enormous Soviet-built complex has undergone a profound westernization and now runs on European Union-funded computer systems as well as — more recently — reactor fuel from the US-based Westinghouse Corporation.

These conversions baffle Russian staff who are used to Soviet designs, making any reactor restarts an unsafe proposition.

To bring any reactors back online, their core temperatures would have to be raised hundreds of degrees and a scarce supply of technicians would have to check a maze of pipes and pumps for leaks. So dwindled are the personnel numbers that as few as a single technician might oversee an entire reactor control room, a report by the US Department of Energy said.

The report added that Russian staff at the plant are underqualified to operate Ukrainian variants of the Russian-designed VVER-type reactors that make up the Zaporizhzhia plant.

Water from the Dnipro River could also be challenging to come by following the 2023 Russian attack on the Khakhovka Dam complex, which feeds some of the reservoirs that cool the Zaporizhzhia plant.

But Gorchakov pointed out that these would all become Russia’s problems.

“An immediate restart of the station for Russia will mean the final consolidation of this station for itself as wells as an increase in the stakes and risks should conflict or military actions resume near the plant,” he said.

But he added that Rosatom could be driven to push this fragile situation in hopes of minimizing the financial losses seizing the plant, which, he says, “is only a source of expenses and headaches” for the corporation.

Much depends on how the international community responds to what amounts to the blatant theft of an entire nuclear power plant, Gorchakov added.

“Unfortunately, there is no certainty of serious protest against such a decision, including from the IAEA,” he said.

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Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, December 2024 24 Feb 2:49 AM (last month)

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for November can be found here.

In this issue:

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route. Results for 2024
2. Shipbuilding news

Bellona’s comment

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
3. EU imposes new sanctions against Russia
4. There are indications that Novatek is attempting to remove the Arctic LNG 2 project from U.S. sanctions
5. New report analyzes the impact of sanctions on Russian LNG supplies to the EU in 2024

Bellona’s comment

HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
6. Mining of almost all types of minerals has increased in Chukotka
7. Nornickel Reports on the implementation of the Sulfur Program
8. Norilsk Nickel has approved its cooperation strategy with China
9. The launch of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in the Krasnoyarsk Territory has been postponed to 2025

Bellona’s comment

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
10. The prosecutor’s office has identified violations of environmental protection legislation in the Chukotka branch of “Rosmorport”
11. New studies on climate change in the Arctic

ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Northern Sea Route and shipping

Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route. Results for 2024 ↑

The Rosatom State Corporation, which operates the Northern Sea Route, has summed up the results for the past year. In 2024, specialists from the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route issued 1,312 permits for navigation in the NSR waters (previously, a maximum of 1,228 were issued per year), which indicates a continuing increase in shipping activity. The total volume of cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route reached 37.9 million tons, exceeding the 2023 figures by more than 1.6 million tons, but significantly lagging behind the planned figure.

Icebreaker in the port of Sabetta. Photo: flyural66

The number of transit voyages has also increased. According to Rosatom, 92 transit voyages with a total cargo volume of over 3 million tons were registered in 2024. This is almost 1.5 times more than in 2023. The Norwegian High North Logistics Centre recorded 97 transit voyages in 2024.

Main routes: from Russia to China (34 voyages), from China to Russia (27 voyages), between Russian ports (36 voyages). As in 2023, there were no international transit voyages.
In terms of transportation volume, the route from Russia to China dominated, accounting for 2.9 million tons of cargo (95% of the total volume).
Main categories of cargo: crude oil, bulk cargo (coal, fertilizers, iron ore concentrate), and container cargo.
Crude oil exports from Russia to China amounted to 1.89 million tons over 18 voyages (three voyages from the Arctic Gate terminal in the Gulf of Ob to China are not included in the statistics).
Bulk cargo transportation reached 877 thousand tons, including iron ore concentrate, coal, and fertilizers.
In addition, 14 voyages carrying container cargo were conducted between China and the Russian ports of Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg.

Shipbuilding news ↑

According to Kommersant, Rosatom has submitted a proposal to the government to introduce an Arctic investment levy for shippers using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) starting in 2028. The levy is expected to be charged as a surcharge on icebreaker escort fees in the eastern sector of the NSR. Companies using the route for cargo transportation, surveyed by Kommersant, have complained about the high icebreaker escort tariffs. Another tariff increase could reduce the attractiveness of this route.

The funds raised from the investment levy are planned to be allocated for the construction of new nuclear icebreakers, for which Rosatom lacks sufficient financing.

On December 28, 2024, the icebreaker Yakutia was officially commissioned, with the state flag raised on board. It became the eighth icebreaker in the Atomflot fleet and the fourth icebreaker of Project 22220, built at the Baltic Shipyard. The universal icebreakers of Project 22220, including Arktika, Sibir, and Ural, are designed to ensure year-round navigation in the western part of the Arctic. Currently, the Baltic Shipyard is continuing the construction of three more vessels in this series: Chukotka, Leningrad, and Stalingrad.

The Zvezda shipyard is building the Rossiya icebreaker of Project 10510 Lider, which is supposed to provide year-round escorts in the eastern Arctic. However, on December 23, the vessel Ursa Major sank near Spain while transporting equipment for this icebreaker—two 380-ton port cranes and two 45-ton reactor compartment hatches. The cargo was en route from St. Petersburg to the Zvezda shipyard in Primorsky Krai.

Russia is in negotiations with India regarding the construction of four additional non-nuclear icebreakers. By 2030, the icebreaker fleet on the Northern Sea Route is planned to consist of 17 vessels.

At the 14th International Forum “The Arctic: Present and Future”, held on December 12–13, Nikita Melnik, a representative of Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, reported that the construction of the first five Arc7 ice-class gas tankers for the Arctic LNG-2 project is 90% complete. These vessels are being built at the Zvezda shipyard and are intended for transporting liquefied natural gas from the Arctic LNG-2 plant. In total, 15 such tankers are planned to be constructed under the contract with Zvezda.

On December 25, the Arc7 ice-class vessel Alexey Kosygin was released for sea trials. This is one of 15 gas tankers designed to transport liquefied natural gas as part of the Arctic LNG 2 project, which are being built at the Zvezda shipyard. If the trials are successfully completed, the tanker could be delivered to the customer as early as the first quarter of 2025, but the sanctions imposed by the United States could limit the use of the tanker for LNG deliveries.

Bellona’s comment:

«The results of the year for cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) were as expected. While the total volume saw a slight increase compared to the previous year, it fell significantly short of the planned target. The nature of transportation and cargo structure remained largely unchanged. Most shipments consisted of exports of natural resources extracted in the Russian Arctic (AZRF), including gas, oil, coal, and minerals. The increase in transit indicates that more Russian resources were transported to China via the NSR.

International economic sanctions have successfully slowed down new resource extraction projects in the Russian Arctic, leading to the failure of plans for a sharp increase in cargo turnover on the Northern Sea Route. Nevertheless, Russian authorities continue to invest political efforts and state funds into building NSR infrastructure and promoting the route to China. However, it is evident that the NSR lacks commercial attractiveness, and it is unlikely to gain significant appeal in the near future.

The increase in icebreaker escort fees—already noted as high in the past—suggests that the organization of vessel passage along the Northern Sea Route is unlikely to be financially viable at this stage, especially under international economic sanctions. Additionally, according to the Baltic Shipyard itself, the construction of nuclear icebreakers remains largely unprofitable. (For more details on the situation with nuclear icebreakers, see the previous issue of Bellona’s Nuclear Digest.)

The planned non-nuclear icebreakers are unlikely to be completed by 2030, as no shipyard has yet been designated to take on the project. Meanwhile, newly built LNG carriers will immediately fall under sanctions and join the shadow fleet. If sanctions against Russian LNG tighten further, it remains unclear who these carriers will deliver to—finding buyers may prove impossible.

However, since the Northern Sea Route is a personal priority for Vladimir Putin, and there is hope for China and global warming, any financial gaps will be covered by the Russian state budget as much as possible. In the near future, much will depend on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly whether international sanctions against Russian industry will be lifted. Regardless, the high risks and questionable profitability of the NSR will likely persist for decades to come.»

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

EU imposes new sanctions against Russia ↑

On December 17, the European Union adopted its 15th package of sanctions against Russia, aimed at further restricting its ability to wage war against Ukraine. As part of these new measures, 52 vessels – including 44 oil tankers and 7 LNG carriers – have been banned from entering European ports. The restrictions specifically target the shadow fleet that Russia uses to circumvent previous sanctions on oil and gas transportation.

Among the sanctioned LNG carriers is Christophe de Margerie, an Arc7 ice-class tanker operating under the Yamal LNG project. This marks the first time sanctions have been directly imposed on Yamal LNG. Previously, in August, the U.S. had only indirectly affected the project by sanctioning Novatek China Holdings, a subsidiary of Novatek responsible for selling Russian LNG to China, including Yamal LNG products.

However, even before being added to the sanctions list, Christophe de Margerie was taken out of service on December 10. The vessel was unable to undergo maintenance at European shipyards due to its affiliation with the Russian shipping company Sovcomflot, which is under sanctions.

Additionally, the 15th sanctions package includes LNG carriers Pioneer, La Perouse, North Way, North Sky, North Air, and North Mountain, some of which had already been sanctioned by the U.S. and/or the UK.

There are indications that Novatek is attempting to remove the Arctic LNG 2 project from U.S. sanctions ↑

According to Reuters, NOVATEK is taking steps to improve its relations with the United States. In the first week of December, company representative Denis Solovyov visited Washington to engage with an American lobbying firm in an effort to remove the flagship Arctic LNG-2 project from U.S. sanctions. NOVATEK is attempting to argue that it does not contribute to financing the war in Ukraine due to its preferential tax status. For example, its Yamal LNG project is exempt from taxes until 2030. A formal message to U.S. government agencies is expected in the coming weeks.

The Arctic LNG 2 facility. Photo: LaNataly / shutterstock.com

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt confirmed that the State Department is aware of NOVATEK’s visit to Washington. However, he emphasized that now is not the time to resume normal business relations with Russia.

Additionally, NOVATEK’s Singapore-based subsidiary, Novatek Gas & Power Asia, participated in the 24th World LNG Summit held in Berlin from December 9–12. The company’s presence sparked criticism and raised questions about why EU representatives allowed NOVATEK to promote its interests at the event.

This trend continued into January, when a senior NOVATEK executive traveled to Brussels in an attempt to soften Europe’s hardline stance on Russian LNG.

New report analyzes the impact of sanctions on Russian LNG supplies to the EU in 2024 ↑

A new report, “A Bumper Year for Russian LNG in the EU, Abetted by Germany“, examines the impact of sanctions on Russian liquefied natural gas deliveries to the European Union in 2024. The report was prepared by four organizations: Deutsche Umwelthilfe, Urgewald, Razom We Stand, and Bond Beter Leefmilieu.

According to the study, despite sanctions, Russian LNG imports to the EU increased by 9% compared to 2023. The volume of gas that remains and is consumed in Europe, rather than being re-exported or transited, rose even more—by 19.3%.

The report highlights that while Germany has not purchased LNG directly from Russia since the start of the invasion, it plays a key role in facilitating record-high imports of Russian LNG into the EU. Securing Energy for Europe GmbH (SEFE, formerly Gazprom PJSC)—a company nationalized by Germany after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—has become an active buyer, purchasing 58 cargoes of Russian LNG in 2024, totaling 5.7 billion cubic meters. This is six and a half times more than in 2023. The German government claims that SEFE remains contractually bound to NOVATEK and can only terminate its agreements under force majeure if a pan-European ban is introduced.

The report’s authors call for greater transparency in the EU’s internal gas market and urge decisive measures to reduce Russian LNG imports, up to and including a full ban on supplies. They also propose sanctions on ice-class LNG carriers transporting gas from Yamal and the inclusion of NOVATEK and its CEO, Leonid Mikhelson, on sanctions lists.

Bellona’s comment:

«The sanctions crackdown on Russia’s shadow fleet—both oil and gas—continues. However, as before, this does not apply to LNG from Yamal. European companies are unwilling to unilaterally terminate long-term LNG supply contracts, which are valid until 2035–2038, likely fearing legal penalties for contract breaches. Meanwhile, European politicians are too concerned about energy price fluctuations to add Yamal LNG to the sanctions list.

NOVATEK’s active efforts in the U.S. and EU indicate that Russia is hoping for favorable treatment from a Trump administration, as well as from right-wing European leaders who have a chance of coming to power in some countries in the upcoming elections. How successful NOVATEK’s lobbying efforts will be remains uncertain. Much will depend on the outcome of negotiations between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky on a ceasefire and its terms—one of which will inevitably be the question of maintaining or lifting sanctions.»

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Mining of almost all types of minerals has increased in Chukotka ↑

Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the easternmost region of the Russian Arctic, saw an increase in the extraction of almost all types of minerals in 2024.

Gold production increased by 3%, with ore gold extraction remaining at the previous level of 21.5 tons, while placer gold production rose by 31% to just over 3 tons. Silver production grew by 13% to 138.4 tons. Coal extraction also increased by 7%. Natural gas production remained at the 2023 level.

The development of one of the world’s largest copper-gold deposits, located in the Baimskaya ore zone, has been postponed once again. This was announced by Georgy Fotin, General Director of GDK “Baimskaya,” at the 14th “Arctic: Present and Future” Forum, held on December 12-13, 2024.

The launch of the Baimsky mining and processing plant was initially scheduled for 2026 but has been postponed several times due to sanctions—first to 2028 and now to 2029. On May 1, the Baimskaya Mining Company itself was added to the U.S. sanctions list. The project is expected to increase Russia’s copper production by 25% and gold production by 4%.

Nornickel Reports on the Implementation of the Sulfur Program ↑

Russia’s leading metallurgical company, Norilsk Nickel, has reported on the results of its Sulfur Program, launched in 2023 at the Nadezhda Metallurgical Plant for sulfuric acid production to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. In 2024, pollutant emissions decreased by 386,500 tons, which is 21.5% lower compared to 2022.

Nornickel’s Vice President for Ecology and Industrial Safety, Stanislav Seleznev, stated that sulfur dioxide emissions are expected to decrease by 734,000 tons in 2025, with plans to capture and utilize 920,000 tons of pollutants by 2026.

In 2022, Norilsk topped the list of the most polluted cities in Russia, according to Rosprirodnadzor. The organization reported that sulfur dioxide emissions in Norilsk reached approximately 1.8 million tons per year (10.5% of the country’s total emissions), while local environmentalists estimated the figure at up to 2 million tons. In 2023, emissions decreased to 1.7 million tons.

In December, Norilsk Nickel launched an online air quality monitoring system in Norilsk. Sixteen automated control stations were equipped with sensors measuring concentrations of sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter. The system allows tracking data over a two-week period; however, users only see a pollution index ranging from 1 to 10, without details on specific substances.

The Copper Plant of Norilsk Nickel, being the main polluter of Norilsk, was initially included in the “Sulfur Program”; however, its implementation became impossible due to sanctions, leading the company to consider relocating part of the operations to Chinese enterprises.

Norilsk Nickel has approved its cooperation strategy with China ↑

Norilsk Nickel has finalized its cooperation strategy with China, aligning it with government priorities. In April, company president Vladimir Potanin announced plans to build a plant in China to relocate the smelting capacities of the Copper Plant in Norilsk. However, the updated strategy aims to retain the tax base and jobs in Russia by expanding the production capacities of the Nadezhda Plant. Currently, Norilsk Nickel is negotiating with the Chinese company Xiamen C&D to acquire a stake in an existing smelting plant in China, but a final agreement has not yet been reached.

Thus, Norilsk Nickel plans to send copper concentrate for processing in China, which will address issues with importing equipment into Russia, reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, and provide access to battery material production technologies. Meanwhile, the industrial capacity of the Copper Plant is planned to be transferred to the Nadezhda Plant, maintaining the workload of partner enterprises, including the Krasnoyarsk Non-Ferrous Metals Plant. By 2028, Norilsk Nickel aims to increase tax contributions to the Russian Federation by 60 billion rubles annually and create 4,500 new jobs by 2030.

The launch of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit in the Krasnoyarsk Territory has been postponed to 2025 ↑

The development of the Syradasayskoye coal deposit, with an investment volume of 33.8 billion rubles, located in Taimyr, has been postponed to 2025. The project, implemented by the company “Severnaya Zvezda,” includes the construction of a coal mine with an initial capacity of 5 million tons per year, with plans to increase to 10 million tons per year. Additionally, the project encompasses the building of a coal processing plant, a highway, a power plant, a rotational camp, and the “Yenisey” seaport.

Earlier, it was expected that the Syradasayskoye deposit would provide several million tons of high-quality coal as early as 2024, and coal transportation via the Northern Sea Route was projected to reach 7 million tons per year by 2026, with a further increase to 12 million tons. However, these plans have stalled. The construction of the processing plant was suspended due to equipment supply issues related to sanctions. Additionally, “Severnaya Zvezda” lacks the vessels necessary for coal export via the Northern Sea Route.

In 2024, Russian coal exports decreased by 6%. According to the International Energy Agency, this is due to the impact of sanctions, infrastructure issues, and reduced profitability.

Bellona’s comment:

«The necessity to replenish the Russian budget, coupled with the limited perspective of Russian authorities, leads to an increase in the extraction of natural resources in the Russian Arctic for export. Despite international sanctions against Russian industry and delays in the commissioning of previously planned projects, a slight increase in extraction is still occurring. Along with the growth in extraction, the negative impact on the environment is also increasing.

The sulfur emission reduction program in Norilsk is unlikely to fundamentally change the air pollution situation in the city. Investments in the sulfur processing plant were made before the military invasion of Ukraine; therefore, Norilsk Nickel continues its Sulfur Program, although Potanin is clearly preoccupied with other issues. His main task now is to circumvent international sanctions and maintain the company’s profits; hence, the idea of relocating the copper plant to China is being considered. Judging by the interim results of the Sulfur Program, the volume of sulfuric acid capture and processing in Norilsk will not cover all of Norilsk Nickel’s emissions, especially considering the planned expansion of the Nadezhda plant.»

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

The prosecutor’s office has identified violations of environmental protection legislation in the Chukotka branch of “Rosmorport” ↑

The prosecutor’s office has identified environmental legislation violations in branches of FSUE “Rosmorport,” including the Anadyr branch located in the Arctic. It was found that measures were not taken to identify facilities having a negative impact on the environment, which entails administrative responsibility under Article 8.46 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation.

FSUE “Rosmorport” is a state-owned enterprise operating maritime infrastructure, including ports along the Northern Sea Route. According to legislation, it is required to identify and account for objects that have a negative impact on the environment. Without considering such objects, it is impossible to accurately assess how the branch’s activities affect the environment, which creates additional risks.

New studies on climate change in the Arctic ↑

A new study published in December in the journal Nature Communications by scientists from the University of Gothenburg predicts that the first ice-free day in the Arctic Ocean could occur before 2030, significantly earlier than previously anticipated. The study specifies that the Arctic is considered “ice-free” when sea ice extent is less than 1 million square kilometers. While this technically does not mean the complete disappearance of ice, at this level, its amount is extremely low, indicating radical climate changes.

According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), the Arctic sea ice extent continues to decline. On January 1, 2025, it measured 12.141 million km², setting a new historical minimum for this month since the beginning of satellite observations of Arctic ice in 1979. The absolute record low for Arctic sea ice extent was recorded in September 2012, when it dropped to just 3.41 million km².

At the same time, scientists from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) consider the disappearance of the ice cover in the Arctic Ocean by mid-century unlikely. Their forecast suggests that between 2030 and 2050, a phase of air temperature decrease is expected, which will help maintain ice volumes at an average level, albeit below the 1979–2000 figures.

A group of scientists from Yakutsk, Tomsk, and Moscow has published a study titled “Climate Change and Permafrost in Arctic and Subarctic Yakutia from 1965 to 2023” on the scientific portal MDPI. The researchers recorded a significant increase in the average annual air temperature over this period, especially pronounced since 2005. As a result of permafrost thawing, the landscape is changing, ecological risks are emerging, and conditions for construction and infrastructure operation are deteriorating.

Scientists from Tomsk State University have studied how fires destroy the moss-lichen cover of peatlands, accelerating permafrost degradation and increasing greenhouse gas emissions. They noted that mosses and lichens serve as a protective layer for permafrost, helping it maintain its structure. However, even decades after fires, vegetation only partially recovers. As a result, the surface albedo decreases, leading to increased heating and accelerated permafrost thawing.

In December, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released the “Arctic Report Card: Update for 2024,” compiled by 97 scientists from 11 countries. The report highlights rapid changes in the Arctic, including the transformation of the tundra from a carbon sink to a carbon source, increased winter precipitation, a rate of temperature rise four times the global average, and a decline in caribou populations, among other findings.

In December, the journal Science published a study on the catastrophic decline of the common murre population due to a marine heatwave in the northern Pacific Ocean from 2014 to 2016. As a result, more than half of the population—about 4 million birds—perished in Alaska. These heatwaves, driven by human-induced climate change, disrupt marine ecosystems by reducing primary production and causing mass mortality among predators.

Common murre colony. Photo: bearacreative

Accidents and incidents in the Northern Sea Route ↑

In December, there were no recorded major accidents or oil spills in the Arctic. However, the incident involving the “Volgoneft” tankers in the Kerch Strait sparked active discussions about the environmental risks that a similar accident could pose in Arctic conditions. An assessment of the potential consequences of such an accident for the Arctic can be found in an article on the Bellona website.

Experts from the UWEC Work Group have identified a connection between the “Volgoneft” tankers and the shadow fleet, noting that vessels used to circumvent sanctions pose a significant threat, especially in the Arctic, where accident response is considerably complicated by extreme climatic conditions.

Even according to Rosatom’s official estimates, the damage to water bodies from an oil spill on the Northern Sea Route would exceed 100 billion rubles in the first 24 hours. This underscores the necessity of developing emergency rescue infrastructure in the region.

The post Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, December 2024 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Bellona Nuclear Digest. November-December 2024 19 Feb 2:51 AM (last month)

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for November and December 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for October, September and August. Download a PDF of this digest here.

Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for November-December 2024
1.1. Events of nuclear diplomacy
1.2. Events at the ZNPP
1.3. The technical state of the ZNPP
1.4. Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by IAEA experts
1.5. Military threats at the ZNPP
1.6. Military threats at other nuclear sites in Ukraine
1.7. Attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Slovakia stockpiles Russian nuclear fuel
3. Westinghouse to conduct safety analysis for licensing fuel for Kozloduy NPP
4. USA and UK extend cooperation in developing fourth-generation nuclear technologies, with Russian no longer participating
5. Romania plans to resume uranium mining
6. US determines potential domestic suppliers of low-enriched uranium
7. Negotiations on NPP construction in Kazakhstan

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
8. Russia places restrictions on uranium export to USA
9. Rosatom to withdraw from several joint uranium producing enterprises in Kazakhstan
10. Russia withdraws on international agreement on multilateral nuclear and environmental program in the Russian Federation
11. Last spent nuclear fuel removed from Gremikha
12. Nuclear icebreaker fleet construction
13. Events in Rosatom projects abroad

RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for November-December 2024 ↑

Events of nuclear diplomacy ↑

In the first week of November a rotation took place of IAEA teams at Ukraine’s nuclear plants – the occupied ZNPP, and also at the operating Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine and Rivne NPPs.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted that the Agency’s missions at nuclear sites of Ukraine assess their nuclear safety and security, provide relevant information to the public and the international community, and also deliver a comprehensive program of technical support and assistance to Ukraine that includes nuclear safety and security-related equipment, as well as expertise, advice and medical assistance.

“We will stay at these sites for as long as it is needed to help avert the threat of a nuclear accident that could have serious consequences for human health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond. As the nuclear safety and security situation remains highly challenging, our experts are continuing to play a crucial stabilizing role at all these facilities,” Grossi said.

Later, on 13 November, Grossi confirmed these intentions: “We will continue to be there until the conflict comes to a new phase, at least less combat and maybe a ceasefire – no, a frozen conflict, whatever phase we enter into, but without this looming threat.”

IAEA representatives at the Chernobyl NPP site (ambulances being delivered as part of the program for comprehensive support), 19 November 2024. Credit: Fredrik Dahl / IAEA

The Russian Federation responded sharply, in the characteristic language of the Russian Foreign Ministry, to this statement by the IAEA Director General, calling Grossi’s comments on the duration of the Agency’s representatives’ stay unacceptable, outrageous, and beyond the organization’s authority. According to Russia, the experts are present at the ZNPP exclusively with the consent of the Russian government and will remain there as long as Russia deems their presence justified. Their task, Russia emphasized, is to report “Ukrainian provocations against the NPP and its staff.”

The Ukrainian operator Energoatom called these threats another act of Russian nuclear terrorism, emphasizing that the presence of IAEA international experts at the ZNPP and other nuclear power plants in Ukraine is the result of agreements between Ukraine and the IAEA aimed at ensuring continuous monitoring and preventing possible incidents.

On 10 December, during the rotation of IAEA teams at the ZNPP, a drone hit an armored IAEA vehicle. There were two people in the vehicle, who were both unharmed, but the rear of the vehicle was destroyed. The vehicle was in a convoy moving towards the handover point on the frontline to meet the IAEA team that had been stationed at the ZNPP for the past month.

The vehicle from the IAEA convoy hit by the drone. Screenshot from IAEA video

On 12 December, Grossi announced that despite the attack during the rotation of teams stationed at the ZNPP, the IAEA remains committed to maintaining a presence at the plant, to help prevent a nuclear accident during the military conflict.

Grossi stated that the drone hit a vehicle with a clearly visible IAEA logo, and that the model used was designed to explode on impact, leaving no discernible debris to be recovered for an investigation into the incident.

“Whoever did this knew exactly what was being done. It was our vehicle that was hit. There was a clear intention to intimidate us. But we will not be intimidated by this brazen and deplorable attack. We will stay as long as it is needed and continue our indispensable work,” Grossi said.

Russia called the incident a Ukrainian provocation ahead of the extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors convened on December 12 at Ukraine’s initiative. During the session, Russia’s representative to international organizations in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, stated that the incident raised concerns about ensuring the safety of IAEA experts during group rotations at the ZNPP and suggested considering a safer route — through Russian territory.

TASS reported Grossi as saying that there are no plans to reconsider the route for the expert team: “We have a system, it works quite clearly with the full agreement of both sides — Russia and Ukraine — and we will continue to work this way.”

Events at the ZNPP ↑

On 13 November, as part of a working visit to Enerhodar, the first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration Sergey Kiriyenko visited the ZNPP. Kiriyenko met with ZNPP representatives and discussed issues related to the current state of the ZNPP, ensuring its nuclear safety, as well as measures jointly taken with the Enerhodar’s municipality to improve the resilience of the energy and heating supply system of Enerhodar.

On November 20, it was announced that a new general director had been appointed to the JSK Operating Organization of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (EO ZNPP) — Ramil Galiev, who replaced Oleg Romanenko. Galiev had previously held the position of director of the Department of Safety Control and Production at the Concern Rosenergoatom. (The ZNPP administration notes that Yury Chernychuk remains the director of the ZNPP itself, and that the JSK EO ZNPP is required to ensure the safe operation of the plant and the professional activity of its personnel.)

Yury Chernychuk and Ramil Galiev. Credit: Strana Rosatom

Nuclear Supervision of the Russian Federation) issued a license to the ZNPP for the operation of radiation sources. Yuri Chernychuk commented that this is the first Russian license received by the plant.

On 25 December, Galiev announced that he plans to transition the ZNPP to the standard organizational structure of Rosenergoatom NPPs. Another task is to prepare the units for power generation mode. According to him, a package of documents is currently being prepared for Rostekhnadzor to obtain a license for the operation of the first unit, followed by the remaining five units.

“As soon as the situation allows and a corresponding decision is made, we will put the units of the ZNPP into operation.” He also stated that in order to replenish water reserves in the ZNPP cooling pond, where the water level is continuously decreasing, a decision has been made to manufacture new pumping station equipment and install it in the Dnipro riverbed.

On 29 December, Kiriyenko visited the ZNPP again to discuss the results of the year and the plans for the station’s development. The meeting was attended by Ramil Galiev and ZNPP director Yuri Chernychuk. It was announced that 2025, in addition to ensuring the safety of the NPP, the second priority is to transition ZNPP to generation mode: “We must start preparing for the fastest possible launch of all six units.”

The technical state of the ZNPP ↑

On 2 November unit 1 was returned to cold shutdown mode after a leak discovered on October 31 on one of the impulse lines was repaired. Experts have received confirmation that all six units would remain in cold shutdown throughout the winter period, with heating provided by on-site boilers. In the first week of December, IAEA experts were informed that gamma radiography conducted at around 30 other locations on Unit 1 revealed another worn-out welded seam, which was not yet leaking but was also repaired.

In early November, experts were informed that the operation of two backup transformers had been resumed after successful high-voltage testing at the end of October. The maintenance of the remaining four backup transformers is planned to be completed by the end of 2024.

In the first half of November, maintenance work was carried out on the water regulation valves of one of the three safety trains on units 4 and 5. Following that, one more safety train from each unit was taken out of service for scheduled maintenance. In early December, work began on elements of the safety systems of units 2, 3, and 6. The work on units 2 and 6 was completed by the end of December.

In the first week of December, the IAEA team at the ZNPP was informed that the voltage stabilizer for the ” Dniprovska” 750 kV power line at the open switchyard outside the plant, had been automatically disconnected by the activation of a protection mechanism. It was confirmed that the connection itself was not affected, and that the stabilizer was undergoing repairs, with plans to return it to operation by the end of December.

On 30 December, Energoatom reported that from November 23, the occupiers tried to repair the demages shunt reactor of the 750 kV Dniprovska line, which stabilizes voltage and is installed at the 750 kV switchyard of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. They had twice unsuccessfully tried to bring it back into operation.

In January 2025, representatives of the IAEA at the Zaporizhzhia NPP were informed that the voltage stabilizer (note – shunt reactor) had been successfully reconnected after repairs on 31 December.

In December, IAEA experts reported that three new mobile diesel generators had appeared by the turbine buildings of three reactor units (in addition to the 20 fixed emergency diesel generators that are designed to provide on-site power, in case of a total loss of off-site power, and another seven mobile diesel generators received by the ZNPP in late 2022 which are currently disconnected and not in use). The IAEA team was informed that these generators comply with the regulations of the Russian Federation, as part of post-Fukushima Daiichi accident measures, and in addition to those previously implemented by Ukraine. They will be used in case of a blackout in addition to the fixed emergency generators.

The IAEA team was informed that on 18 December the circulation pump of unit 4 was switched off. It was used to maintain the water level in the cooling pond, pumping water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels. The ZNPP confirmed that water from the 11 groundwater wells is sufficiently feeding the sprinkler ponds that provide cooling to the six reactors in cold shutdown.

From 20-22 December and from 24-25 December the sole functioning 330 kV back-up power line at the ZNPP was disconnected for maintenance.

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by IAEA experts ↑

In November and December, the updates from the Agency did not provide detailed descriptions of walkdowns conducted by the IAEA team at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. They only reported that the team continues to carry out inspections across the entire station site and monitor technical maintenance (see above). Additionally, we may note that:

From 1-7 November, the reactor and containment of Unit 4, as well as several emergency diesel generators of Units 1 and 5, were inspected.
In the first two weeks of November, experts visited the turbine halls of Units 1-4 (without access to their western parts).

In November, for “security reasons,” experts were denied access to the central warehouse and diesel fuel storage outside the station’s premises. For the same reason, in December, the planned visit to the 750 kV switchyard was cancelled (where the above-mentioned shunt reactor is being repaired).

The last information circular from Russia to the IAEA on 15 November, describing the “actual state of affairs” at the ZNPP (including what was shown to the IAEAM team) concerned events for the entire month of October (previously these messages were issued weekly, like the IAEA updates). The Russian permanent mission to international organizations did not provide any more information for November and December. Besides the above mentioned INFCIRC/1259 of 15 November, there was only one Russian report, INFCIRC/1266 of 13 December, with a letter from the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the attack on an IAEA vehicle (see above).

Military threats at the ZNPP ↑

IAEA experts at the ZNPP regularly reported throughout November and December 2024 that they heard frequent explosions at varying distances, sometimes daily. However, no damage to the plant was reported.

On 16 and 21 November, the ZNPP was left without power from its primary 750 kV line, relying instead on a single backup 330 kV line. This was caused by Russian shelling, which damaged one of the power lines on the right bank of the Dnipro River in Ukrainian-controlled territory. On November 30, the backup 330 kV line was disconnected for two days.

Military threats at other nuclear sites in Ukraine ↑

On 7 November, Ukraine’s State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate informed the IAEA that the Central Storage Facility for Spent Fuel, located within the exclusion zone of the Chernobyl NPP, had lost off-site power for two hours and relied on emergency diesel generators for electricity during this time. On 11 November, two units at the Rivne NPP, both units at the Khmelnytsky NPP and all three units of the South Ukraine NPP temporarily reduced their power output as a preventive measure as a result of military activities.

Throughout November and December 2024, IAEA teams at the three operational Ukrainian plants reported frequent air raid alerts. Numerous drones and missiles were detected in the vicinity of NPP sites. In December, IAEA members at the Khmelnytsky NPP had to take shelter several times. (This is mentioned in every IAEA update during this period, as well as in Ukraine’s information circulars for IAEA members INFCIRC/1258 and INFCIRC/1267).

On 25 December, the nuclear subcritical neutron source facility at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology was without external power for five hours, relying on an emergency diesel generator during this time (as we wrote earlier, at the beginning of the war the installation was switched to a deep subcritical state, and contains only a small amount of radioactive material).

Attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ↑

Russia continues to launch mass attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 17 November, Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants — Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and South Ukraine — reduced their production capacity as a precautionary measure. These plants were not directly affected and did not cease operations; however, according to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, several substations critical to the plants’ functioning were damaged. The main power lines from four substations were disconnected, and two 330 kV power lines at Rivne NPP were rendered unavailable.

The IAEA notes that the functioning of energy infrastructure directly affects nuclear safety, as nuclear power plants require grid connections not only to transmit the electricity they generate but also to receive external power for reactor cooling.

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 20, Grossi recalled that following a similar attack in late August, an IAEA expert team inspected several substations identified as crucial for nuclear safety. During these inspections (in September at the Kyiv substation and in October at six others), extensive damage was documented, and it was concluded that the network’s capacity to provide reliable external power to Ukrainian nuclear power plants had significantly decreased. Ukraine carried out repair work and implemented additional protective measures, but four of these substations were damaged again by shelling on November 17.

On 25 November, an independent UN experts’ statement was published, warning that Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s power system pose a threat of nuclear disaster. The statement said that on October 22, 2024, 13 UN special rapporteurs and working groups had addressed the Russian government, emphasizing that attacks on energy infrastructure vital for the survival of the civilian population are prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The United Kingdom made a similar statement at the OSCE meeting in Vienna on November 7. The statement also said: “We have also heard Russia threaten Ukraine in this room that it could turn off 75% of its remaining electricity by hitting just five targets. This could only be a reference to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Such threats are unacceptable. As is the risk to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants of an unreliable power supply due to Russia’s sustained attacks against Ukraine’s grid.”

On 28 November, as a result of another large-scale Russian attack, the three operating Ukrainian nuclear power plants had to reduce their output again as a precautionary measure. At the Rivne NPP, one reactor was disconnected from the grid, and the Khmelnitsky NPP lost the connection to two of its power lines (off-site electricity supply to all stations was not interrupted). No direct damage to the nuclear plants was reported, but the strikes once again affected crucial electrical substations necessary for nuclear safety. By December 5, the power capacity of the plants had been gradually restored, although some of the off-site power lines used for both receiving and transmitting electricity were still disconnected.

On 12 December, at Ukraine’s request, an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors was held to discuss the consequences of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The resolution adopted following the meeting highlights that the attacks violate one of the “seven indispensable pillars” of safety defined by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, specifically the requirement to ensure reliable external power supply for all nuclear facilities. It calls on the IAEA to continue assessing the risks and extent of damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including substations identified as necessary for maintaining nuclear safety and protection, and urges member states to continue providing political, financial, and technical support to strengthen IAEA’s activities in Ukraine.

During the meeting, Russian representative Mikhail Ulyanov stated that the topic of discussion was not related to nuclear safety, as IAEA safety requirements for nuclear plants do not prioritize the power supply, since disruptions in the electricity grid should not threaten the operation of nuclear power plants. He emphasized that nuclear plants have emergency power sources, safety system channels, and passive emergency cooling systems. His statement also emphasized that assessing the energy infrastructure goes beyond the Agency’s mandate.

The resolution was adopted with 22 votes in favor, 2 votes against, and 10 abstentions.

On the following day, 13 December, Russia again launched a massive strike on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Five reactors at the three operating Ukrainian nuclear power plants reduced their power output once again, and two others continued operating at reduced capacity after the attack on November 28 (total power generation from Ukrainian nuclear plants was reduced by 2.5 GW). Air raid sirens were heard at all nuclear power plants, and military objects were spotted flying approximately 300 meters from the South Ukraine NPP.

From 16-23 December, IAEA experts visited seven critical substations essential for the safe operation of nuclear power plants (not only the three operational ones, but also the ZNPP and the Chernobyl NPP), where they documented damage and collected evidence highlighting the vulnerability of the power grid due to Russian attacks. During the mission, the team met with experts from Ukrenergo, Energoatom, and the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate. Drawing on information from this mission and two previous substation assessments, the IAEA will work on targeted technical assistance to prevent a nuclear accident.

On 25 December, Russia launched another massive strike on Ukraine’s energy sector, causing several reactor units to reduce their output for several hours.

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Slovakia stockpiles Russian nuclear fuel ↑

14 November. The Slovakian energy company Slovenské elektrárne, operator of the Mochovce and Bohunice nuclear power plants, has taken the opportunity to stockpile Russian-produced nuclear fuel. The existing fuel reserves in Slovakia are sufficient for the next two and a half years, but Slovenské elektrárne will continue purchasing fuel under the contract with Rosatom’s fuel company TVEL, which has been in effect since 2019. The contract is set to expire in 2026, but it includes an option for extension until 2030.

The director of Slovenské elektrárne stated earlier in July this year, that Slovakia intends to exhaust this contract. In November, Slovakia’s Minister of Economy, Denisa Saková, announced that the energy company had taken advantage of the contract extension and would be able to secure nuclear fuel supplies for the next six years.

The Slovak company has signed agreements for alternative fuel supplies with Westinghouse and Framatome, but the fuel from both companies will not be used at Slovak nuclear power plants until 2027. Moreover, Framatome plans to supply fuel under a Russian license during the first few years of deliveries.

Mochovce NPP, Slovakia (VVER-440 Reactors). Credit: Slovenské elektrárne

Commentary by Bellona:

Westinghouse to conduct safety analysis for licensing fuel for Kozloduy NPP ↑

On 20 December, the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria signed a contract with Westinghouse Electric Company to conduct a safety analysis for licensing a new design of nuclear fuel assemblies compatible with the design of the resident fuel for Unit 6 of the plant.

Previously, realizing its goal to diversify nuclear fuel suppliers, Kozloduy NPP signed a contract for the supply of nuclear fuel for Unit 5 with Westinghouse, with the first batch being loaded in June 2024. For Unit 6, which uses a different modification of Russian fuel compared to Unit 5, the plant signed a supply contract with Framatome. The first partial loading of French fuel (to be produced at the plant in Lingen, Germany, under Rosatom’s license) was initially planned for the autumn of 2025.

Commentary by Bellona:

USA and UK extend cooperation in developing fourth-generation nuclear technologies, with Russia no longer participating ↑

During the COP-29 conference in Baku, the United Kingdom and the United States signed a new framework agreement on 18 November, which will allow them to continue their cooperation within the Generation IV International Forum, initiated in 2000 and officially registered in mid-2001.

The goal of the forum is to support the exchange of information on advanced nuclear technologies necessary to test the feasibility and performance of Generation IV nuclear systems, and to make them available for industrial use by 2030. Six technological concepts were identified for potential development: gas-cooled fast reactor, lead-cooled fast reactor, molten salt reactor, sodium-cooled fast reactor, supercritical water-cooled reactor, and very high-temperature reactor.

Currently, the alliance includes 13 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as Euratom, representing the 27 members of the European Union.

The United States and the United Kingdom became the first two countries to sign the new Framework Agreement. Once a third country signs it, the agreement will officially come into effect on March 1, 2025. Other member countries will have three years to pass the agreement through their national decision-making bodies if they wish to continue participating in the forum’s activities.

Under the new agreement, the Generation IV International Forum will no longer include Russia, which had been a member since 2009, in order to “ensuring future collaborations remain among mutually willing parties who respect nuclear safety norms.”

BN-800 reactor with sodium coolant at Unit 4 of the Beloyarsk NPP, operating on uranium and plutonium MOX fuel (in operation since 2015). Credit: Rosatom

Commentary by Bellona:

Romania plans to resume uranium mining ↑

On 21 November, the Romanian government approved the country’s energy strategy for 2025–2035, which includes the resumption of uranium mining.

It is reported that the Tulgheș-Grințieș deposit will be developed. The concession license for uranium mining activities at this deposit was granted to the Romanian energy company Societatea Națională Nuclearelectrica (SNN) in 2021 to consolidate the nuclear fuel cycle. Investors are expected to be involved in the development.

Currently, SNN, which also operates the two CANDU reactor units at the Cernavodă NPP, owns a uranium conversion plant in Feldioara and a fuel fabrication plant for CANDU reactors in Pitești. The uranium concentrate for these facilities is imported.

Earlier, Romania mined uranium at the Crucea-Botușana deposit, but production ceased in 2021 after the deposit was depleted.

Cernavodă NPP, Romania. Credit: Nuclearelectrica

Commentary by Bellona:

US determines potential domestic suppliers of low-enriched uranium ↑

On 10 December, the US Department of Energy announced that it has selected six companies for potential contracts to supply low-enriched uranium (LEU) as part of efforts to stimulate the development of new uranium production capacity within the country. (The request for proposals for purchasing LEU was announced in June 2024.)

These companies are American Centrifuge Operating (a subsidiary of Centrus), General Matter, Global Laser Enrichment, Louisiana Energy Services (operator of Urenco USA’s centrifuge enrichment plant), Laser Isotope Separation Technologies, and Orano Federal Services (a division of Orano USA). The Department of Energy plans to purchase LEU under these contracts produced from new domestic sources — at new facilities or through projects expanding existing capacities. The contracts will be concluded for terms of up to 10 years, with a minimum value of $2 million and a maximum total value of all contracts reaching $3.4 billion.

Four of these companies (American Centrifuge Operating, General Matter, Louisiana Energy Services, and Orano Federal Services) were selected in October as potential suppliers of HALEU enrichment and storage services.

We may also note that on 18 December, the Department of Energy announced the allocation of $80 million to support industry partners developing innovative technologies and approaches to strengthen the HALEU supply chain in the United States. The funding will support demonstration projects on an engineering or pilot scale, as well as early-stage applied research and development projects.

Commentary by Bellona:

Negotiations on NPP construction in Kazakhstan ↑

Following the referendum on 6 October that approved the decision to build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, and reports that Kazakhstan intends to entrust the construction to an international consortium, negotiations with representatives of countries whose projects were shortlisted back in 2019 have intensified. These include China’s CNNC (HPR-1000 reactor), Rosatom (VVER-1200 and VVER-1000 reactors), South Korea’s KHNP (APR-1400 reactor), and France’s EDF (EPR1200 reactor).

In October 2024, meetings were held in South Korea at the ministerial level and in France, where Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev paid a state visit. The uncertainty regarding the selection of the main participants in the future consortium, along with the high likelihood of Rosatom’s involvement in some capacity, prompts us to closely monitor this negotiation process, without providing detailed commentary for the moment.

On 14 November, Kazakhstan Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev. According to the press release, one of the topics discussed was cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. (The publication Orda.kz believes this confirms the October rumors that following the referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, Rosatom requested a meeting with President Tokayev or Olzhas Bektenov on either 28 October or 14 November.)

On 27 November, talks were held between Tokayev and Putin, who was visiting Kazakhstan on a state visit. According to Likhachev, who accompanied Putin, the issue of NPP construction was discussed in both the closed and extended parts of the negotiations. Likhachev also believes that only Russia has the ability to assemble large international consortiums for the construction of nuclear power plants.

On 29 November, a meeting took place between the CEO of Kazakhstan Atomic Power Stations Timur Zhantikin and the Chief Economist of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Huang Mingang. The meeting focused on bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, with the main point being the discussion of collaboration on the nuclear power plant construction project in Kazakhstan, including issues related to site selection and securing funding.

From 4-6 December a Kazakh delegation led by Minister of Energy Almasadam Satkaliyev made a working visit to France. Negotiations were held with French organizations in the nuclear industry, including the energy generation company and operator of nuclear power plants EDF, the developer and manufacturer of nuclear power plant equipment Framatome, as well as the supplier of turbine equipment for nuclear power plants Arabelle Solutions.

In addition, a meeting was held with the international consulting company Assystem, specializing in engineering services, project management, and digital solutions for complex infrastructure projects, including nuclear power plants.

We should note that on 3 January, Tokaev stated that the issue of the international consortium was discussed during Putin’s visit, and that “it was agreed that the Kazakh side would be the main operator in the consortium” and that “the project related to the construction of nuclear power plants may involve the company Rosatom, which has extensive experience working in foreign countries and possesses high qualifications,” but the achievements of China in the construction of civilian nuclear facilities are also being considered, and negotiations are ongoing with them as well.

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Russia places restrictions on uranium export to USA ↑

On 14 November, Russia imposed temporary restrictions on the export of enriched uranium to the United States or under foreign trade contracts concluded with entities registered in the U.S. Exceptions will be made for supplies under individual licenses issued by the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control in cases where this is in Russia’s interests. According to the current wording of the decree, this ban (along with the ban on the export of several other goods) will remain in effect until the end of 2025. Rosatom commented that the implementation of uranium product supplies to other countries will continue without changes.

It is stated that this decision was made in response to the restrictions imposed by the U.S. in May on the import of Russian enriched uranium, with a complete ban set for 2028.

The American company Centrus, a reseller of Russian LEU, received permission from the US Department of Energy in July to import Russian LEU in 2024 and 2025.

After the restrictions imposed by Russian authorities, Centrus reported that on November 18, Tenex, a subsidiary of Rosatom and the largest supplier of low-enriched uranium to the company, notified them that its general export license for uranium products had been revoked. Tenex will now need to obtain a special export license for each shipment to Centrus. The Russian company stated that it plans to request the necessary licenses in a timely manner to fulfill its contractual obligations, but cannot guarantee that they will be issued or issued on time.

According to Centrus, if Tenex is unable to obtain export licenses, it will affect the company’s ability to meet its supply commitments to customers.

Commentary by Bellona:

Rosatom to withdrawn from several joint uranium producing enterprises in Kazakhstan ↑

On 17 December, Kazatomprom reported that the Rosatom subsidiary Uranium One Group had sold part of its assets in Kazakhstan to Chinese companies—specifically, a 49.979% stake in the joint venture Zarechnoye to Astana Mining Company Limited, the ultimate beneficiary of which is State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Company. As of the beginning of 2024, uranium reserves at the deposit being developed by this joint venture amounted to about 3,500 tons of uranium, with extraction planned to be finished in 2028.

According to some estimates, the deal could have amounted to $300–400 million, while others suggest it could have been $400–500 million.

It is also expected that 30% of Rosatom’s stake in SP Khorasan-U (with uranium reserves of 33,000 tons and an operating life until 2038) and 30% of its stake in Kyzylkum (which does not have any mining rights and only provides uranium processing services) will be sold to China Uranium Development Company Limited, the ultimate beneficiary of which is China General Nuclear Power Corporation.

Kazatomprom, along with Uranium One Group, still has several joint ventures. These include the joint venture Karatau at site 2 of the Budennovskoye deposit, the joint venture Akbastau developing sites 1, 3, and 4 of the Budennovskoye deposit, and the joint venture Budennovskoye for sites 6 and 7. (The mining rights to site 5 of the Budennovskoye deposit belong solely to Kazatomprom.)

In addition, they are co-owners of the South Mining and Chemical Company – Kazatomprom holds 30%, while Uranium One Group holds 70%.

Commentary by Bellona:

Russia withdraws from international agreement on multilateral nuclear and environmental program in the Russian Federation ↑

On December 28, Russia denounced the framework agreement on the multilateral nuclear and environmental program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR agreement) and the related protocols. The bill for denunciation was submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on November 22. The explanatory note to the bill states that cooperation under the MNEPR agreement was effectively suspended as early as 2015–2017.

The MNEPR agreement was signed in 2003. The signatories were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK, the US (which did not join the Protocol), the European Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. The goal of the agreement was to cooperate in ensuring the safety of handling spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in the Russian Federation during the disposal of decommissioned nuclear submarines and nuclear-powered service vessels in northwest Russia. A key part of the cooperation was the environmental rehabilitation of the former naval bases of the Russian Navy in Andreeva Bay and the settlement of Gremikha. The project was financed by France, the EU, Germany, the UK, Canada, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.

More details about the purpose of the MNEPR agreement, what was accomplished as part of it, and what still remains to be done in the Norwegian, Barents and Kara Seas and other areas can be found in the Bellona article, “We wanted Norway to stay in the projects until the very end.”

Last spent nuclear fuel removed from Gremikha ↑

On December 2, Rosatom reported that in November, the removal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the coastal technical base of the Northern Fleet in Gremikha had been completed. The last set of spent fuel elements (SFE) with uranium-beryllium fuel from the reactor of a nuclear submarine with a liquid-metal coolant was dismantled and sent for reprocessing at the Mayak Production Association. In total, the dismantling and removal of all SFEs took more than ten years. The project for rehabilitation was funded by the international community, with significant contributions from France (which is not mentioned in Rosatom’s press release).

According to Vasily Tinin, Director of State Policy in the Field of Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel, and Nuclear and Radiation Hazardous Objects at Rosatom, there is currently only one SNF storage facility left in the Russian part of the Barents Sea – in Andreeva Bay, from where more than half of the SNF has already been removed. The removal work is planned to be fully completed by the end of this decade.

The last batch of spent nuclear fuel is removed from the coastal technical base of the Russian Navy in the closed administrative-territorial entity of Ostrovnoy (village of Gremikha). Credit: Northwest Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Federal State Unitary Enterprise RADON).

Commentary by Bellona:

Nuclear icebreaker fleet construction ↑

On 18 December Kommersant newspaper reported that Rosatom is proposing the introduction of a new Arctic investment levy for shippers of the Northern Sea Route starting in 2028. The fee would be charged as a surcharge for icebreaker escort through the eastern sector of the NSR. The state corporation hopes that this will help fund the construction of icebreakers, as the company currently lacks sufficient funds to complete them.

The publication writes that shippers are already complaining about the rising tariffs for icebreaker escort, so the prospect of further increases is even less appealing to them. It is also noted that only the super-powerful icebreaker of the Leader project (Rossiya) is being built entirely with budget funds. Icebreakers of the 22220 project are being built on a mixed scheme: 50% from the budget and 50% from off-budget sources. Four new non-nuclear icebreakers are proposed to be built entirely from off-budget sources.

On 20 December, the keel-laying ceremony for the multifunctional nuclear service vessel (MSATO) of project 22770, named the “Vladimir Vorobyev”, took place at the Baltic Shipyard. The construction contract was signed in May 2023, with commissioning planned for 2029. Although the development plan for the Northern Sea Route up to 2035 indicated the project timeline as 2023–2027, this plan has not been updated since its approval in August 2022, except for amendments made in April 2023 regarding the search for new suppliers of essential components for icebreakers due to anti-Russian sanctions.

On 13 December, at the 14^th International Forum “The Arctic: Present and Future,” Ignaty Vodennikov, Technical Director of the Baltic Shipyard, spoke about the construction of the nuclear icebreaker fleet. He noted that sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022 have affected the 22220 series, particularly the “Yakutia”. Equipment ordered from European manufacturers was never delivered, and issues arose with the commissioning of components already delivered to the shipyard.

Vodennikov noted that as part of the import substitution program, Russian-made products have replaced coatings, insulation materials, forgings and castings (shafts and propellers), fire suppression systems, special energy materials, general ship system components (pumps, filters), stern tube bearings and cooling systems, main thrust bearings, and elevator equipment. Despite these difficulties, the Baltic Shipyard has remained on schedule. Construction of the Leningrad icebreaker is underway on the slipway, while the Chukotka is being outfitted at the completion quay, with delivery expected in 2026. The final two icebreakers of the 22220 series are planned for completion in 2028 and 2030.

The Yakutia nuclear icebreaker. Credit: Rosatom

On 28 December the state flag was raised on the Yakutia nuclear icebreaker. Its construction took 4.5 years.

As for the lead nuclear icebreaker of the 10510 Leader project, it was reported at the above-mentioned forum that it will be able to operate in the Northern Sea Route in 2030, which already differs from the originally planned schedule.

On 23 December the ship Ursa Major which was sailing from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok sank in international waters between Spain and Algeria. The ship was transporting two large port cranes and two 45-ton top of the two reactors for the nuclear icebreaker Rossiya.

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in Rosatom projects abroad ↑

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On 4 November, a ” melt trap” was delivered to the construction site of Unit 4 of the nuclear power plant, and its installation began on November 19. (The melt localization devices for Units 1 and 2 were installed in 2023, and for Unit 3 in 2024.)

On November 23, a law came into effect ratifying the protocol to the agreement on providing Egypt with a state export loan for the construction of the El Dabaa nuclear power plant, originally dated November 19, 2015. The protocol extends the loan utilization and repayment period by two years and exempts the debtor from paying accrued penalty interest, provided that the accumulated interest debt since March 2022 is repaid on time. Implementing the protocol will enable Egypt to resume servicing the loan, repay overdue debt currently totaling approximately $185 million, and allow Russia to resume project financing using state credit funds.

Assembly of the melt trap at Unit 4 of the El-Dabaa NPP. Credit: Rosatom engineering division

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. Bangladesh and Russia continue negotiations on repayments for the loan provided by Russia for the construction of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. In September we wrote that Bangladesh was ready to make payments, with approximately $809 million accumulated in a designated deposit account at the Bangladesh Bank. However, a secure and seamless payment method has yet to be found. Russia proposed payments through a Chinese bank in yuan, but Bangladesh rejected this option, considering it legally inconvenient at the international level.

In November, reports indicated that Russia was pressuring Bangladesh to open a branch of a Russian bank in Dhaka (a clause allegedly included in the loan agreement) to facilitate fund transfers for debt repayment either directly to Russia or under its control. However, both countries failed to reach an agreement on this proposal.

On December 5, another solution was announced: a foreign currency account in the name of the Russian government would be opened at the local branch of the state-owned Sonali Bank in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where loan repayments would be deposited. However, the proposed account at Sonali Bank will handle future payments, while the funds already accumulated in the deposit account at the Bangladesh Bank will not be transferred to the Russian account. The Bangladeshi government has already agreed to start the account opening process, while Russia is still considering the proposal.

The total estimated cost of the Rooppur project is $12.65 billion, of which 90% ($11.38 billion) is financed by the Russian government in the form of a loan, while the remaining 10% is provided by the Bangladeshi government. However, as of August 14 this year, Russia had allocated $7.33 billion to Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, the Anti-Corruption Commission began an investigation in December into allegations of corruption, embezzlement, and money laundering related to the Rooppur nuclear power plant project. According to the commission’s report, the ousted Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, her son, and her niece are accused of embezzling $5 billion from an inflated project cost of $12.65 billion.

Rosatom called the allegations of embezzlement in the construction of the nuclear power plant project false and stated its readiness to “defend its reputation” in court.

Regarding the technical aspects of construction, on 18 December, Rosatom announced: “We have entered the final stage of preparing the first power unit for physical startup.” This phase involves testing the functionality of equipment and mechanisms, including the initial launch and trial operation of the main circulation pumps. “

In addition, we may note that Rosatom had hoped to achieve the physical startup of Unit 1 in December 2024 (this was mentioned in August 2024).

Kudankulam NPP, India. On 30 November, Russia and India ratified agreements related to credit arrangements originally signed in December 2023. These agreements provide for debt restructuring, outlining procedures for repayment and servicing obligations in Russian rubles.

In early 2024, Russia and India discussed the possibility of accelerating the construction of the second phase of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (Units 3 and 4). Additionally, in January 2024, Likhachev stated that Unit 3 would definitely be commissioned that year, along with Unit 1 of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh.

Details about the progress of the construction of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant can be found in the Bellona article “Despite challenges at Kudankulam project, India and Russia likely to deepen civilian nuclear cooperation.”

Paks-2 NPP, Hungary. On November 29, Hungary’s National Atomic Energy Agency (Országos Atomenergia Hivatal, OAH) passed a resolution allowing the construction of NPP units to begin.

Hungary’s atomic regulator granted approval for the installation of Units 5 and 6 back in August 2022 but included hold points for future operations. One such point required the submission of an updated preliminary safety report. Paks-2 submitted the report in November 2022, followed by several revisions. OAH has now lifted this hold point, allowing work on the first concrete pour to commence once the necessary permits are secured, marking the start of construction on the reactor island for the unit.

Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, stated that the country expects to begin pouring the first concrete at the start of 2025.

Akuuyu NPP, Turkey. On 11 November, the concreting of the dome section of the outer containment dome for the reactor building of Unit 1 was completed (the metal components of the dome were installed in two phases in August and September).

On December 12, the turbine installation for Unit 1 was completed. The event marking this milestone was attended by Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev and Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar.

Xudapu NPP, China. At Unit 4 of the Xudapu Nuclear Power Plant, which is being constructed with Rosatom’s involvement, a reactor vessel was installed under the technical supervision of representatives from Rosatom’s Engineering Division.

Recommended publications ↑

The report “The IAEA’s Role in Times of War” by Bellona expert Alexander Nikitin is available on Bellona’s website. The report provides a survey of the agency’s structure and capabilities while analyzing the limitations of its influence on current challenges, particularly the threats to nuclear facilities in Ukraine. An online presentation of the report including a Q&A session took place on 23 January. A recording of the event is available on Bellona’s YouTube channel.

Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin on the unraveling of environmental agreements with Russia — this article is the transcripting of a podcast with Alexander Nikitin about Russia’s withdrawal from the environmental agreement on the Soviet nuclear legacy was posted on Bellona’s website on 12 February.

The article “This German Town Could Decide the Future of EU Reliance on Russian Nuclear Fuel” by Bellona expert Dmitry Gorchakov, was published in The Moscow Times. It analyzes the situation surrounding the nuclear fuel plant in the German town of Lingen and highlights its crucial role in Europe’s efforts to phase out nuclear fuel imports from Russia.

Bellona hosted a side event “The Russian Arctic During the War: Current Situation and Forecasts” at the Arctic Frontiers 2025 international conference in Tromsø, Norway. A video recording of the event is available on our website.

The post Bellona Nuclear Digest. November-December 2024 appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Bellona’s Comment on the Military Drone Strike at Chernobyl reactor shield 14 Feb 3:06 AM (2 months ago)

A military drone with a high-explosive warhead struck the former Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine overnight, damaging a protective shelter that prevents radiation leaks at the plant’s destroyed fourth reactor unit, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said on Friday.

In a post on social media, Zelensky called the damage “significant” but said that there were no signs of increased radiation at the plant, the site of the worst nuclear accident in history. Denys Shmyhal, the Ukrainian prime minister, said Friday morning that emergency crews had extinguished a fire at the site. A Kremlin spokesman denied that Russia had attacked the plant.

The structure that was damaged — called the New Safe Confinement — was installed with EU to seal in vast quantities of radioactive isotopes from the fire and meltdown in 1986 at Chernobyl’s Reactor No. 4, and was intended to last generations. The enormous dome — which is the world’s largest movable land-based structure — was installed in 2016 to augment the ad-hoc cement sarcophagus installed by the disaster’s original liquidators, and which began to fail in 2005.

According to inspectors from the IAEA mission on-site, there are no signs of internal structural damage, and radiation levels inside and outside the structure remain normal. No casualties have been reported.

“A drone or missile strike on the new protective shell could potentially damage or collapse the structures of the old sarcophagus inside,” Dmitry Gorchakov, a nuclear advisor at Bellona Environmental Transparency Center, said.

The shield of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant after it was hit by a drone. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine

The engine of the drone hit the Chernobyl NPP. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine

The new 108-meter-high structure, resembling an enormous airplane hangar and built to last 100 years, is the main radiation shield protecting the Chernobyl personnel who are working to decommission the remains of No 4 reactor — which still includes enormous blobs of melted-down, highly radioactive uranium fuel mixed with cement and steel. It also encloses high-tech robotic devices that perform dismantlement tasks that are too dangerous for humans to undertake.

“A potential full penetration of the new confinement and damage to the old sarcophagus could lead to the collapse of aging structures, the release of radioactive dust, and its dispersion beyond the protective shell through the resulting breach,” said Gorchakov. “In this case, the drone pierced the outer cladding of the confinement, with its debris and engine — resembling the engine of a Shahed drone used by Russian forces—and lodged between the outer and inner layers of the New Safe Confinement without breaching the internal structure or damaging the old sarcophagus.”

Gorchakov’s appraisal was backed by reports from Ukrainian authorities. But the structure’s vulnerability to future attacks remains. It also remains unclear whether the structure was actually the target of the attack or was just collateral damage caused by an errant drone.

But Gorchakov warned that such an incident was only a matter of time given the Chernobyl site’s location below a flight path used for Russian attacks on Kyiv.

The shield of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant after it was hit by a drone. Photo: The engine of the drone. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine

Bellona has repeatedly warned of the risks of shelling and drone strikes on Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. Alexander Nikitin, a nuclear advisor at Bellona, believes that this time, people in the potential contamination zone were lucky. “But luck may not last forever,” he concludes.

The post Bellona’s Comment on the Military Drone Strike at Chernobyl reactor shield appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin on the unraveling of environmental agreements with Russia 13 Feb 4:36 AM (2 months ago)

The so-called Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) had since 2003 brought together financial and technical resources from some of Europe’s biggest economies, as well as institutions like the European Commission, to launch massive efforts to clean up decommissioned Soviet nuclear submarines and the irradiated bases in the Arctic that served them.

It had also broadly functioned as an instrument of hope by providing an arena where Russia and the West could come together and work to improve the environment for people on both sides of what used to be the Iron Curtain. The cooperative agreement had endured some of the most trying political disputes of the early 21^st century, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Even Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hadn’t officially killed it. But in a terse announcement late last year, Russian officials reported they had prepared a “denunciation” of the MNEPR, which facilitates Moscow’s withdrawal from the agreement—a legal necessity under Russian law given that the agreement was ratified by Russia’s parliament.

Earlier this year, Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin—who was instrumental in helping Europe and Russia direct much of the agreement’s funding—sat down with journalist Vladislav Gorin, who runs the What Happened podcast for Meduza, the independent Russian newspaper now published in exile from Riga, Latvia, to discuss what this agreement accomplished, and what it’s unraveling will mean. We’re grateful to Meduza for allowing us to publish this edited and translated transcript of their interview.

Vladislav Gorin – Which agreement is Russia withdrawing from now?

Alexander Nikitin – This is the so-called Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program, adopted and ratified by Russia in 2003. It is unfortunate that the country is leaving the program so easily now because we know how important it was for environmental protection efforts. In addition to this program, there were many other significant programs at the time of its development and ratification, which funded various projects aimed at eliminating the so-called nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union.

– What has been accomplished since the program was enacted in 2003?

The first program that was adopted was the so-called Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, also known as the Nunn–Lugar Program, initiated by U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. This was a massive program that began after the collapse of the Soviet Union and lasted until about 2010. It focused on eliminating excess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their delivery systems.

At the same time, there was another program known as the HEU-LEU Agreement or the “Megatons to Megawatts” program. This was negotiated between the U.S. and Russia in the late 1990s. Under this agreement, approximately 500 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were to be converted into low-enriched uranium (LEU) and used in nuclear power plants. The process was expected to take around twenty years—since it was signed in 1995, it was set to run until 2015.

Members of the Russian-Norwegian delegation, which included Bellona experts, during a tour of the technical base in Andreeva Bay. Photo: Nikita Petrov

Additionally, the G8 agreed on the so-called Global Partnership. In 2002, at the Kananaskis Summit in Canada, the G8 signed this agreement, often referred to as “10 plus 10 over 10.” Under this agreement, Russia received $20 billion—$10 billion contributed by the G8 countries and another $10 billion from the United States. In total, $20 billion was allocated over ten years to dismantle excess nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Why am I listing all of this? Because MNEPR, the agreement we are discussing today, was a crucial framework that encompassed all these programs. It allowed for the coordination of essential bureaucratic matters, such as tax procedures, nuclear safety regulations, and legal responsibilities, ensuring the effective execution of these programs and projects.

This was vital because bureaucracy functioned according to its own rigid rules on both sides. Without coordinating the procedures outlined in the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program, it was often impossible to utilize the allocated funds. For instance, $20 billion was secured under one program, $10 billion under the CTR program, and about $10 billion under the HEU-LEU program. These were enormous sums contributed by multiple countries, but their use was frequently hindered by the lack of agreed-upon procedures.

Another initiative was the “Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership”, which included a project called “The Nuclear Window.” This project specifically dealt with nuclear waste management, in addition to general environmental initiatives addressing water and conventional waste. The Nuclear Window focused on dismantling nuclear submarines, handling spent nuclear fuel, and managing radioactive waste storage sites in northern and eastern Russia. Contributions to this project came from Northern European countries and the European Commission, while the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development managed financial transactions.

However, for all these programs and projects to function, the MNEPR agreement was necessary. I haven’t even mentioned other agreements between, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The funds gathered through these initiatives had to be used according to the regulations of both donor countries and Russia. That’s why MNEPR was essential, and why it was eagerly awaited. Bellona, where I was already working at the time, closely monitored these agreements and helped initiate these programs, as environmentalists were deeply concerned about eliminating Russia’s nuclear legacy in the north.

MNEPR was adopted and ratified in Russia in 2003 and remained in effect. Some Russian media claim that it ended around 2017. However, the reality is different—it wasn’t just about funding running out (although some projects did face financial constraints as some countries left while others remained involved until 2022, when the war began). The real significance of MNEPR was in regulating procedural matters. That is what we now regret—the fact that Russia’s withdrawal has ended this regulatory framework.

Spent nuclear fuel in dry storage at Andreyeva Bay before remediation efforts began:Approximately 22,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies were stored here, some of which were damaged and thus resistant to disposal by conventional means. Photo: Bellona

Cleanup at Andreyeva Bay

-Why is Russia withdrawing? What does the explanatory note say? Should we blame Russia for this decision, considering the war and sanctions? Funding from Western countries for anything related to Russia would likely have been problematic anyway. Wouldn’t these projects have stopped regardless?

Some projects have indeed stopped, but others might have resumed in the future. The legacy we are dealing with still requires attention. For instance, there are still sites in northern Russia that need financial investments to complete cleanup operations.

For example, in Andreyev Bay, some spent nuclear fuel remains in an emergency storage facility, a well-known issue we have reported on extensively. We continue to monitor this site daily. Similarly, the Gremikha submarine base remains in limbo because several nuclear-hazardous facilities there have yet to be fully decommissioned and made safe.

However, our greatest concern is the sunken and submerged nuclear and radiological hazards.

Recently, we published a review examining the state of these hazardous objects before the war and predicting their future under the current circumstances—given the war, sanctions, and the withdrawal of international participants, leaving Russia to deal with them alone. According to our data, at least six sunken nuclear-hazardous objects remain—primarily nuclear submarine reactors still containing spent nuclear fuel. Ideally, these should be recovered.

Beyond that, there are 17,000 containers and various small vessels containing radioactive waste, which have been officially recorded as sunk. These must also be monitored. While they may not pose an immediate threat like spent nuclear fuel still inside reactors, ongoing observation and decision-making are necessary.

The Arctic and Northern Seas, where these objects are submerged, will always be of critical importance—regardless of the war, political situations, or any other circumstances. The Arctic will remain the Arctic.

Retrieving scuttled radioactive was and sunken nuclear subs

-Let’s discuss the 2011 report “Problems of Radiation Remediation in Arctic Seas: Solutions and Approaches.”Here’s an excerpt detailing what nuclear waste remains in Russia’s northern seas—left primarily from the Soviet Union—and the environmental burden inherited from that era:

“Currently, around 18,000 objects of varying degrees of radiation hazard lie on the seabed of the northwestern Arctic. Most of these were dumped during the Cold War and contain radioactive waste (RAW) from the operation of nuclear submarines of the Northern and icebreaker fleets. Seven of these radioactive legacy objects contain fissile materials, specifically spent nuclear fuel based on enriched uranium, and are classified as nuclear-hazardous. The most notable among them are three nuclear submarines: one of them, K-27, which had two nuclear liquid-metal reactors, was deliberately sunk in 1981 in Stepovoy Bay off the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. The other two submarines sank accidentally: K-278, known as the Komsomolets” in 1989 in the Norwegian Sea, and K-159 in 2003 in the Barents Sea.

Additionally, in the 1960s, five reactor compartments with shipborne and marine nuclear power plants were dumped in bays off the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. Two of these compartments contain spent nuclear fuel (SNF), as does a special container holding a shielding assembly with SNF elements from one of the reactors of the nuclear icebreaker “Lenin”. In the Novaya Zemlya depression of the Kara Sea, a barge was sunk containing an emergency reactor with SNF that had been removed from a nuclear submarine, designated Order No. 421.”

A vast amount of radioactive waste was either deliberately dumped or lost in accidents. What should we understand about this unpleasant legacy of the Soviet Union? Some reports suggest that, for example, radiation levels in the Black Sea or the Mediterranean are actually higher than in the Arctic. They argue that these reactors were designed with protective mechanisms, which are still functioning. They might remain intact for decades, or they may be undergoing erosion. How significant is the danger—both in terms of severity and scale?

– At the end of 2023, we conducted a brief review to summarize what is currently lying on the Arctic seabed and how dangerous it is. The information you mentioned is largely correct. I would even add that at one time, we conducted an extensive study of what was dumped, how much was dumped, and in which seas and trenches.

A map showing the locations of radioactive debris sunk by the Soviet Navy. This includes the K-27 and K-159 submarines, as well as the reactor compartments from the К-11, К-19, and К-140 submarines, as well as waste from the Lenin nuclear icebreaker.

To gather information, we met with people—many of whom are no longer alive—who were responsible for these dumpings. These were the officials who made the decisions. However, when we tried to get precise answers on the locations and quantities of dumped materials, many of them simply could not provide clear information. They told us that in some cases, the dumping was chaotic and unplanned.

For example, a barge carrying radioactive waste would be sent out to sea with orders to dump the waste at specific coordinates. But for various reasons—bad weather, technical issues, or simply arbitrary decisions by the crew—the waste was often dumped elsewhere.

Today, researchers investigating the Arctic seabed, particularly around Novaya Zemlya in the Kara Sea, often find that nothing is located at the official coordinates. As a result, we have only an approximate understanding of where the waste is. We have fairly good knowledge about the locations of large objects, particularly those containing spent nuclear fuel. But for smaller objects, we can only make rough estimates.

–Which objects pose the greatest threat?

When I chaired the Environmental Commission of the Public Council of the Rosatom State Corporation, experts worked on identifying which objects should be raised first based on their level of danger.

Experts unanimously agreed, and still insist, that the K-27 submarine must be raised first. The issue is not only the liquid-metal coolant used in its reactors but also the highly enriched nuclear fuel inside them. Unlike typical nuclear submarine reactors, which use thermal neutrons, K-27 had an intermediate neutron reactor requiring highly enriched fuel.

K-27 is a Soviet nuclear submarine, the only ship with liquid metal as a coolant. In September 1982, it was sunk in the Kara Sea off the northeastern coast of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago at the entrance to Stepovogo Bay. Photo: forum.moov-vmf.ru

Because of this, scientists, engineers, and nuclear specialists believe that K-27 should be the first to be raised—especially since it lies at a relatively shallow depth of around 40 meters.

For comparison, the K-140 is at a depth of 300 meters, the Komsomolets is at a depth of 1,000 meters.

There is no discussion about raising Komsomolets—it lies far too deep, and no country currently has the technology or resources to carry out such an operation. However, it is constantly monitored, as it not only has a nuclear reactor but also torpedoes with nuclear warheads. Monitoring missions are periodically conducted to assess radiation levels.

As for K-27, raising it would not be very difficult. In Gremikha, with the help of France, a unique facility was built specifically for unloading spent nuclear fuel from submarines with liquid-metal reactors. Handling SNF from such reactors requires specialized technology and equipment—something that only exists at this facility in Gremikha.

All other Soviet/Russian submarines that used liquid-metal reactors have had their fuel safely removed and transported to proper disposal sites. K-27 is the last one remaining. The Gremikha facility, built with French funding, was maintained for precisely this purpose.

Another submarine that must be raised is K-159, which sank in 2003.

The K-159 nuclear submarine at dock in Gremikha awaiting its final tow. Photo: Bellona

-Why does K-159 worry environmentalists?

– Unlike the other reactor compartments deliberately dumped around Novaya Zemlya (except K-27), those other compartments were at least properly prepared for long-term underwater storage. Special preparations were made to ensure that their reactors could remain submerged indefinitely with minimal leakage risk. However, K-159 sank accidentally while being towed for disposal and SNF removal.

It sank in a highly problematic location—near the entrance to the Kola Bay, an area with heavy civilian and fishing activity. This is a key fishing region where commercial vessels operate.

K-159 lies at a depth of 170 meters, and its reactors were not sealed for long-term underwater storage. Over time, the SNF inside its reactors will begin to leak, contaminating the surrounding waters.

– What needs to be done?

– The K-27 must be raised first because it contains highly enriched nuclear fuel. It lies at a manageable depth of 40 meters and the necessary technology for its safe dismantling already exists at Gremikha. K-159 must also be raised because it sank accidentally, without proper reactor sealing. It also lies near the entrance to the Kola Bay, in a critical fishing zone. If left in place, radioactive leakage will occur over time.

Before the war, these concerns were being discussed with international partners, particularly within the framework of the “Nuclear Window” initiative I mentioned earlier. MNEPR, which is now closed, would have played a role in these efforts. Now, however, Russia has been left alone to deal with these hazardous legacy sites. That is the current situation.

As for the other objects, they need to be monitored, and expeditions must be regularly sent to observe and track them—especially those containing spent nuclear fuel—to prevent leaks, contamination, and other hazards. This is a long and very meticulous process, but it must be carried out. This is the situation with the sunken and submerged objects.

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) Lighthouses

– I’d like to talk about another category of objects—lighthouses located along the Northern Sea Route that operate on radioisotope thermoelectric generators. Essentially, these are nuclear-powered lighthouses installed during Soviet times. They emit both a radio signal and a light beacon without requiring human presence. As I understand it, Rosatom is currently overseeing them. There have been some threats associated with them. In the mid-2000s, near Norilsk, one of these facilities was looted, and people searching for scrap metal literally discarded radioactive material after dismantling it. Could you talk about these lighthouses and such exotic threats from radioactive objects?

– Yes, this was another issue, related to the elimination of this legacy. However, unlike the sunken submarines, this was a civilian rather than military legacy. According to our information, all lighthouses with radiation sources have now been decommissioned. Norway primarily funded this process, while Japan and the U.S. contributed in the eastern regions.

A few of these lighthouses remained, and yes, there were cases where local scavengers found and tampered with them, leading to incidents like the one you mentioned. But as of now, these lighthouses no longer exist, so we consider this problem resolved and have written about it.

– To summarize, what can be said about the dangers if these objects are not dealt with? Over what time frame could they become a serious problem?

– According to our assessments and those of the designers of the K-27 submarine, they say that if we don’t raise K-27 within the next five years, we may have to reconsider and perhaps leave it untouched altogether. Why? Because it has been lying there since 1981, meaning 45 years have already passed.

The reactor compartment and its structural casing may lose integrity and begin to deteriorate. While a nuclear reactor is designed as a sealed pressure vessel, it still has various inlets and outlets for operational purposes.

Over 40-50 years, everything inevitably corrodes and weakens. The structure is deteriorating due to exposure to seawater. On the other hand, the radioactivity of the fuel is also decreasing over time, making it less hazardous—this is simply the physics of nuclear fuel, which undergoes decay after the nuclear reaction ceases.

Some experts have expressed concerns about the potential for a spontaneous chain reaction—essentially, a small nuclear explosion. They base this on the fact that the reactor fuel in K-27 is highly enriched.

It is difficult to say what exactly will happen, when it will happen, or how it will happen. However, those who argue that the next five years are critical still advocate for raising K-27 as soon as possible.

K-159, on the other hand, is more dangerous because fuel leakage will begin much sooner. As I mentioned, it was never prepared for long-term underwater storage. The reactors were not sealed, the submarine was not decontaminated, and no protective measures were taken.

Once fuel leakage begins, we will need to assess: The rate and intensity of the leakage, how long the leakage will continue, where the contamination will spread and how ocean currents will carry the radioactive material. This means that constant monitoring around K-159 is absolutely necessary.

Objects lying at a depth of 170 meters are, on the one hand, not extremely deep. However, on the other hand, we saw how difficult it was to raise the Kursk submarine. Russia did not have the resources to raise the Kursk alone and had to seek help from foreign partners.

So, how do they plan to raise K-159? I don’t know. To do this, they first need to develop all the necessary lifting equipment, which, unfortunately, does not yet exist. Perhaps they are working on it—perhaps not. Everything is quite secretive at the moment.

Can Russia continue cleanup on its own?

– That’s what I wanted to ask. Why the pessimism? Couldn’t the Russian Federation fund and carry out these operations on its own? Why is international cooperation necessary?

– Yes, of course, many people have argued that Russia should develop its own capabilities. Since the late 1990s, we have been saying that funding should not only be used for cleaning up contaminated sites but also for developing domestic technologies.

However, let’s take the Kursk disaster as an example. The Kursk sank in just 100 meters of water. That is nothing for a submarine of its size—it was nearly 100 meters long itself. I have spent a large part of my life serving on submarines. I know what 100 meters of water means for a submarine—it is nothing. And yet, Russia could not lift the Kursk alone. This was recent history.

Since then, we have not seen or heard of any significant developments in recovery technology. Maybe they exist. Maybe we just don’t know about them. But I highly doubt that Russia is prepared to lift K-159.

Meanwhile, Russia claims to be a great naval power. Recently, there was talk of developing a submarine tanker to transport liquefied natural gas. Some academician even announced plans to build an underwater gas carrier.However, there are no shipyards capable of building such vessels—they simply do not exist.

Currently, they are slightly deepening the Severodvinsk shipyard to accommodate the repair of modern submarines. The shipyard basin is being dredged, and everyone understands what needs to be done. But it hasn’t been completed yet. Maybe it will be.

Maybe new facilities will be built in the Russian Far East, where they are reconstructing the Zvezda shipyard. But for now, these capabilities do not exist. If they do develop them, great—then Russia can handle it alone.

The Role of International Oversight

– Would it be fair to say that international cooperation was important from a management perspective? It provided mutual oversight and accountability, making it harder to cut corners.

– Yes, absolutely. International involvement provided oversight. This is why we fought so hard to keep Norway involved in these projects until the very end. And it wasn’t just about Norwegian funding—it was about transparency and accountability.

For example, Andreeva Bay, where spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from Soviet submarines was stored, was an infamous environmental disaster zone. Handling SNF removal from crumbling Soviet-era storage facilities required constant vigilance.

Storage site for reactor compartments in Saida Bay.

I won’t call it control, because that’s too strong a word. But at least we needed to know what was happening—how the money was being spent, whether technologies were actually being used, and whether anything was getting done at all.

Because let’s be honest—in Russia, money can appear, and just as easily, it can disappear without a trace. That’s why international oversight was crucial—especially for public trust, both in Russia and abroad. People had a right to know how serious the risks were and whether taxpayer money was being used effectively to mitigate them.

– In your opinion, how much sense is there in terminating this cooperation, since we want to continue doing various things related to radioactive materials without any control? Can we recall 2019 – the accident with the Losharik deep-sea vehicle. Is this a factor or are these unrelated things? And does the process of neutralizing old radioactive waste not interfere with the production, testing, and dumping of new radioactive waste?

– I was a little surprised when I heard about the MNEPR being denounced, I was surprised that Russia agreed to close this program, because, strictly speaking, this program could remain for a long time, in case, let’s say, something changes. Well, I still believe that maybe in 10-15 years, maybe in 20, there will be changes, when this cooperation can once again be established. And this cooperation should be again; it is impossible to live behind the Iron Curtain.

What if, then, some projects are needed that need to be implemented, similar to those that were implemented earlier, and this program, it will already be ready. Because I remember how hard it was to get it going in the first place. Before this program was adopted, a lot of money was just lying around. It could not be used because there were no conditions and rules that I spoke about, these procedures were not agreed upon— judicial, tax, nuclear liability, and so on. This is very important.

This program, in fact, is about this, about these procedures mainly. And let it lie there, this already an agreed upon program, let these agreed upon procedures lie there and exist. This does not say anything about access to secret facilities. If, for example, you do not want to let someone in somewhere or share something, for example, your Losharik sank, well, it sank, just do not talk about it and especially do not let anyone in to have a look. There, in such questions about Losharik this program does not work, there is no international money there, so who did it bother? But they decided what they decided.

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Nuclear risks in the Russian Arctic during the war in Ukraine 3 Feb 2:52 AM (2 months ago)

Nuclear activity in the Arctic region of Russia has been ongoing for over 70 years. More than 100 nuclear tests were conducted here, and more than a hundred nuclear-powered submarines, military ships, and civilian vessels were built, operated, and decommissioned here. Several nuclear power plants, dozens of military bases, and other facilities with radioactive materials were built and still operate in the area. And, of course, there have been many radiation accidents.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of these facilities were left in a very dangerous state and comprised what we call the nuclear legacy. History shows that when a major nuclear state collapses due to economic problems and military expenses, it creates significant risks for everyone around it. We know it from the past. But we may face this again in the future when the Putin regime collapses, sooner or later.

Bellona has been actively involved in solving nuclear legacy problems for about 30 years, first simply drawing attention to them, and then actively promoting international assistance toward eliminating them.

Nuclear legacy issues still unresolved

The good news is that many of the nuclear legacy problems have been resolved, many with the help of international financial and technical assistance. European countries, including Norway, have spent about €2.5 billion to address these issues.

Among those, we can mention Sayda Bay, where reactor compartments of nuclear submarines are securely stored. And the nuclear service ship Lepse, a floating storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, which was finally disposed of last year.

A partially solved problem is Andreeva Bay. This former submarine base is a storage site for more than twenty thousand spent fuel assemblies of the Soviet Northern Fleet, just 40 km from the Norwegian border. The base has been brought to a safe state, and since 2016, half of the some 22,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies have already been removed from here. But the second half, which is more complex, remains.

The problem of scuttled nuclear hardware is no less important than Andreeva Bay. There are some 10 nuclear reactors at the bottom of the Arctic seas. The most dangerous are those aboard the sunken submarines K-27 and K-159.

Slide from Bellona presentation at Arctic Frontiers

The issue of raising them was discussed among Russia and foreign partners until 2022, when the war in Ukraine began. It is now unlikely that Russia will be able to raise them alone, both because it lacks the technology and money, and because it is no longer a priority for Moscow.

Last year Bellona published a special report about the nuclear legacy of the Russian Arctic where all these problems are discussed in detail.

Increased military activity in the Arctic and Nuclear escalation

Russia’s main focus now is to confront the West. Most of the nuclear legacy comes from past military programs, but nuclear militarization in the Arctic is still ongoing. By early 2025, the Russian Northern Fleet had accrued around 30 nuclear ships and submarines. The Navy remains the main operator of nuclear installations in the Russian Arctic. Among those are some 40 nuclear reactors—many more than the 25 reactors operated in a civilian capacity within the nuclear icebreaker fleet and at nuclear power plants.

And no less important are the 300 nuclear warheads on combat duty on strategic submarines. Russia spends $10 billion a year on its nuclear weapon programs. In recent decades, Russia has built over 10 new nuclear submarines and is developing new nuclear weapon carriers. This will create a new nuclear legacy in the future and poses risks of accidents during testing and operation today.

Among accidents with nuclear vessels over the past few decades, we must note the tragedy of the Kursk nuclear submarine, the sinking of the K-159 submarine, and a fire aboard the top-secret Losharik submarine. In 2019 the Burevestnik cruise missile, equipped with a nuclear reactor, suffered an accident that caused a radiation release in the Arkhangelsk region and killed five Rosatom engineers. These tests have now been moved to another site in the Arctic –the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago.

The Novaya Zemlya test site has seen 132 nuclear explosions. Fortunately, no full-scale nuclear tests have been conducted here since 1990. However, the site has never been officially closed and is deliberately kept open and ready for use. This is a part of Putin’s strategy to intimidate the West. In recent years, he has taken many of steps toward nuclear escalation.

Last year, in fact, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. And in a year, the New START treaty between the United States and Russia will expire. This means that, likely next year, for the first time in decades, we will find ourselves in a situation where there are no treaties between the two largest nuclear powers limiting their nuclear arsenals. Potentially, this will allow Russia to quickly place up to 100 additional nuclear warheads on existing submarines in the Arctic.

Unfortunately, if the nuclear escalation continues, we may well see the resumption of nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya within in a few years—the very activity that Bellona opposed 35 years ago.

Big plans for civilian nuclear programs in the Arctic

In addition to military activities, Russia is also developing civilian nuclear projects in the Arctic that are closely connected with the extractive projects in this region.

The primary example of civilian nuclear technology in the Arctic is Russia’s nuclear icebreaker fleet. These have been used on the Northern Sea Route for 65 years. Today, there are eight nuclear icebreakers working there, which exceeds what was in operation during Soviet times. Half of these icebreakers are new and were commissioned in the last five years—and Russia plans to build four more.

But in recent years, these plans have faced problems. First, the war in Ukraine has caused a breakdown in industrial cooperation with many European countries, including Ukraine itself. Second, there is less government funding for building icebreakers. And third, the region’s economic development, which needs icebreakers to forge forth, is occurring more slowly than expected. Last year, the plan was to transport 80 million tons of cargo along the Northern Sea Route. But in reality, shippers managed only half that amount.

Russia also broadly uses nuclear energy in the Arctic. Out of 11 nuclear power plants in Russia, three are located in this region. Two of them, Kola and Bilibino, have been working for more than 50 years. In the future, Russia plans to build five new nuclear power plants in the Arctic with a total number of reactors of up to 16.

Both in Soviet times and today, Russia has chosen the Arctic for special nuclear installations due to its extreme conditions. Currently, Rosatom is planning to build new reactor types in the Arctic that would be unlike anything built elsewhere in Russia. These technologies are being tested here with the goal of future export.

We can classify most of these projects as small modular reactors, which is a new direction in nuclear energy development that many countries are currently interested in, even Norway.

Most of these reactors in Russia are intended to power industrial projects in remote areas. However, the success of these projects depends on the export of extracted resources. With sanctions on Russia, it’s unlikely that all these projects will be completed.

Conclusions and Key Points

First, nuclear legacy issues are still dangerous and unresolved. In the current situation, nuclear cleanup projects may slow down or stop indefinitely.

Second, new risks arise from ongoing nuclear militarization of the Arctic.

Third, the lack of reliable information from Russia makes these problems even worse and more difficult to respond to. Bellona is working to address this by publishing analytical materials and monitoring the situation in the Russian Arctic and in Russian Nuclear industry in our monthly digests.

And last but not least. Sanctions and pressure on Russia are slowing its Arctic projects. Russian Arctic natural resources should be banned on the international markets both for environmental reasons and to limit Russia’s capacity to continue its war against Ukraine.

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Arctic Frontiers: The Russian Arctic in wartime 28 Jan 8:27 AM (2 months ago)

Enge’s remarks came at Bellona’s side event at the Arctic Frontiers conference, which convened on Monday in Tromsø, Norway. The 5,600-kilometer Northern Sea Route runs along Russia Arctic northern coast in an area characterized by vast distances and harsh winters. Should an accident occur along the artery, search and rescue missions would be severely hampered by the elements.

Major environmental consequences

Such scenarios would have catastrophic consequences for human crews aboard Arctic faring ships. It will also be very difficult to address oil spills along the route, which is also the habitat of a number of seabirds red listed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature.

“The oil booms we have cannot handle seas over two meters, or strong currents, or high winds,” said Enge. “They also cannot be effectively operated in darkness or sea ice. In other words, neither Russia or the other Arctic nations the technology to handle a major marine oil spill during the Arctic winter,” said Enge.

Russia’s shadow fleet

Bellona has recently been closely monitoring Russia’s shadow fleet, which consists of vessels used to circumvent Western sanctions using anonymous ships that bring Russian oil and gas to whatever markets are willing to pay. These often dilapidated vessels are not built to withstand Arctic waters, nor are they crewed by sailors trained to sail that far north.

“There are strict international regulations for which ships can sail in Arctic waters. A number of the vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet are grossly violating these regulations,” Enge said.

Bellona fears that transport along the Northern Sea Route will increase as Russia forges more illicit markets for their oil and gas. Such irresponsible practices dramatically increase the risk of a serious accident, and are a clear consequence of Western sanctions as Russia seeks to feed its war economy.

Deep dive into the Russian Arctic

The panel also highlighted the current situation in Russia’s extractive industry, nuclear activity in the Russian Arctic, as well as the situation for civil society. Among others, Bellona’s Ksenia Vakhrusheva spoke about how Russia is now going for more mineral and oil and gas extraction in the Arctic without considering any goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or reduce environmental consequences.

Download the presentations

Video of Bellona’s event at Arctic Frontiers

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VIDEO: Presentation of the Bellona’s new report, The IAEA’s Role in Time of War 22 Jan 11:59 PM (2 months ago)

On January 23, from 12:00 to 13:00 (GMT+2), Alexander Nikitin, nuclear advisor with The Bellona Foundation will host an online presentation of our new report on the role and actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the safety of Ukraine’s civilian nuclear facilities during the war since it began in 2022.

The war between two major nations that possess nuclear technology and civilian nuclear facilities is now in its third year. The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces caught the international community off guard. For the first time, we are witnessing the armed seizure of one country’s civilian nuclear facilities by another. At the war’s beginning, Russian forces occupied and then plundered the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant complex and seized Europe’s largest nuclear facility, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. How the International Atomic Energy Agency functioned in these conditions, what capabilities it had, and how the agency deployed them is a question of great interest to politicians, experts, and the public alike.

The report, analyzing the IAEA’s actions since the war began, offers Bellona’s assessment of the agency’s effectiveness as a UN body. It seeks to understand the IAEA’s capabilities within its granted authority at different periods of the war and in various situations involving nuclear facilities. It also examines the professional relationships between the IAEA’s governing bodies and officials from the warring nations. The report aims to invite interested parties to a discussion on how to ensure nuclear and radiation safety at civilian nuclear facilities during and after war.

As an environmental organization, Bellona aims to foster dialogue about international nuclear safety in the 21st century. In Bellona’s view, it is time to discuss how international organizations, such as the IAEA and others, should act to ensure the safety of civilian nuclear facilities in a new era of political and military conflicts.

“The purpose of Bellona’s report is to summarize and discuss information on how the international safety system functions today in wartime conditions,” says the author of the report, Bellona’s Alexander Nikitin.

During the live broadcast, Nikitin will share findings and details from the report. After his presentation, there will be a Q&A session where all attendees can participate via the chat feature.

Registering for the presentation will allow you to submit your question in advance and receive a notification with a YouTube link when the broadcast begins. If your question cannot be answered live, you will receive a written response the following day, so be sure to register early.

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Facts, Figures, and Reach 14 Jan 5:22 AM (3 months ago)

Throughout the past year, our mission at the Bellona Environmental Transparency Center has focused on two key, but intertwined issues—nuclear and radiation safety as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drags on, and the worldwide influence of Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, which itself is actively involved in the war and has participated in the occupation of a Ukrainian nuclear power plant.

We have studied issues of nuclear safety for 30 years, first within Russia, where one of our representatives chaired the Public Council’s Environmental Commission of Rosatom, influencing the corporation’s environmental decisions. Then—after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine made our work in the country impossible—from Vilnius, where we continue to identify and address issues of radioactive waste management and radiation safety.

This new geography demanded we adjust our approach. But now, two years after this shift, we remain one of a vanishingly small number of analytical teams throughout the world with expertise embedded in the Russian-speaking context.

Over the past year, we published three reports, 11 nuclear digests, and 34 articles in English and Russian. These publications covered nuclear energy issues, Rosatom’s role during the war and in international energy markets, and nuclear safety at facilities during the war in Ukraine.

We also devoted no small part of our analysis to developments in the Russian Arctic. This stems from our long commitment to the Murmansk area, where, before the war, Bellona maintained one of its oldest offices. After all major environmental organizations were expelled from Russia and pressure increased on local eco-activists and indigenous communities, there are scant few left to document, analyze and contribute to the solution of environmental problems in this region—thus our continued focus.

Immersed in the Russian-speaking context, Bellona staff understand that, despite sanctions and growing international isolation, the Russian Arctic will see continued exploitation by oil, gas and mineral concerns, as well as environmental batterings from increased shipping along the Northern Sea Route. Sunken and submerged nuclear and radiation-hazardous objects are also part of the Arctic region’s complicated environmental profile.

This means environmental risks will inevitably increase while other Arctic states have fewer resources and tools for international pressure. Climate change and pollution from activities in the Russian North could negatively impact the entire Arctic region. Someone had to continue addressing these issues and speaking out in the West. We were among the few to take this mission on.

In 2024, we published two reports, released 10 Arctic digests, and authored 17 articles in two languages. These analyzed factors related to Russia’s activities in the Arctic, highlighting pollution risks and their influence on global climate change. During this time, we built expertise and found our voice in the media.

Key Themes Analyzed by Our Experts in 2024:

Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Rosatom’s Role in Energy Markets

Nuclear safety issues raised during the war were addressed at a forum at Bellona’s Oslo office, entitled “Russia, Ukraine, and Rosatom during the War,” in early 2024. This event brought together our experts, as well as outside analysts, and journalists from Norway.

“We are currently witnessing a full-scale war in a country with nuclear facilities, under conditions where international cooperation on nuclear safety no longer exists,” stated Bellona founder Frederic Hauge during his opening remarks.

Risks of Restarting Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)

The largest nuclear plant in Europe, occupied by Russian forces in 2022, remains a concern. We conducted an analysis and presented a report on the technical and political aspects of a potential ZNPP restart. Throughout the year, we monitored and wrote about developments at and around the plant in our nuclear digests and articles.

Monitoring Nuclear Safety Events Related to Russia and Ukraine

Following Ukraine’s offensive in the Kursk region on August 6, Bellona evaluated the risks and provided warnings about the potential consequences of a seizure or attack on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant.

The Role of the IAEA in Times of War

In our latest report, we analyzed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s actions throughout the Ukraine crisis, stipulating that its existence is insufficient to prevent attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. This is due to the agency’s dependence on its 178 member states, including Russia, which limits its ability to criticize, investigate, or prevent actions threatening nuclear and radiation safety.

Review of Nuclear Legacy Sites in the Russian Arctic

Bellona also prepared an overview of developments at nuclear legacy sites in the Russian Arctic in 2022-2023. This included analyzing activities at the former military base in Andreyev Bay which is home to much spent nuclear fuel from submarines, and assessing the condition of nuclear and radiation-hazardous objects scuttled by the Soviets in Arctic seas.
We summarized interim results and discussed the consequences for nuclear safety projects following the announcement of Russia’s official withdrawal from the International Agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR), ratified by Russia in 2003. The agreement regulated the use of billions of dollars in international funding from the U.S., EU member states, and other countries to address the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union on Russian territory.
Throughout the year, Bellona monitored changes in global nuclear fuel production and supply chains, particularly measures by the U.S. and several EU countries to reduce dependency on Russian imports. Bellona experts believe that, due to the political situation and the war in Ukraine, the nuclear fuel market for Soviet-designed reactors in the EU will undergo significant changes over the next five years. The volume of enriched uranium purchased by the U.S. is also expected to decrease.
Nevertheless, preparing for upcoming changes, the EU purchased Russian nuclear fuel worth €686 million in 2023, doubling its imports. We were the first to analyze this process, publishing a detailed report on the topic at the start of the year. Similar transformations are occurring in the international uranium market. In the first half of 2024, President Joe Biden signed a law banning imports of Russian enriched uranium into the U.S. Earlier, it was announced that five American companies are resuming uranium mining in Texas, Wyoming, Arizona, and Utah. Our experts believe the new U.S. law could become the most significant restriction for Rosatom.

Analysis of Rosatom’s International Markets

Bellona experts also analyzed Rosatom’s presence in other international markets. It is likely that Moscow will remain India’s largest—and only foreign—partner in the nuclear sector. Furthermore, the corporation is making significant efforts to participate in the construction of nuclear power plants in former Soviet states and many other places around the world, and is currently building reactors in a host of countries both in Europe and in Asia.

Environmental Protection in the Arctic

Environmental issues in the Arctic returned to the forefront as Norway assumed the Arctic Council chairmanship following Russia’s tenure. Bellona, as an Oslo-based organization, responded immediately. At the beginning of the year, our representatives met with the Council Chair Morten Høglund. Shortly after the meeting, the Clean Arctic Alliance, of which Bellona is a member, published an open letter emphasizing the need to reduce black carbon emissions and urging Norway, as the Council’s chair, to facilitate the adoption of measures to achieve this goal.

At the beginning of the year, Bellona published an English-language report on the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, assessing its production and use as marine fuel in the Russian Arctic. We examined the impact of international sanctions on the future development of LNG extraction. Our analysis revealed that EU countries continued actively importing Russian fossil fuels, making the EU one of Russia’s trading partners indirectly financing the war.

According to our report, the largest Russian gas producer, Gazprom, is simultaneously the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the Arctic, primarily methane, significantly contributing to global climate change.

Arctic Development and Resource Extraction

We prepared a comprehensive review of key documents defining Russian Arctic policy until 2035. The region, occupying nearly one-third of Russia’s territory, operates under laws distinct from the rest of the country. The extractive industries in the Russian Arctic are developing rapidly, increasing the burden on fragile northern ecosystems. Russia exports resources extracted from the region to fund the war.
Every month, we tracked and published updates on changes in Russian legislation, industrial company plans, events on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), international sanctions, and accidents in the Russian Arctic. The NSR is becoming increasingly opaque, with shadow fleet tankers transporting oil and LNG along the route, data about which is absent from official Northern Sea Route Administration records.
In September, we wrote an open letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre ahead of his visit to China warning him about the climate, environmental, and political risks of using the NSR and urged him to convey to Chinese authorities that Norway does not support the development of shipping along the route.

Black Carbon and Arctic Shipping Fuel

In mid-summer, with some exceptions, a voluntary agreement banning the use and transport of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic, developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a UN body regulating global shipping, came into effect. The agreement is set to be fully implemented by 2029. The only Arctic country that did not join the agreement and has not announced its own plans to ban HFO in the Arctic is Russia. From 2015 to 2019, black carbon emissions in the Arctic increased by 85%, as reported in our articles and reports.

The Scale of Bellona’s Activities Today

Today, leading media outlets and think tank experts reach out to us for a better understanding of developments in nuclear safety or the Russian Arctic. Through collaboration with journalists, we managed to share our analyses with the audiences of 30 different media outlets over the past year, with a combined reach of several million people. These include printed interviews, articles, our own materials on other platforms, podcast appearances, and YouTube channel discussions. Among others, our opinions and analysis appeared in Foreign Policy, Der Spiegel, The Barents Observer, The Moscow Times, Deutsche Welle, Meduza, and The Insider.

Our materials were cited by 52 publications, including Politico, Nucnet, Forbes, NL Times, and others. Our analysis appeared in 17 academic and expert publications and digests, including at the The Stimson Center, Russia Matters, Nuclear Transparency Watch, The Arctic Institute, the World Nuclear Report, NATO, the Central European Institute of Asian Studies, and other think tanks. The combined audience for our publications includes hundreds of thousands of English- and Russian-speaking readers across Europe and Ukraine, many of whom are engaged in addressing political, economic, and intellectual challenges related to state security, risk forecasting, and mitigating environmental threats.

Our nuclear and Arctic digests, with an open rate of over 60%, are read monthly by more than 180 experts, including NGO staff, academics, intelligence officers, think tank analysts, advisors, and officials from Western governments. Bellona.org, our main organizational website, attracted 236,000 unique users last year, generating 500,000 page views. Our articles on nuclear safety rank among the top publications on these topics.

Over the past year, we hosted six presentation events with a combined audience of more than 250 experts and held over ten meetings with stakeholders interested in the issues Bellona covers. Our experts participated in seven specialized events, including the Arctic Circle Forum in Berlin; the joint Fjum and Presseclub Concordia seminar, “The Struggle for the Arctic: Climate Change, Economy, Security. What Happens in the Arctic Affects Everyone,” in Vienna; the COP29 Climate Conference; the Nuclear Energy and Climate Change Seminar in Prague; the 9th European Nuclear Industry Congress 2024 (ENIC 2024); the PWR Prague Conference; and the Arctic Frontiers Conference in Tromsø, Norway, among others.

Connecting with Russian Civil Society

Following the closure of our offices in Russia, we strive to maintain ties with Russian civil society. Despite repression, censorship, and our organization’s designation as “undesirable” by Russian authorities, we continue to inform the public about the environmental consequences of the war in Ukraine and the state of Russia’s environmental community. Some posts on our Russian-language Telegram channel reach tens of thousands of views. Our Russian-language newsletters are read by more than 250 people, some of whom remain in Russia and who know that Bellona materials are officially banned.

We continue to publish the journal Ecology and Law, one of the oldest environmental journals, originally produced by Bellona in Russia since 2002, and since 2022, in Lithuania. The journal addresses issues related to environmental protection and citizens’ environmental rights, featuring reports, articles, and interviews with experts.

The journal has more than 100 subscribers, with print runs of 200 to 450 copies, which are quickly distributed at our events. The entire archive is available as PDF files on a dedicated website, where issues can be downloaded at any time. In May this year, we presented a new issue in Berlin, focusing on Russia’s environmental movement, and at the end of the year, we dedicated the journal to environmental crimes. Its presentation is planned for early 2025.

Goals and Plans for 2025

We plan to continue analyzing information and publishing articles and reports on environmental issues in the Russian Arctic, nuclear and radiation safety in Russia and Ukraine. We will monitor Rosatom’s projects in Europe and worldwide. We will also advocate for the public’s right to access reliable information about the environment.

A key goal of our office is to leverage our knowledge of the Russian context and experience in international environmental work, as well as insights from our colleagues in Bellona offices in Oslo, Brussels, and Berlin, to provide the global community with the most relevant and objective information on the issues Bellona addresses today.

Bellona is part of global efforts to ensure a safe and environmentally responsible future. We look forward to potential collaboration with those reading this text and financial support for our projects from major donors who find the issues Bellona experts work on to be important.

The organization maintains an active presence on major social media platforms, including X (formerly Twitter), LinkedIn, Telegram, and YouTube. You can also subscribe to our newsletters here.

The post Facts, Figures, and Reach appeared first on etc.bellona.org.

EU and US reduce Russian uranium and nuclear fuel purchases in 2024 13 Jan 11:11 PM (3 months ago)

Overall, imports of uranium and nuclear fuel from Russia to Western countries actually dropped sharply in 2024. Unlike the situation in Germany, this is already an established trend.

Supplies to Germany

On January 3, Spiegel newspaper, citing data from the Ministry for Environment, Energy, and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony, reported that “despite the war in Ukraine, at least 68.6 tons of uranium were imported from Russia to Germany in 2024, almost 70% more than in 2023.” According to the ministry, the material was supplied to the fuel element production plant owned by Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) in the Lower Saxon town of Lingen. ANF is a subsidiary of the French company Framatome. The same day, this news was disseminated by the Russian state news agency TASS.

We have already extensively covered the Lingen plant and its crucial role in diversifying nuclear fuel supplies for European-based, Soviet-built VVER reactors in a recent article. At this Framatome plant, in cooperation with Rosatom, efforts are underway to establish licensed production of fuel for Soviet-designed VVER reactors, for which Rosatom is currently the main supplier, with Westinghouse being the only alternative Western supplier.

At the Lingen plant, like most nuclear fuel facilities globally, enriched uranium is used as raw material. It is then processed into fuel pellets, and subsequently into specially designed fuel rods and assemblies tailored to each type of nuclear reactor, which are then shipped as nuclear fuel to various nuclear power plant operators.

Imports of Nuclear Fuel from Russia to the EU (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Finland; Bulgaria’s data excluded due to incompleteness), tons. Source: Eurostat

The Lingen plant has produced nuclear fuel for Western-designed reactors for many years. The sharp rise in supplies from Russia last year might raise concerns among the German and European public—and delight within Russian propaganda— but such fluctuations in the supply of these products are not uncommon.

However, the overall trend shows a decline in imports of enriched uranium from Russia to Germany (see chart). This is largely due to the closure of Germany’s last nuclear power plants in 2023. Nevertheless, the Lingen plant continues to supply fuel to foreign nuclear power plants. Moreover, the 68 tons of uranium supplied from Russia are sufficient to produce fuel for only 3-4 large reactors annually (there are about 100 in the EU), and for the Lingen plant itself—and these supplies account for only about a quarter of all its foreign raw material imports. Thus, the EU or specifically Germany cannot be said to have significant dependency on these Russian supplies.

Purchases by France, the EU, and the US

There is a broader trend that is even more interesting. Within the EU in 2024, low-enriched uranium from Russia was purchased primarily by French companies—about 30 tons were imported directly to France, and up to 70 tons were purchased by the French-owned plant in Germany. According to Eurostat data available as of January 7, 2025, total imports throughout the first 10 months of 2024 amounted to less than 100 tons of low-enriched uranium—less than half of the figure for 2023 (about 250 tons) and significantly lower than imports for 2022 and 2021, which ranged from 430 to 480 tons.

The share of Russiаn low-enriched uranium supplies to the EU dropped to 15% in 2024, compared to over 50% in some years before 2022. Other major importers of Russian low-enriched uranium in the past, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, ceased purchases from Russia back in 2022. Thus, while France remains almost the sole buyer of enriched uranium from Russia, it too has drastically reduced its purchases in recent years.

Supplies of Enriched Uranium from Russia to the EU (excluding the UK) from 2022 to 2024, excluding uranium supplied within nuclear fuel, in tons. Source: Eurostat

While 2024 data is still incomplete and Eurostat has not yet accounted for imports in November and December—which could slightly increase total imports from Russia for the year—it is unlikely that these two months will significantly change the overall trend. Europe is gradually reducing its reliance on Russian enriched uranium. Rosatom’s competitors, such as Urenco and Orano, are solidifying their hold on the European enrichment market and expanding their capacities.

A similar pattern is observed in the US, where, according to Comtrade international trade data, imports of enriched uranium from Russia amounted to only about 312 tons in the first nine months of 2024—less than half of the total imports from Russia in 2023 (over 700 tons).

Decline in Nuclear Fuel Supplies

A similar downward trend in the supplies of nuclear fuel for Soviet-designed VVER reactors, 19 of which operate in EU countries, was also observed in 2024. Bellona was one of the first to report last year that the EU significantly increased nuclear fuel purchases for VVER reactors from Russia in 2023, doubling them to stockpile against potential supply disruptions during the transition to new suppliers.

This growth is also explained by the increase in supplies of natural uranium enrichment services offered by Russia, which is reflected in the Euratom Supply Agency’s annual report for 2023, as these components were included in the supply of Russian fuels as a final product.

However, Eurostat data for the first 10 months of 2024 indicate that purchases of nuclear fuel declined again last year, almost halving to levels closer to the pre-2023 average of 300-360 tons. Given that all Russian nuclear fuel buyers in the EU signed contracts for alternative supplies last year, and some, like Bulgaria and Finland, have already begun using alternative fuel, new peaks in Russian nuclear fuel purchases are unlikely.

Conclusions and Forecasts

Although these figures are based on preliminary and incomplete data for 2023, we can conclude that the EU is gradually reducing its imports from Russia in the nuclear fuel sector. However, concerns remain over the pace of diversification and licensing issues at the Lingen plant.

Monitoring market dynamics in recent years and reviewing 2024 figures confirm our earlier predictions. When we consider current supply replacement contracts, we can surmise that by 2030, nuclear fuel imports from Russia to the EU may drop by at least 60% from 2022 levels—or below 100 tons annually. A similar forecast applies to uranium enrichment services. Moreover, when we account for plans announced by Urenco and Orano in the US and EU to expand capacities, Western countries will have ample opportunity to reduce their dependence on Russian uranium enrichment services by at least threefold over the next five years, to a level of less than 10% the total volume of purchases.

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This German Town Could Decide the Future of EU Reliance on Russian Nuclear Fuel 9 Jan 12:20 AM (3 months ago)

The following op-ed, written by Bellona’s nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov, originally appeared in The Moscow Times.

Currently, 19 nuclear power units with Soviet-designed VVER reactors operate within the EU, all of which use Russian nuclear fuel. All operators of these plants’ operators have already signed new contracts with alternative suppliers — the U.S. company Westinghouse or the French company Framatome.

However, Framatome intends to supply Russian fuel assembled under a Rosatom license in the coming years. These plans have sparked heated debates that have brewed for some time.

On November 20-23, 2024, a public hearing was held in Lingen, Germany to discuss proposals for the licensed production of Russian nuclear fuel for VVER reactors in the EU. Framatome plans to expand production at the Lingen fuel fabrication plant, operated by its subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) in collaboration with the Russian company TVEl, a subsidiary fully owned by state-owned Rosatom. After ANF’s submitted license expansion application to the Lower Saxony Environment Ministry became publicly available in early 2024, approximately 11,000 objections were filed against the plans for expansion and cooperation with Russia.

To address these objections, the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment organized a meeting of 400 people between November 20-23. However, it remains unclear what decision will be made on the fate of the license and when.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the imposition of extensive sanctions on various sectors of the country’s economy, the issue of reducing Europe’s dependence on Russia’s nuclear industry became critical. Currently, 19 nuclear power units with Soviet and Russian-designed VVER reactors operating in Finland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary use Russian nuclear fuel. The only alternative supplier for these reactors is currently Westinghouse, which has already assisted Ukraine’s transition away from Russian fuel for half of its nuclear units before 2022 and now supplies fuel for all nine operational units under Ukraine’s control.

The French nuclear fuel manufacturer Framatome does not yet possess its own technology for producing fuel for VVER reactors. However, it does have a long history of collaboration with Rosatom. Notably, in the early 1990s, the French nuclear fuel giant Areva (later Framatome) organized the licensed production of nuclear fuel for Western European nuclear power plants at the Russian MSZ plant in Elektrostal. Over several decades of cooperation, several thousand Russian-French fuel assemblies were produced for NPPs in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Britain.

Furthermore, enriched uranium and fuel pellets (used to assemble fuel rods) are still being supplied from Russia to the plant in Lingen to produce fuel for Western nuclear power plants. Since there are currently no sanctions or restrictions on the import of these products from Russia to the EU, such deliveries continued even after 2022. For example, according to data from the German authorities, three shipments of fuel pellets were sent from the MSZ plant to Lingen throughout 2023 and 2024.

In January 2023, Framatome and Russia’s TVEL jointly established European Hexagonal Fuel SAS, registered in France, to license Russian fuel technologies. In March 2023, Framatome applied for permission to produce hexagonal fuel assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors in Lingen. This initiative eventually received over 11,000 objections and led to public hearings in November 2024, while the Ministry for the Environment has yet to respond.

Critics of the project cite security threats as one of their main objections since Russian specialists will be present at the plant to deliver and commission equipment, as they were in the spring of 2024. Critics worry that granting Russians access to a German nuclear fuel production facility could be exploited by Moscow for industrial espionage or even sabotage, as these people will be employees of the Rosatom state corporation which is actively involved in military operations in Ukraine and the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. According to several German anti-nuclear organizations, this could provide the Kremlin with intelligence to carry out provocations or sabotage at European nuclear power plants.

Christian Meyer, the Lower Saxony Environment Minister who is responsible for deciding on the license application, has repeatedly said publicly that he shares protestors’ concerns and takes the security threats associated with potential collaboration between the plant and Rosatom structures very seriously.

However, the question remains why after more than a year and a half of reviewing the application, the license still has not been denied. Perhaps the complexity of the legal justification and German thoroughness prevent making the simple, swift and obvious decision to deny the license, especially given the current political climate.

Along with the specific security concerns raised, it is worth considering the role and prospects of this production within the broader context of the West’s nuclear industry and energy sector’s move to sever ties with Moscow. How necessary, really, is this joint project with Russia for Europe and the French company?

Russia and Rosatom’s economic motives are understandable. The export of nuclear fuel for European VVER reactors brought Rosatom approximately €300–700 million ($310-731 million) annually. A licensing deal with Framatome could retain at least part of this revenue, as direct deliveries of Russian fuel are expected to cease in the near future.

Currently, the only alternative supplier of nuclear fuel for VVER-1000 and VVER-440 reactors is the North American company, Westinghouse. The company has its own licensed technology and many years of experience supplying fuel for VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine. In 2024, this fuel began to be loaded into a power unit at the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria, with deliveries expected to a unit in the Czech Republic by the end of the year.

Fuel for the continent’s 15 VVER-440 reactors was developed later. Still, Westinghouse began delivering fuel to two units at the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine in late 2023, and starting in mid-2024, ahead of schedule, to the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in Finland.

The French company Framatome, the world’s second-largest supplier of nuclear fuel after Westinghouse, does not yet have its own independent technology for VVER reactor fuel despite working on its development since 2018. According to the company’s plans presented at the PWR Prague 2024 conference, the development of its fuel for VVER-1000 reactors is scheduled to be completed in 2025, and for VVER-440 reactors in 2028.

At the same time, Framatome has already signed contracts to supply fuel for VVER-440 reactors in Slovakia and Hungary from 2027. Plans were also announced to supply fuel for the VVER-1000 reactors of the Temelín NPP in the Czech Republic from 2024 and for Unit 6 at the Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria from the end of 2025.

Thus, for both types of VVER reactors, Framatome will not be able to complete its own fuel development on time, lagging behind by at least 1-2 years, and will only be able to fulfill its contractual obligations on schedule by using licensed Russian fuel assemblies. The only exception may be the fuel supply to Bulgaria next year.

Without cooperation with Rosatom, Framatome risked losing these contracts, which could have either gone to Westinghouse or been extended with Rosatom. However, it remains uncertain whether Westinghouse could have expanded fuel production sufficiently within 2-3 years to meet the demand. Therefore, expanding the license for the Lingen plant is crucial for Framatome to fulfill its multi-million euro obligations under existing contracts, particularly in Slovakia and Hungary.

It would undoubtedly benefit Europe’s energy security to eliminate any critical dependence on fuel supplies from Russia as quickly as possible. To expedite the development of alternative supplies, Euratom has supported two projects aimed at developing and implementing alternative fuel for VVER reactors.

In January 2023, the Accelerated Program for Implementation of Secure VVER Fuel Supply (APIS) was launched, followed by the Safe and Alternative VVER European Project (SAVE) in June 2024. Both projects received €10 million in financial support from the EU, with participation from all VVER reactor operators in five EU countries. The main difference between the two projects is that the first is led by Westinghouse, while the second is led by Framatome.

Of course, competition and the presence of at least two alternative suppliers provide greater flexibility and choice for end customers, as well as ensuring the security of future supplies. However, the business interests of individual companies may conflict with the policy of cutting ties with Russia, leading to overt or covert cooperation with Rosatom, especially as there are no EU-level sanctions against this cooperation.

Theoretically, by compromising the principles of free market competition, the EU could issue a directive requiring operators of VVER reactors to stop purchasing nuclear fuel produced by or through cooperation with Russia at a similar timeframe to the delayed U.S. ban on buying enriched Russian Uranium, as part of the next EU sanctions package related to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

It is true this would lead to signing contracts with the sole supplier, Westinghouse. However, combined with the requirement for shorter contracts (not immediately for 10 years, but perhaps for 5 years, for example), this would make it possible in future, when Framatome completes its fuel development (possibly even sooner than currently stated), to move to a competitive selection of Western suppliers and greater supply stability.

Framatome’s constant emphasis that it is the only company that can develop truly sovereign European fuel, since Westinghouse is from North America (owned by Canadian companies, with its headquarters in the U.S.), is not entirely fair. After all, Westinghouse’s fuel production facilities for VVER reactors are located entirely in the EU — at a plant in Sweden, with the involvement of the Spanish company Enusa. In the future, more production will take place in Ukraine.

The imbalance in Westinghouse’s favor could have been mitigated by creating a unified project under the auspices of Euratom for the development, implementation, and licensing of fuel for VVER reactors, rather than two separate projects like APIS and SAFE. However, such flexible solutions were not found, and sanctions on Russian fuel at the EU level (which would advantage Westinghouse) would likely have been blocked by France and Hungary.

This is why Framatome is currently trying to secure a portion of the market, even at the cost of cooperation with Rosatom, with which European nuclear power plant operators want to sever ties. However, it is not surprising that Paris’ Hungarian partners, who have ordered French-Russian fuel, see nothing wrong with this cooperation, as Hungary remains the only EU country where Rosatom is carrying out a construction project.

It is unclear how much more time the German authorities will need to make a decision about the Lingnen plant’s license. However, even if the license is denied, Framatome may still have the opportunity to try to set up a licensed assembly of Russian fuel at its plant in France or even under a different brand at Rosatom’s plant in Russia.

All of these risks could have been avoided only with official EU sanctions on the supply of Russian fuel. However, the business interests of companies, the political decisions of certain countries and the unwillingness to seek more flexible and compromise-based approaches leave us with the situation as it is.

As a result, the issue of the security of future fuel supplies has moved from the high offices of EU leaders to the hearing room in Lingen, where local residents and activists voiced in no uncertain terms what diplomats have struggled to express in milder form over the past few years. Now the decision rests once more with diplomats, lawyers and officials from the Lower Saxony Environment Ministry.

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Russia’s Chernobyl-style reactors to keep operating until the end of the decade 6:05 AM (4 hours ago)

Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, February 2025 14 Apr 5:03 AM (2 days ago)

In this issue:

Northern sea route and shipping

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian arctic

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

Bellona Nuclear Digest. February 2025 8 Apr 12:25 AM (8 days ago)

In this issue:

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for February 2025

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Russia rebuffs US notion of taking over embattled Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant 7 Apr 2:50 AM (9 days ago)

Nuclear Crimes without Punishment: Why Are World Mechanisms Powerless? 5 Apr 3:23 AM (11 days ago)

Could the US assume control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant? 25 Mar 1:00 AM (22 days ago)

Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, January 2025 24 Mar 6:34 AM (23 days ago)

In this issue:

Northern sea route and shipping

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

Bellona Nuclear Digest. January 2025 20 Mar 2:08 AM (27 days ago)

In this issue:

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for January 2025

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Enriched Uranium Fuels Russia’s War Machine. But the US Still Imports It 18 Mar 8:02 AM (29 days ago)

Rosatom head says Russia will restart seized Ukrainian nuclear plant 4 Mar 12:01 AM (last month)

Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic, December 2024 24 Feb 2:49 AM (last month)

In this issue:

Northern Sea Route and shipping

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic

Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic

Bellona Nuclear Digest. November-December 2024 19 Feb 2:51 AM (last month)

In this issue:

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

Commentary by Bellona:

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona:

Commentary by Bellona: